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Abstract 
 
This thesis is chiefly concerned with understanding the reasons behind British 
foreign policy towards Palestine between the invasion in December 1917 and final 
withdrawal in May 1948. It applies Poliheuristic Decision (Ph) Theory to British 
Cabinet decision-making at four critical junctures in foreign policy decision-making 
during this time period, arguing that contrary to the established literature on Mandate 
Palestine, British Cabinet policy reflected a stark lack of viable alternatives that left 
little room for consideration of personal biases, allegiances or sentimental attachment 
to either Zionism or Arab nationalism during the decision-making process. This 
reveals how crucial decisions concerning the future of Palestine were frequently more 
concerned with fighting narrow, domestic or broader, international political battles 
than preventing or dealing with a burgeoning conflict in a tiny strip of land on the 
Mediterranean. In so doing, this thesis aims to elucidate previously neglected areas of 
the British Mandate for Palestine as well as highlight some of the problems with Ph 
theory as a bridging framework between Rational Choice and cognitive models, while 
contributing new and innovative case studies to the field of Foreign Policy Analysis. 
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 5 
Introduction 
 
“All we have to do is not to mix ourselves up with religious squabbles”.1 
Sir Mark Sykes, British diplomat, 1915. 
 
The British Empire controlled Palestine for little more than thirty years (1917-
1948), but during that time had an enormous impact on the course of its future 
development, fostering the creation of a Jewish national home and suppressing Arab 
rebellion. This thesis is chiefly concerned with understanding the reasons behind 
British foreign policy towards Palestine – high policy decided by the cabinet in 
Westminster and not the day-to-day policy of administering the territory, which was 
conducted chiefly through the bureaucracy of the Colonial Office.  As such, this thesis 
illustrates four case studies, critical junctures of foreign policy decision-making 
between the beginning of Britain’s occupation in December 1917 and its withdrawal 
from Palestine in May 1948. It argues that, contrary to the established literature on 
Mandate Palestine, British high policy reflected a stark lack of viable alternatives that 
left little room for consideration of personal biases, allegiances or sentimental 
attachment to either Zionism or Arab nationalism during the decision-making process, 
revealing that decisions made about the future of Palestine were frequently more 
concerned with fighting narrow, domestic or broader, international political battles 
than preventing or dealing with a burgeoning conflict in a tiny strip of land on the 
Mediterranean.  
As previous studies have been focused chiefly on day-to-day interactions in 
Palestine, they have relied heavily on original documentation of the Palestine 
Administration, the High Commissioner and his dealings with the Colonial Office in 
London, as well as the diaries and memoirs of prominent Zionist leaders such as 
                                                 
1 CAB 24/1, 16 December 1915, “Evidence of Lieutenant Colonel Sir Mark Sykes, Bart., M.P., on the 
Arab Question”, The National Archives, Kew (hereafter TNA). 
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Chaim Weizmann and David Ben-Gurion. This has meant that academic discussion of 
British policy decisions made during the Mandate has been conducted almost 
exclusively through the prism of external parties’ perceptions. As this thesis seeks to 
elucidate specifically British decision-making, the focus has been placed on British 
archives as well as particular relevant collections held in the United States that are 
useful for examining the post-war Mandate period.  
Additionally, while the established literature on Mandate Palestine has left 
complex British motives and goals largely unexplored – this is discussed in greater 
detail in Chapter One – a relative neglect shown by relevant studies of British foreign 
policy of the use of theoretical frameworks confounds the situation.2 In order to 
understand the “simultaneously fragmented and unitary character” of foreign policy-
making, as well as generalise findings to the wider field of international relations (IR), 
it is necessary to engage with theories that address the role of governmental choice.3 
Consequently, this thesis applies one theory of governmental choice to archival 
documents in order to draw a line between what did and did not determine decision-
making. This approach is anchored in the subfield of IR: Foreign Policy Analysis 
(FPA), and utilises the theoretical framework of Poliheuristic Decision (Ph) Theory. 
In so doing, this thesis aids a more complete understanding of the British 
Mandate for Palestine, contributes innovative case studies to FPA, and demonstrates a 
useful and widely applicable framework for the study of foreign policy decision-
                                                 
2 Charles Ronald Middleton, The Administration of British Foreign Policy 1782-1846 (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1977); Matthew Hughes, Allenby and British Strategy in the Middle East (London: 
Frank Cass, 1999); Bruce Westrate, The Arab Bureau: British Policy in the Middle East 1916-1920 
(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992); Richard Grayson, Austen Chamberlain 
and the Commitment to Europe: British Foreign Policy 1924-29 (London: Frank Cass, 1997); John 
Darwin, Britain, Egypt and the Middle East: Imperial Policy in the Aftermath of War 1918-1922 
(London: Macmillan, 1981); Paul Doerr, British Foreign Policy 1919-1939 (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1998); Philip Reynolds, British Foreign Policy in the Inter-War Years (London: 
Longman’s, Green & Co., 1954); Matthew Hughes, British Foreign Secretaries in an Uncertain World, 
1919-1939 (London: Routledge, 2006); Isaiah Friedman, British Pan-Arab Policy, 1915-1922 (New 
Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2010). 
3 Christopher Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 85. 
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making. Using Poliheuristic Decision Theory allows for the identification of 
predictable and generalisable patterns of behaviour among political leaders. This 
approach is based on a fundamental assumption – that the primary and immediate 
consideration of decision-makers is their own political survival and every other 
concern is secondary. This thesis argues, therefore, that while actual decisions varied 
during the British Mandate, Palestine foreign policy decision-making processes were 
driven primarily by a desire for political survival, which significantly narrowed the 
scope of options available to politicians for dealing with successive crises. This means 
that although colourful, interesting and engaging, the personalities, biases and beliefs 
of decision-makers had little demonstrable impact on British foreign policy decision-
making towards Palestine during the Mandate.  
 
Foreign Policy Analysis 
Foreign Policy Analysis is the subfield of IR most concerned with choice, 
focusing on the decision-making of individual leaders and groups. Concerned with 
human decision-makers, FPA utilises historic case studies in order to distil useful 
patterns, seeking to provide a more comprehensive understanding of past behaviour, 
and even to predict present and future decisions. Crucially, this is not merely a 
descriptive exercise but one aimed at producing generalisable findings through the use 
of a theoretical framework. The case studies presented in the following chapters, 
therefore, are not studies in British foreign policy. Rather, they are investigations of 
British foreign policy decision-making, specifically towards Palestine during the 
initial occupation and Mandate period, conducted in order to identify patterns of 
behaviour. As Palestine policy between 1917 and 1948 was decided principally by 
politicians, it would be artificial to try and address the reasons behind these choices – 
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in a manner that reflected their complexity – without reference to domestic politics. 
Systematising the relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy, however, 
involves a degree of hybridisation between different FPA models. This thesis utilises 
the bridging framework of Poliheuristic Decision Theory as an appropriate model 
while it strives to provide this type of analysis.  
Using a two-stage decision-making process, Ph Theory ostensibly represents a 
bridge between rational choice and cognitive models. These elements of Foreign 
Policy Analysis are discussed in greater detail in Chapter Two, but, in short, rational 
choice is a highly reliable if simplistic predictive model, whereas cognitive 
approaches seek to uncover the nuances of human decision-making by drawing upon 
other fields such as psychology and anthropology; the cognitive models are so 
detailed that they can rarely yield generalisable findings. In contrast, a Ph approach 
tries to combine them both in the two-stage decision-making process that operates as 
follows: in the first stage, politicians eliminate from their range of choices any 
alternatives that threaten their political survival. Then in the second stage, politicians 
choose an option out of the remaining alternatives using a simple cost-benefit 
analysis.4  
No amount of benefit on any dimension, such as the economy or the military, 
can cancel out risk to a leader’s political survival. This is the noncompensatory 
principle.5 Through this “logic of political survival” and the noncompensatory 
principle, Poliheuristic Decision Theory helps to provide a better understanding of 
                                                 
4 Alex Mintz and Nehemia Geva, “The Poliheuristic Theory of Foreign Policy Decision Making”. In: 
Decisionmaking on War and Peace: The Cognitive-Rational Debate, eds. Alex Mintz and Nehemia 
Geva, 81-102 (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997); Alex Mintz, “Integrating Cognitive and 
Rational Theories of Foreign Policy Decision Making: A Poliheuristic Perspective”. In: Integrating 
Cognitive and Rational Theories of Foreign Policy Decision Making, ed. Alex Mintz, 1-10 (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). 
5 Ibid. 
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decisions in which the final choice seems to have been irrational.6 This is because the 
Ph approach, by elucidating domestic political constraints on British foreign policy 
decision-making, supplies a new principle of rationality that does not exist in either 
rational choice or cognitive models on their own.7  
Although the poliheuristic model is based to a large extent on research 
conducted into the United States presidency, the logic of political survival and 
noncompensatory principle should be applicable to any government system, including 
a dictatorship.8 In applying Ph Theory’s two-stage decision-making framework to 
Britain’s Palestine policy at four key junctures during the Palestine Mandate, it is 
possible to demonstrate why the cabinet decided to pursue action that worsened the 
burgeoning conflict between Palestine’s two communities, sometimes in a manner 
that seemed entirely contrary to British interests, and how these policy decisions were 
often concluded without direct reference to the desires of either Zionists or Palestinian 
Arabs.  
This thesis finds that in every case, the British cabinet always rejected 
alternatives that failed to meet their political requirements. Once these options were 
eliminated, the cabinet chose among the remaining alternatives by seeking to 
maximise benefit and minimise costs for other relevant considerations. This analysis 
reveals how the development of policy in Palestine was based primarily on the need to 
satisfy British domestic political concerns. This was not because Palestine was 
unimportant, but rather because Palestine policy frequently overlapped with issues 
more crucial to individual governments’ political survival. This thesis, therefore, 
                                                 
6 Alex Mintz, “How Do Leaders Make Decisions? A Poliheuristic Perspective”, Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 48 (1) 2004: 3-13. 
7 David Brulé, “The Poliheuristic Research Program: An Assessment and Suggestions for Further 
Progress”. International Studies Review 10 (2) 2008: 266-293, 267. 
8 Brandon Kinne, “Decision Making in Autocratic Regimes: A Poliheuristic Perspective”, International 
Studies Perspectives 6 (1) 2005: 114-128. 
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asserts that Ph Theory provides cogent explanations for a series of critical British 
decisions, as well as the ability to generalise to later and more culturally and 
politically diverse case studies, making it a highly useful theory of political decision-
making. This is despite the various limitations and weaknesses that are discussed in 
Chapter Two.  
 
Methodology 
An execution of this poliheuristic approach is achieved through a series of 
qualitative case studies: multiple embedded case studies analysed using the method of 
process-tracing. While there are limitations to this approach, potential problems are 
minimised by the nature of the studies themselves, their theoretical framework, and 
the construct, internal and external validity they attempt to achieve through the use of 
a rich theoretical framework and extensive archival research. 
First, Yin defines a case study as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when 
the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident”.9 When 
context is a crucial consideration, the case study is appropriate. As the studies 
presented in this thesis have not predetermined which variables influenced British 
decision-making towards Palestine, but instead investigate principally which variables 
were at play, context has been a vital component necessitating the use of case study 
analysis. This methodology is also appropriate because a traditional quantitative study 
is unlikely to provide the detail necessary to understand this type of decision-making. 
While it is possible to use Poliheuristic Decision Theory in large-N studies, the 
shifting nature of routine foreign policy is more problematic to classify than crisis 
                                                 
9 Robert Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 4th Edition (London: Sage Publications, 
2008), 18. 
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behaviour.10 In addition, a qualitative approach utilising Ph Theory then also allows 
for an explanation of behaviour that defies rationality – defined by the rational choice 
model as purposive action seeking utility maximisation – rather than labelling it a 
statistical anomaly.11   
In applying a qualitative methodology to the poliheuristic framework, this 
thesis is concerned with four specific case studies: the decision to reaffirm the Jewish 
national home in the Churchill White Paper of 1922; the reversal of the Passfield 
White Paper in 1931; the decision to issue the MacDonald White Paper in 1939; and 
the decision to withdraw from Palestine made in 1947. This thesis does not, however, 
provide a separate analysis of decision-making behind the original Balfour 
Declaration in 1917 (see Chapter One). This is because the subject has already been 
covered in great depth and also because an extremely vague wartime promise of 
dubious sincerity, released initially as a private letter rather than as a white paper, 
does not necessarily constitute foreign policy. Rather, the affirmation of the Balfour 
Declaration is the real starting point for British foreign policy decision-making 
towards Palestine and the declaration itself is a natural component of analysing the 
Churchill White Paper of 1922.  
Otherwise, these case studies have not been selected from a wider pool of 
options; they represent four distinct periods of decision-making during British rule 
over Palestine. Each period is defined by a problem in Palestine – a violent riot or 
protest – that required a policy decision from the British cabinet in Westminster rather 
                                                 
10 Karl DeRouen and Christopher Sprecher, “Initial Crisis Reaction and Poliheuristic Theory”, Journal 
of Conflict Resolution 48 (1) 2004: 56-68; David Brulé and Alex Mintz, “Blank Check or Marching 
Orders? Public Opinion and Presidential Use of Force in the United States”. In: H Starr, ed. 
Approaches, Levels, and Methods of Analysis in International Politics: Crossing Boundaries (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 157-172. 
11 Paul MacDonald, “ Useful Fiction or Miracle Maker: The Competing Epistemological Foundations 
of Rational Choice Theory”, American Political Science Review 97 (4) 2003: 551-565; Graham 
Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971). 
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than the Palestine Administration in Jerusalem or simply the Colonial Office. These 
disturbances always preceded two commissions of enquiry followed by a statement of 
policy, which remained in place until the next violent outbreak necessitated another 
reassessment. These four case studies represent the only instances when the central 
British government became directly involved in shaping Palestine’s burgeoning 
conflict, and these decisions had the long-term consequences that make their study 
vital to understanding formative stages in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  
Implementing Yin’s five components of research design12, this thesis aims to 
answer the question, what motivated British foreign policy decision-making towards 
Palestine during the Mandate period? Its key propositions derive from Poliheuristic 
Decision Theory: the logic of political survival and the noncompensatory principle, 
and the units of analysis are the four key junctures of foreign policy outlined above. 
Providing the logical link between data collected on each of these junctures and 
propositions of Ph Theory is an identification of which variables constituted the 
cabinet’s political dimension (understanding of its political survival) and what were 
the key substantive dimensions (other considerations such as the economy or 
diplomacy) in each decision-making process. This is also achieved through archival 
research. In addition, the Ph approach’s two-stage decision-making process provides 
the criteria and vehicle for analysing findings: was stage one or stage two more 
influential in the adoption of a final choice? This process is discussed in greater detail 
in Chapter Two. 
These case studies represent a multiple-case, or collective case, design, as they 
represent four cases that are part of the same study.13 They are embedded because the 
cases are variants, or subunits, of the same phenomenon and do not purport to address 
                                                 
12 Yin, Case Study Research, 27. 
13 Ibid, 53; Robert E. Stake, The Art of Case Study Research (London: Sage Publications, 1995). 
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the global nature of British foreign policy decision-making in its entirety.14 In an 
attempt to ensure construct, internal and external validity,15 these case studies are 
performed using a variety of source materials including official documentation and 
private papers, a number of different archives and written evidence from both sides of 
the political spectrum. As these are explanatory case studies, the presence of an 
unknown third factor intervening in what would otherwise be a direct causal 
relationship between x and y would undermine their internal validity. To try and avoid 
such a mishap, all of these studies have involved both extensive “soaking and poking” 
through secondary sources highlighted in Chapter One and a deliberate over-
collection of data in archival research.16 Rival causal explanations have also been 
considered, and so each case study includes a brief explanation of why the rational 
choice model, which is not traditionally centred on the importance of domestic 
politics in Foreign Policy Analysis, would have provided incorrect or less than 
satisfactory predictions under the circumstances of each decision-making juncture.  
As it is not possible in this study to conduct a controlled comparison – when 
every variable between two or more cases is the same apart from one – it utilises a 
process-tracing approach.17 This method “attempts to identify the intervening causal 
process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable 
(or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable”.18 Such an approach fits 
particularly well with Poliheuristic Decision Theory because both allow for and 
accept the possibility of equifinality – that there may be multiple causal pathways. As 
Ph Theory essentially describes decision-making as convergent causal mechanisms, 
                                                 
14 Yin, Case Study Research, 50. 
15 Ibid, 40-45. 
16 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 90. 
17 Ibid, 179. 
18 Ibid, 206. 
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there is no temptation to force the analysis into proclaiming a single, and probably 
unrealistic, determining variable. Likewise, tracing the process of decision-making 
“helps narrow the list of potential causes” but “forces the investigator to take 
equifinality into account, that is, to consider the alternative paths through which the 
outcome could have occurred”.19 This thesis specifically applies the variety of 
process-tracing labelled Analytic Explanation; it converts a historical narrative into an 
analytical causal explanation couched in explicit theoretical forms.20 The actual 
process of process-tracing, however, remains somewhat ambiguous. This is why 
Gerring insists that the case study method “is correctly understood as a particular way 
of defining cases, not a way of analyzing cases or a way of modeling causal 
relations”.21  
In terms of external validity, these cases are intrinsic – because one of the 
primary concerns is to provide a better understanding of the case itself – and 
instrumental – as they provide insight that aids development of Poliheuristic Decision 
Theory.22  Neither purpose, however, is necessarily secondary to the other, and this 
thesis purports to contribute to both disciplines, of history and FPA. This method, 
therefore, agrees with Stake’s view that “case studies need not make any claims about 
the generalizability of their findings but rather, what is crucial is the use others make 
of them”.23 This is based on the implication that if one case is valid then that analysis 
                                                 
19 Ibid, 207. 
20 Ibid, 211. 
21 John Gerring, “What is a Case Study and What is it Good For?” American Political Science Review 
98 (2) 2004: 341-354, 341. 
22 Stake, The Art of Case Study Research; Pamela Baxter and Susan Jack, “Qualitative Case Study 
Methodology: Study Design and Implementation for Novice Researchers”, The Qualitative Report 13 
(4) 2008: 544-559, 549. 
23 Lee Peter Ruddin, “You Can Generalize Stupid! Social Scientists, Bent Flyvbjerg, and Case Study 
Methodology”, Qualitative Inquiry 12 (4) 2006: 797-812, 798. 
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must hold for comparable cases.24 External validity, therefore, is a matter of degree 
rather than a binary distinction between generalisable and not.25  The test is whether 
case studies “afford sufficient contextual information to facilitate the reader’s 
judgment as to whether a particular case can be generalized to a specific field of 
practice”.26  
An important step in trying to achieve a certain level of dependability or 
credibility, is maintaining the chain of evidence and utilising “a rich, theoretical 
framework” that states the conditions under which a phenomenon is likely to be 
present, when it is unlikely to be present, and then this framework becomes the 
vehicle for generalising.27 In the following cases, the evidentiary chain is maintained 
through extensive citations of archival documents that are readily available for further 
study, and the theoretical framework, as already mentioned, is Poliheuristic Decision 
Theory. This methodology does possess certain limitations, however, which George 
and Bennet have highlighted as the dangers of selection bias, difficulty identifying 
scope, the “Degrees of Freedom” problem, a lack of representativeness and a potential 
lack of independence between cases.28  
As the following chapters seek to elucidate the reasons behind centralised 
British decision-making regarding Palestine policy and cover the breadth of those 
high policy decisions, the dangers of selection bias are not overly applicable. It has 
not been possible to choose cases based on a particular outcome, and the thesis is 
more concerned with decision-making processes than resultants, which often do not 
become clear until after the research is complete. While George and Bennet do also 
                                                 
24 Robert E. Stake, “Naturalistic Generalization”, Review Journal of Philosophy and Social Science 7 
(1-2) 1982: 1-12; Roger Gomm, ed., Case Study Method (London: Sage Publications, 2000), 19-26; 
Ruddin, “You Can Generalize Stupid!”, 801. 
25 Ruddin, “You Can Generalize Stupid!”, 806. 
26 Ibid, 805. 
27 Yin, Case Study Research, 54. 
28 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 22. 
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highlight that bias may arise because cases are selected for their historical importance, 
this cannot be problematic when the cases in question mark the beginning of a 
phenomenon.29 As there was no large-scale nationalist conflict between Zionism and 
Arabs in Palestine before the Balfour Declaration and British rule, the case studies 
presented in subsequent chapters are historically significant, and, more importantly, 
they mark boundaries of research that are methodologically sound. 
The second potential limitation is scope because case studies are better at 
assessing causal relations in particular cases than estimating generalised causal effects 
across a range of cases.30 Although this is a common problem, the use of Poliheuristic 
Decision Theory overcomes it because the theoretical framework is based on a single 
key assumption: the logic of political survival. The theory assumes that a decision-
maker will consider his or her political survival over any other variables, regardless of 
the system of government in place. While the decision outcome may vary, therefore, it 
is possible to chart patterns in decision-making processes. This creates a scope limited 
only by the necessity of one key condition, that decision-makers in all case studies are 
political leaders taking purposeful action. Since Ph Theory begins with a fundamental 
assumption, the following chapters are less concerned with demonstrating the 
importance of the political dimension to British decision-making regarding Palestine, 
but rather how this political dimension was operationalised.  
Other limitations on case studies highlighted by George and Bennet, such as 
the “Degrees of Freedom” problem, a lack of representativeness or the potential lack 
of independence between cases become far less problematic when dealing with 
qualitative rather than quantitative research. This is reinforced by the aim of Foreign 
Policy Analysis, which specifically seeks to understand the variables that constitute a 
                                                 
29 Ibid, 25. 
30 Ibid. 
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causal pathway, and so FPA case studies are much less likely to be in danger of 
under-determination or the championing of theoretical parsimony at the expense of “a 
well-defined type or subtype of case with a high level of explanatory richness”.31 
Indeed, there is more of a danger of over-determination. As finding the cut-off point 
for a decision-maker’s political requirements (the point at which risk becomes too 
great) can only be done through specialist knowledge, this particular element of the 
case study may be susceptible to selection bias.  
It is important to consider, therefore, that the case studies in the following 
chapters reflect an argument supported by evidence rather than conclusions reached 
through laboratory experimentation or statistical models. Instead, the Ph case study 
analysis presented herein is based on extensive primary research. As well as 
substantial collections held at The National Archives in Kew, it has utilised the 
Cadbury Archives in Birmingham, the Parliamentary Archives in Westminster, the 
London School of Economics archives, the Cambridge Archive Centre, the University 
of Durham special collections, the Truman Presidential Library in Missouri, the 
United Nations archives in New York and the United States National Archives in 
Maryland. This material includes a wide swathe of source types, including 
government documents, reports and memoranda, as well as personal diaries, memoirs, 
correspondence, speeches, press conferences and debates. As the research is focused 
specifically on decision makers in Westminster rather than Jerusalem, Israeli archives 
have been deliberately avoided. This is because books on the Palestine Mandate have 
traditionally relied upon Israeli-held documents, creating a dominant narrative that is 
centred on Zionist activities. This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter One, but it 
is important to stress that British motives during the Mandate have been left largely 
                                                 
31 Ibid, 31. 
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unexplored and have frequently been misrepresented by the over reliance on Israeli 
state and Zionist archives.   
 
Structure 
 After introducing the research, this thesis progresses through a survey of the 
traditional Mandate narrative through a review of the established literature, before a 
chapter detailing Foreign Policy Analysis and the Poliheuristic Decision Theory. 
Following these are four analytic chapters that utilise multiple embedded case studies 
to highlight the specific decision-making processes operationalised during key 
junctions of British decision-making on Palestine. The concluding chapter then 
highlights the historical lessons of this poliheuristic perspective as well as the 
implications these case studies have for the future development of Poliheuristic 
Decision Theory. 
 The first case study concerns the Churchill White Paper of 1922 and why the 
British government decided to affirm the policy of a Jewish national home that was 
first articulated in the Balfour Declaration in 1917. This was despite violent Arab 
protests and Palestine’s questionable military or strategic value. Two commissions of 
enquiry concluded that the government’s policy, a draft Mandate based on the Balfour 
Declaration, was the source of Palestine’s unrest. Why then, was the policy 
reaffirmed? This time period represented a Balfour Zeitgeist, in which the policy’s 
confirmation in 1922 meant it remained unquestioned until a large-scale riot erupted 
in Palestine in 1929. 
 The second case study deals with policy formulated following this later 
outbreak of violence. It details the government’s attempts to create policy that 
reflected the underlying problems in Palestine’s society between the Arab majority 
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and Zionist minority. After another two commissions of enquiry, the government 
released a white paper named for the Colonial Secretary, Lord Passfield, which 
attempted to limit Jewish immigration and land purchase in Palestine. This white 
paper constituted a rational response to the conclusions offered by two independent 
investigations, but it was reversed only three months later. Why did this u-turn occur? 
The reversal meant that underlying tensions in Palestine continued to be ignored, and 
the early 1930s built to an Arab Revolt in Palestine, from 1936-1939.  
 The third case study, therefore, is centred on the British reaction to this larger 
rebellion. Again, two commissions of enquiry advised the government that the 
Mandate policy was the source of Palestine’s unrest. The first recommended partition, 
and the second advised against that plan. In 1939, the government issued the 
MacDonald White Paper, which promised Palestine its independence within ten years 
and set a limited quota for Jewish immigration for five years, after which any further 
immigrants required Arab approval. This appeared to be a radical departure from the 
Balfour Zeitgeist, and from the pressures that caused a reversal of the Passfield White 
Paper, but why did it happen? The MacDonald White Paper stood as official British 
policy throughout the Second World War and into the post-war period, which 
witnessed an intense Jewish insurgency and burgeoning civil war in Palestine.  
 The fourth and final case study then deals with the British withdrawal from 
Palestine. After the war, there were two final commissions of enquiry, one conducted 
in concert with the United States and another by a United Nations Special Committee. 
The first recommended a binational state, whereas a majority opinion of the UN 
commission advocated partition. The British government, however, decided on 
neither of these courses and instead initiated a withdrawal plan in late 1947. After 
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more than 30 years committed to the territory out of political and perceived strategic 
necessity, why did the British government make this final decision?  
Together, these case studies represent the building blocks of a more 
comprehensive understanding of British foreign policy decision-making towards 
Palestine during the Mandate and how it revolved around periods of violence. By 
elucidating precisely what variables drove British policy towards Palestine during and 
after riots and rebellions, it is possible to identify patterns of behaviour. While some 
established literature (see Chapter One) has offered incomplete explanations of British 
behaviour during this time, none have approached the subject in a systematic fashion 
or offered conclusions within a theoretical framework. This is exactly what 
subsequent chapters are intended to address, both individually and as a cohesive 
collection of interrelated case studies. Using Poliheuristic Decision Theory, this thesis 
seeks to find the root causes of British foreign policy decision-making towards 
Palestine, from 1917 to 1948. 
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Chapter 1: The Historical Narrative 
 
“It is asked, why are not the Arabs satisfied with the improvements in wages and in 
this and that? There never was an invader at any time who did not justify his invasion 
on that very ground – ‘We have given you a mess of pottage, so what is all this 
nonsense about a birthright?’ Have the Arabs a case? Yes, they have a case. They 
have had a rotten deal.”32  
William Gallacher, Communist MP for West Fife, 1936. 
 
Although the effects of British decision-making have been widely researched, 
reasons behind Britain’s Palestine policy have been left largely unexplored. How did 
the British government make decisions regarding Palestine? What were the motives, 
intentions and goals behind them? In order to provide as full an answer as possible to 
these questions, this thesis examines four critical junctures of policy during the 
entirety of Britain’s occupation and officially sanctioned Mandate, from 1917-1948. 
This is necessary because, notwithstanding some notable exceptions, the vast majority 
of studies of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict settle for only a cursory overview of this 
period.33 Works on the Mandate tend to use British policy decisions as plot devices, 
focusing only on each new white paper’s effect on relations between Jews and Arabs 
in Palestine. British decision-making towards Palestine has provided the focus of very 
few scholarly investigations to date.  
Although the work of historians such as William Roger Louis and Michael J. 
Cohen have, for example, explored in great detail the domestic and international 
political constraints on Palestine policy, their work has focused exclusively on the 
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later Mandate and withdrawal.34 This means there has been no study dedicated to 
British policy decision-making during the entire Mandate and certainly none (even for 
a truncated decision-making period) that apply a theoretical framework designed to 
make any findings generalisable. In addition, there is one prevalent trend within the 
literature that this thesis intends to address. 
As previous analyses have centred on the role of the Colonial Office and the 
Palestine High Commissioner, focused as they have been on day-to-day 
administration of the Mandate within Palestine, they have ignored the decision-
making processes behind high policy, relying instead on certain assumptions, some 
stubborn myths and frequent over-simplification to explain the inner workings of 
British decision-making, often only with reference to British politicians’ personal 
feelings toward Zionism or Arab nationalism. Epitomising this is a comment offered 
by Shlomo Ben-Ami: 
“Frequently driven by pro-Zionist sentiments, and not withstanding the 
apprehension of many in the mandatory administration at the ruthless drive of 
the Zionists, an apprehension sometimes fed by a strong anti-Semitic bias as 
much as it was driven by a genuine sympathy for the dispossessed Arab 
fellahin, or by a romantic, Lawrence of Arabia brand of admiration for the 
Arab ‘wild man’, the policy makers in London and the high commissioners on 
the ground were essentially the protectors of the Zionist enterprise”.35  
 
The following chapters will demonstrate that although these attitudes may 
have been prevalent, they did not necessarily direct policy in Westminster, and 
connecting the two uncritically is partly the result of source choice. Investigating 
principally the Zionist Archives in Jerusalem and the papers of officials serving in 
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Palestine has created a history of British intents and purposes based on the 
supposition of parties far from the decision-making process, whose uninformed fears 
and frustrations naturally bled into their interpretations of cabinet decision-making. 
This has resulted in the survival of largely unfounded “explanations”, such as simple 
ideas of Zionist and Arab pressure on the British government, in what are otherwise 
academically rigorous studies. Examining the British Mandate only from Jerusalem’s 
perspective provides an incomplete version of events that does not help to elucidate 
the inner workings of Westminster during the Mandate years. Other, more specific 
myths have also been allowed to endure for similar reasons. By providing a survey 
analysis of British Palestine policy through a review of the current literature, it is 
possible to discern a dominant Mandate narrative and highlight its neglected 
dimensions that are addressed in later chapters. This chapter charts some of the most 
common historiographical themes as they have been represented in the established 
narrative: Zionism and Arab nationalism in the British imagination, riots and rebellion 
in the Interwar period, lobbying and influence, and the Mandate and the international 
community. These themes then also provide the backdrop against which more detailed 
analyses of British decision-making are subsequently laid. 
 
Zionism and Arab Nationalism in the British Imagination 
A major recurring theme in British Mandate historiography is the 
importance placed on ideas of Zionism and Arab nationalism in the British 
imagination, an emphasis with its roots in studies of Britain’s three infamous wartime 
promises. Between 1915 and 1917, the British government entered into three separate 
pledges that involved the future of Palestine: the Hussein-McMahon correspondence, 
the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the Balfour Declaration. As this thesis argues that 
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later British decisions were not driven by ideology, however, it is necessary to admit 
that these foundation pledges did involve a degree of sentiment combined with 
substantive concerns. The importance of ideology has been vastly overstated, 
however, and this informs perspectives like that of Shlomo Ben-Ami. These promises 
provide an important foundation for understanding the Mandate as a whole, but they 
are not sufficient devices to understand British behaviour in the 30 years that 
followed. As a great deal of studies have focused on this topic and they often 
contradict each other, the following survey is intended to demonstrate a combination 
of the factors that drove British decision-making under the curious and distinct 
political atmosphere created by a world war.  
First, the Hussein-McMahon correspondence produced Britain’s initial 
Palestine pledge, to Hashemite ruler Sharif Hussein of Mecca and his sons Ali, 
Abdullah, Faisal and Zeid. Despite Hussein’s exalted position within the Ottoman 
Empire as guardian of the holy cities, he suffered a tense relationship with 
Constantinople.36 Consequently, Hussein’s son Abdullah (future king of Jordan) 
penned an official approach to the British Oriental Secretary in Cairo, Sir Ronald 
Storrs, in July of 1915.37 Abdullah’s letter ostensibly opened formal negotiations 
between “the Arabs” – represented by Sharif Hussein – and Great Britain – 
represented not by Storrs, but by his superior, the District Commissioner to Cairo, Sir 
Henry McMahon. What followed was a series of dispatches between July of 1915 and 
March of 1916 – the Hussein-McMahon correspondence. These communiqués 
outlined a deal in which the sharif agreed to lead a revolt against Ottoman forces in 
the Middle East, and in return, Britain would aid the creation of an independent Arab 
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state. While Hussein did indeed lead the Great Arab Revolt in June of 1916, it was the 
letters of negotiation rather than his military action that proved politically and 
historically significant. The correspondence became highly controversial due to a 
sustained debate over what, exactly, Britain had pledged to the Arabs, whether it 
included Palestine and how this affected the legitimacy of later promises to the French 
and ultimately to the Zionists.  
The principal issue was one of wording. Abdullah’s opening letter proposed 
an Arab state encompassing most of the Middle East.38 In response, McMahon 
specifically excluded “portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, 
Homs, Hama and Aleppo”, claiming this was necessary because “the interests of our 
ally, France, are involved in them both”.39 These exclusions were based on vague 
instructions from Foreign Secretary Grey, but a problem later arose from McMahon’s 
use of the word “district”, or vilayet in the Arabic version sent to Hussein. Damascus, 
Homs, Hama and Aleppo were cities, and so the concept of their districts was open to 
interpretation.40 As Palestine had existed without boundaries for nearly 500 years 
under Ottoman control, it was difficult to ascertain whether, according to McMahon’s 
exclusions, Palestine was inside or outside the area promised to an Arab state.41 This 
first promise has been made famous in the West largely by David Lean’s 1962 film, 
Lawrence of Arabia. In the story, British generals and politicians are presented as a 
combination of enthusiastic Orientalists and evil imperialists, which is echoed in Ben-
Ami’s comment above. A great deal of research has been conducted into British 
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intentions in this case, but opinion is divided.42 The same is true regarding 
interpretations of the second promise, made to France. 
 The Sykes-Picot Agreement was the result of negotiations between the attaché 
to the imperial war cabinet, Sir Mark Sykes, and French diplomat Francois Georges-
Picot conducted during the latter stages of McMahon’s correspondence with Hussein. 
These Anglo-Franco talks produced an explicit division of the Middle East into 
British and French spheres of influence, resulting in an academic debate questioning 
whether the Sykes-Picot Agreement contradicted promises made to Hussein. The 
problems associated with McMahon’s wording have already been discussed above, so 
this answer hinges on why Britain entered into a second pledge. The agreement with 
France allowed Britain the political freedom to pursue an offensive through Ottoman 
territory without fearing that its principal ally would become hostile, either during or 
after the war. French Ambassador Paul Cambon, for example, had complained during 
the initial Hussein-McMahon correspondence that there was “too much talk in Cairo” 
and that this was discourteous to France, which “regarded Syria as a dependency”.43  
War Secretary Kitchner also recognised the potential diplomatic storm arising 
from McMahon’s correspondence with Hussein, posing the question to Sykes a month 
later: “May you not be straining your relations with France very gravely if you 
assume you have come to an agreement with them and take action in Syria?”44 The 
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resulting negotiations were an exercise in preventative diplomacy. Rather than a 
rejection of the previous promise, this new agreement facilitated it because “without 
the British offensive there could have been no Arab revolt; and without the Sykes-
Picot Agreement there would have been no British offensive”.45 The motive was to 
prevent a misunderstanding in which French politicians believed they were being 
double-crossed.  
Although the later establishment of a British Mandate in Palestine often leads 
commentators to assume that Sykes and Picot allotted the entire area to Britain, their 
agreement actually shared Ottoman Palestine between several authorities. A brown 
area on the map prepared during the negotiations indicated that most of Palestine west 
of the River Jordan would be under international administration, and this was 
dependent upon consultation with Britain and France’s mutual ally Russia, as well as 
with the sharif. Within the blue area allotted to France, Britain reserved the ports of 
Haifa and Acre with the right to build a railway linking them to Baghdad in its own 
red area. The northern tip of Palestine above Lake Tiberius was to be part of France’s 
annexed Syrian territory, whereas Palestine’s regions west of the River Jordan and 
south of Gaza were part of the Arab state under British protection, leaving the now-
Israeli city of Beersheba, for example, as unequivocally Arab-owned.46 The spirit if 
not the letter of this Sykes-Picot Agreement did come to fruition during post-war 
talks, but again this was partly due to Britain’s third promise, made to the Zionist 
movement. 
On 2 November 1917, British Foreign Secretary Lord Balfour lent his 
signature to a short letter addressed to Zionism’s high-profile patron, Baron Lionel 
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Walter Rothschild. In fewer than 150 words, the message conveyed, for the first time 
in Jewish history, the support of a great power to the cause of a Jewish homeland in 
Palestine: 
“His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of 
a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to 
facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that 
nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of 
existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status 
enjoyed by Jews in any other country”.47 
 
The Balfour Declaration was a key juncture in the history of Britain’s involvement 
with Palestine; it laid the foundations – however unsteady they proved to be – for the 
British Mandate and a pro-Jewish Palestine policy that would continue until the brink 
of the Second World War. These initial British interests in Palestine evolved from two 
considerations: securing military lines of communication, and – after the Sykes-Picot 
Agreement – preventing a French Palestine.  
British politicians sought the means during wartime to limit long-term German 
threats to the Empire.48 This was because “the acquisition by Germany – through her 
control of Turkey – of political and military control in Palestine and Mesopotamia 
would imperil the communication […] through the Suez Canal, and would directly 
threaten the security of Egypt and India”.49 Although the Sykes-Picot Agreement had 
concluded with an international Holy Land, neither party was satisfied. If the War 
Office wanted to secure communication between Great Britain and the East, they 
would first need to block residual French claims to Palestine.50 Prime Minister David 
Lloyd George intended to use British forces advancing on Gaza to present the French 
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with a fait accompli – British occupation of Palestine would constitute a strong claim 
to ownership.51 They did not need Zionism to do so. This strategy, however, risked a 
direct political confrontation with a much-needed ally. To avoid this eventuality, the 
ubiquitous Sir Mark Sykes pursued Zionism – a “just cause” with interests in 
Palestine – to legitimate what were fundamentally strategic claims.52 As a result, 
Sykes began to introduce Zionist interests in his negotiations with Picot.53  
It was not until the first British invasion of Palestine was in motion, however, 
that Sykes contacted the two men who would figure most prominently in British-
Zionist diplomacy. In January 1917 he met with Secretary General of the World 
Zionist Organisation Nahum Sokolow, and President of the British Zionist 
Organisation Chaim Weizmann, and the two leaders made it clear to Sykes that they 
favoured British rule in Palestine. The following month Sykes introduced Sokolow to 
Picot, and the amicable meeting resulted in the opening of a Zionist mission in Paris. 
Thus by the spring of 1917 the Zionist agenda was reassuringly recognised by the 
Entente. This, combined with an underlying anti-Semitic belief in the power and pro-
German tendencies of world Jewry, led to the final British agreement to the Balfour 
Declaration.54  
When the war cabinet approved the letter – drafted in negotiation between the 
Foreign Office, Sykes and several Zionists – on 31 October, 1917, the action passed 
because they believed “the vast majority of Jews in Russia and America, as, indeed, 
as over the world, now appeared to be favourable to Zionism. If we could make a 
declaration favourable to such an ideal, we should be able to carry on extremely 
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useful propaganda both in Russia and America”.55 This conviction provided the final 
motivation – targeting American and Bolshevik Jews for propaganda – in approving 
the Balfour Declaration. It was merely the final step on a longer journey through 
military communication requirements and the need to keep France out of Palestine.  
If, however, the Hussein McMahon correspondence is seen as a promise 
motivated by Orientalist fascination with the Bedouin, or if the Balfour Declaration is 
viewed as a morally-intentioned return of the Jews to their homeland that was brought 
about by the lobbying skill of Weizmann and Sokolow, then the result is an 
impression of British decision-making based on sentiment and ideology. This implies 
that politicians were free to make decisions regarding the future of Palestine 
unhindered by domestic political constraints. Ben-Ami’s quote exemplifies this 
misunderstanding, but it pervades the literature on Mandate Palestine in more subtle 
and nuanced ways that result in misleading views of British policy. This is discussed 
in greater detail below and forms the basis for the historical intervention contributed 
by this thesis.  
 
Riots and Rebellion in the Interwar Period 
During the Interwar period there were three main outbreaks of violence that 
each resulted in a statement or change of British policy towards Palestine. Mandate 
histories tend to use this convenient chronology as a plot device to move the reader 
through a discussion of Jews and Arabs’ relations during the time period. As British 
motives during these instances is not the primary focus of other studies, cabinet 
decision-making in Westminster is largely assumed to follow the same influences that 
led to the Balfour Declaration and, crucially, no deeper investigation is attempted. 
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The first violent outbreak was characterised by the Nebi Musa Riots of April 
1920 and the Jaffa Riots of May 1921. The Nebi Musa procession is traditionally a 
celebration of Moses and also a rally against the Crusades, and this Muslim holiday 
attracted an influx of revellers to Jerusalem’s Old City every year. In 1920, the 
traditional procession clashed with members of a Zionist group called Beitar, which 
had decided to stage its own demonstration, and the situation escalated into a riot.56 
Nine deaths, hundreds of injuries and the sheer scale of destruction demanded a 
commission of inquiry. It was led by Major-General P.C. Palin.  
This was the first British attempt to redress Jewish-Arab tensions in Palestine, 
but its findings were highly critical of Zionists, positing that they, “by their 
impatience, indiscretion and attempts to force the hands of the Administration, are 
largely responsible for the present crisis”.57 The Palin Commission, however, was 
never published, and just as Palestine’s military occupation transformed into a civilian 
administration, another riot began on 1 May 1921. These disturbances continued for a 
further two days in Jaffa, and spread to the surrounding region leading to attacks on 
Jewish agricultural settlements.58 Again, the violence necessitated an official enquiry 
– the Haycraft Commission – which repeated many of Palin’s concerns and 
recommended a clarification in policy to prevent further violence.  
The result in Westminster was the Churchill White Paper, published June 1922. 
On 24 July 1922 the League of Nations then officially awarded Britain’s Mandate to 
govern Palestine.59 The British government, therefore, possessed ample evidence that 
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the policy of supporting a Jewish national home in Palestine was creating violent 
tension, but chose nevertheless to pursue it. For the first time, however, the Churchill 
White Paper tied Jewish immigration to Palestine’s economic capacity “to ensure that 
the immigrants should not be a burden upon the people of Palestine as a whole, and 
that they should not deprive any section of the present population of their 
employment”.60 
Although the allotment of blame for these early outbreaks of violence varies 
between scholarly interpretations – Tom Segev for example, chooses to highlight 
incidents of horrific violence perpetrated against Jerusalem’s Jewish families,61 
whereas Haim Gerber focuses on the clash between Muslims and Zionist political 
demonstrators62 – there has been no investigation of why Britain responded with the 
Churchill White Paper in 1922. The traditional Mandate narrative always includes 
some discussion of this white paper, but scholars’ differing opinions about its contents  
(discussed more below) have informed their analyses of British decision-making 
without making this the focus of their research. In actuality, the exact sequence of 
events that led up to the Churchill White Paper form an important foundation in 
understanding how the British government developed policy during the rest of the 
Mandate, and this is addressed in detail in Chapter Two.  
For High Commissioner Samuel, the problems created by the Mandate were 
too great, and he left Palestine bitter and disillusioned in 1925. His successor, Sir 
Herbert Plumer, oversaw a period of relative calm in Palestine – possibly because a 
recession in Poland meant Jewish immigration declined during his tenure.63 In fact, 
                                                 
60 Cmd 1700, 1922, Palestine. Correspondence with the Palestine Arab Delegation and the Zionist 
Organisation. 
61 Tom Segev, One Palestine, Complete: Jews and Arabs Under the British Mandate (London: Abacus, 
2000), 140-141. 
62 Gerber, Remembering and Imagining Palestine, 93. 
63 Segev, One Palestine, Complete, 289. 
 33 
this calm remains one of the enigmas of British rule since tensions failed to either 
dissipate or erupt. Believing Palestine’s tranquillity was permanent, Plumer 
dismantled several units.64 Leaving with a successful record in 1928, Plumer 
informed his replacement, Sir John Chancellor, that, “the main security problems 
deserving attention were in Transjordan, not in Palestine”.65 A wave of unprecedented 
violence swept the country only a few months later. 
The disturbances of 1929 were sparked by a long series of events connected 
with the Western or “Wailing” Wall in Jerusalem – beginning on the Jewish holiday 
of Yom Kippur in 1928, and culminating in a Zionist demonstration on 15 August 
1929 and a Muslim protest on the following day.66 Rumours that Jews were killing 
Muslims spread to other cities and some whole families were killed in their homes. 
The reaction from Westminster constituted another two commissions of inquiry and a 
subsequent white paper. The first was the Shaw Commission, which identified that 
“the difficulties inherent in the Balfour Declaration and in the Mandate for Palestine 
are factors of supreme importance in the consideration of the Palestine problem” and 
like the Palin Commission and the Haycraft Commission, saw the fundamental cause 
as “the Arab feeling of animosity and hostility towards the Jews consequent upon the 
disappointment of their political and national aspirations and fear for their economic 
future”.67  
As this investigation identified that there was a problem with Jewish 
immigration and land purchase, the Shaw report recommended “a scientific enquiry” 
which became the one-man commission of Sir John Hope-Simpson.68 Although 
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Hope-Simpson did not conclude that Jewish immigration was the source of all Arab 
woes in Palestine, he had to admit that immigration into a flooded labour market was 
impractical. He recommended both the curtailment of Jewish immigration and “an 
active policy of agricultural development” for the Arabs.69 This was not an issue of 
fairness, but of peacekeeping and riot-prevention. Whitehall prepared a new statement 
of policy – the Passfield White Paper.   
Since both the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate instructed that Jewish 
immigration should not prejudice the position of any other group in Palestine, and 
both Shaw and Hope-Simpson had demonstrated the potential harm created by adding 
to the labour market at that time, the mandatory power had a “duty to reduce, or, if 
necessary, to suspend” immigration until unemployment had eased.70 This new white 
paper built upon the foundations of Churchill’s earlier policy, but it made establishing 
the Jewish national home through force of numbers significantly less likely. The 
Passfield White Paper, however, lasted less than four months. In February 1931, 
Prime Minister James Ramsay MacDonald wrote to Chaim Weizmann and essentially 
reversed the immigration restrictions included in the Passfield White Paper.71 This so-
called “Black Letter” has led to an impression that the documents prepared by Shaw, 
Hope-Simpson and finally the Colonial Office under Lord Passfield are immaterial to 
the study of British Palestine. This is because to date there are very few, and only 
unsatisfactory, analyses of why the white paper was reversed (discussed more below).  
The third, and most violent, episode of Arab-Jewish clashes in the inter-war 
period began in mid-April 1936. As little action had been taken after MacDonald’s 
letter, the situation in Palestine continued to fester. Smaller disturbances became more 
commonplace, but they achieved no political recognition and were repelled through 
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the use of force alone; one example was the October-November demonstrations of 
1933 when Whitehall was assured that Palestine’s government could handle any 
future breaches of the peace.72 This confidence was called into question during the 
Arab Revolt of 1936-1939, which erupted in two distinct phases: the first was 
championed by urban elites involved with the Higher Arab Committee (HAC), and 
was focused mainly on political protest and a general strike. The British civil 
administration dealt with this mainly through concessions and diplomacy, negotiating 
via – among others – Abdullah of Transjordan and Iraq’s Foreign Minister, Nuri 
Pasha, utilising their connections to calm protestors and prepare for yet another 
inquiry, the report of which ignited a second stage in the revolt.73 
Led by Lord Peel, the Royal Commission was asked to examine wide issues of 
British obligations to Arabs and Jews. Although sent ostensibly to “study”, the 
commission’s report betrayed an underlying conviction that the real problem was 
opposition to the Mandate; it was unworkable, and every solution except partition 
would provide only illusory and temporary relief.74 They decided that the 
disturbances of 1936 reflected “the same underlying causes as those which brought 
about the ‘disturbances’ of 1920, 1921, and 1933 [...] All the other factors were 
complementary or subsidiary, aggravating the two causes or helping to determine the 
time at which the disturbances broke out”.75 These “other factors” were developing 
Arab independence in Iraq, Transjordan, Egypt, Syria and Lebanon; high Jewish 
immigration and Jewish pressure on Palestine due to the Nazi regime in Germany; 
Jewish ability to appeal directly to His Majesty’s Government by means denied to the 
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Arabs; distrust in British promises following the Hussein-McMahon correspondence; 
and provocative Jewish nationalism and modernism.76  
The final report, consequently, recommended an end to the Mandate and a 
two-state solution.77 This report marked a real departure from all investigations and 
statements of policy that preceded it, and reactions from the interested parties ranged 
from cautious endorsement from Zionists to utter condemnation from Arabs – apart 
from Abdullah – and Britons alike.78 The plan’s widespread rejection was based 
either on the moral refusal of Britain’s right to give Arab land to Jews, or on the 
grounds that it betrayed the Balfour Declaration, appeased Arab violence or damaged 
Anglo-Arab relations.79  
In Palestine, the publication of Peel’s recommendations in July 1937 provoked 
the second phase of the Arab revolt – a violent but initially successful peasant 
rebellion that British forces met with a brutal crackdown. The British cabinet headed 
by Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain then appointed a further commission in 
December of 1937 to gather the technical details needed to implement partition, and 
traditional scholarship attests that it was strongly encouraged to consider a negative 
opinion.80 This Woodhead Commission reported they were “unable to recommend 
boundaries which will afford a reasonable prospect of the eventual establishment of 
self-supporting Arab and Jewish states”.81 To a question of two states, therefore, the 
answer was a resounding “no”.  
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Consequently, partition was formally rejected in November of 1938 and 
instead, the government invited Jewish and Arab representatives to a conference in 
London.82 The Colonial Secretary Malcolm MacDonald authorised the drafting of a 
new policy in conjunction with the Foreign Office under Lord Halifax. Although its 
terms were rejected in meetings with both Zionist and Arab delegates, the resulting 
MacDonald White Paper of 1939 outlined a commitment to independence in Palestine 
within ten years and essentially halted the Jewish national home.83 In the interim, 
immigration during the next five years would allow Jewish numbers in Palestine to 
reach approximately one third of the population – economic capacity permitting. 
Numerically, this translated into an additional 75,000 legal Jewish immigrants over 
five years.84 The policy represented a complete reversal of the spirit of Britain’s 
earlier commitment to the Balfour Declaration. Rather than a stand-alone incident, 
however, it was part of the larger pattern of decision-making throughout the period of 
British rule. 
In Palestine, the new policy embittered Jews who compared the MacDonald 
White Paper to the Nuremberg laws. Jewish paramilitary organisations, the Irgun (a 
right-wing group founded in 1937 by Revisionist Zionists) and its radicalised splinter 
group, the Stern Gang, attacked British installations, blew up phone booths and post 
offices, attacked Arab civilians in markets and coffee houses, and committed a total of 
130 murders in the few short months between Britain’s new policy and the outbreak 
of the Second World War.85 The Jewish Agency’s paramilitary wing, the Haganah, 
agreed to support Britain’s war effort and instead fought the white paper by 
facilitating illegal immigration, but the Irgun continued violent attacks throughout the 
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war.86 British troops continued to fight what they termed Jewish terrorism, but when 
evidence of the Holocaust was discovered, widespread horror and outrage turned 
Palestine policy from a purely British concern into an international crisis. These three 
outbreaks of violence form the spine of a dominant Mandate narrative, but various 
interpretations of how they led to British policy-making are characterised by overly 
simple explanations of lobbying and influence. 
 
Lobbying and Influence 
The idea that pro or anti-Zionist feelings drove Palestine policy is one that 
reappears frequently in the Mandate literature alongside other tenuous explanations 
for British decision-making that do not withstand even a small degree of scrutiny. The 
most common instances of this relate to the passage of the Churchill White Paper in 
1922 and the reversal of the Passfield White Paper in 1931. 
Following the Nebi Musa and Jaffa riots of 1920-21, the most memorable 
aspect of the Churchill White Paper policy was that, in theory, it tied Jewish 
immigration to Palestine’s economy. How scholars have explained this development 
depends on whether they have perceived it as a change or continuation of policy. Avi 
Shlaim, for example, views the Churchill White Paper as the beginning of Britain’s 
withdrawal from Zionism.87 Likewise, Benny Morris cites the reason for the Churchill 
white paper as a change of personality in Downing Street from a pro-Zionist Liberal 
Lloyd George to the ambivalent Conservative Bonar-Law, leading to more even 
handed language in Britain’s dealings with Zionism.88 The problem with this analysis 
is that Lloyd George resigned on 22 October 1922, months after the white paper was 
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written and published.89 Conversely, Gudrun Kramer and James Renton posit that 
Britain allied itself with Zionism to justify its occupation to the other Great Powers, 
especially France, at the Supreme Council of the Paris Peace Conference in San 
Remo.90 Acting supposedly under the Wilsonian principles of non-annexation and 
national self-determination, Britain had chosen to justify its rule over Palestine by 
presenting itself as the protector of Zionism.91 This is echoed in John McTague’s 
work, which notes that by appointing the first High Commissioner to Palestine as Sir 
Herbert Samuel, a Jew and a Zionist, the British Prime Minister appeared determined 
to promote the Balfour Declaration irrespective of internal advice to the contrary.92 In 
this respect, the white paper was an instrument of governance, imposing a minor 
limitation that was necessary to maintain the commitment to Zionism.  
This seemingly unshakeable commitment did, of course, face its first test in 
the Passfield White Paper of 1930 despite the swift reversal in 1931. Scholars tend to 
assume that the activities of Zionist lobbyists, such as Chaim Weizmann, placed the 
British government under immense pressure to recant the Passfield policy and that 
this was the sole reason for its reversal. Shlomo Ben-Ami, for example, notes that, 
“before it could even come into effect, Passfield’s White Paper was for all practical 
purposes abrogated by Chaim Weizmann’s skilful lobbying”.93 Similarly, Benny 
Morris writes, “By early 1931 well-applied Zionist pressure in the press and lobbying 
by Weizmann in London bore fruit”.94 The same reasoning is found in Yehoshua 
Porath’s work, citing “Zionist pressure” in the reversal of policy, in Ilan Pappe’s A 
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History of Modern Palestine, Neil Caplan’s Contested Histories and many others.95 
Such “explanations” of British behaviour are almost entirely without citation, 
however, and when they are referenced, the evidence is tenuous. Susan Pederson, for 
example, notes that “Historians usually and rightly credit Weizmann’s remonstrance 
and effective lobbying for that volte-face”, and cites Norman Rose’s The Gentile 
Zionists, chapter one, to illustrate this point.96 It is particularly interesting that Rose is 
credited with this analysis as it appears nowhere in his book. Instead, Rose offers an 
account that highlights Parliamentary political infighting and at no point credits 
Weizmann with a victory.97  
Rather than Rose’s work, which is based heavily on research at the Weizmann 
Archives, this myth is actually most likely the result of Chaim Weizmann’s own 
account in his autobiography, Trial and Error.98 In what Christopher Sykes agrees is 
a highly biased account of the negotiations with British politicians, Weizmann paints 
the British attitude as incompetent and coloured by anti-Semitism.99 Accounts of the 
white paper’s reversal are rarely granted more than a sentence or two in histories of 
the Mandate or Anglo-Zionist relations, and there seems to have been a widespread 
acceptance of these largely unfounded assumptions. The idea that Chaim Weizmann 
successfully lobbied the British government stems from his own personal 
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interpretation of events, but is one that has been repeated often without citation and 
has endured relatively unquestioned by further academic investigation.100 
A small number of scholars have attempted to provide a more nuanced 
explanation for this reversal decision, but the analyses remain unsatisfactory. One 
argument points to a Whitechapel by-election as the reason for Labour’s apparent 
collapse under pressure.101 Crucially, however, the by-election took place on 3 
December 1930, two months before MacDonald wrote to Weizmann, and James Hall, 
the Labour candidate in Whitechapel, won having secured the support of the British 
chapter of the international Zionist organisation, Poalei Zion, despite the Liberal 
candidate actually being Jewish and every other candidate denouncing the white 
paper.102 Although Hall did not actively defend the new policy, his election pamphlets 
and documentation did repeat the official government interpretation of Passfield’s 
white paper, that it was both a continuation of the Mandate and the Churchill White 
Paper of 1922.103 It is incongruous, therefore, to explain the government’s reversal 
decision by implying that it was a preventative measure directed towards this by-
election; neither the timings – months before MacDonald’s letter to Weizmann – nor 
the campaign – in which the Labour candidate won by opposing the white paper and 
securing Zionist support – demonstrate a plausible causal relationship. This by-
election, however, was certainly important in retrospect, and this is discussed in 
relation to the government’s correspondence with Chaim Weizmann in greater detail 
in Chapter Four. 
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Another opinion about this incident points to a letter to The Times written by 
pre-eminent lawyers Hailsham and Simon. Taking what amounted to a pro-Zionist 
stance, the letter called for an opinion from The Hague on whether limiting Jewish 
immigration violated the official Mandate for Palestine.104 The scholarly argument, 
therefore, cites Prime Minister MacDonald’s desire to avoid such scrutiny as the 
reason for reversing Passfield’s white paper.105 The problem with this reasoning, 
however, is that Hailsham and Simon specifically focused on criticising paragraphs 27 
and 28 of the white paper, neither of which were mentioned in MacDonald’s letter to 
Weizmann. If Hailsham and Simon’s criticisms were crucial, then why were their 
arguments absent from the final reversal? No evidence has been presented to 
demonstrate that MacDonald viewed interference from The Hague as a credible 
threat, and indeed these accusations levelled at the white paper met only sarcasm and 
scorn at the Colonial Office (see Chapter Four). On its own, the Hailsham and Simon 
letter provides only a half-formed explanation. The letter was important, but for a 
different reason: Hailsham and Simon were pre-eminent lawyers, but more 
importantly, they were both also former and future cabinet ministers from the 
Conservative and Liberal parties respectively, and their letter to The Times is evidence 
of a larger campaign to destabilise an already weak Labour government. This 
domestic political angle, however, has been largely ignored.  
Although both Norman Rose and Gudrun Kramer mention the importance of 
political infighting within Westminster in the final decision, no study has thus far 
been dedicated to elucidating the decision-making process itself.106 Rose, for 
example, notes that “MacDonald must have been extremely sensitive” to rumours of 
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Zionist activism against his government around the world but chooses not to 
investigate this idea further.107 Coupled with this collection of unexplored 
assumptions about the reversal of the Passfield White Paper is also a general apathy to 
the event. Major works such as Gelvin’s Hundred Years War fail to even mention the 
Passfield White Paper and other scholars, such as Michael J. Cohen deliberately avoid 
it, proceeding in the Mandate narrative directly from 1928 to 1936.108 Asking why the 
Passfield White Paper was reversed is not only crucial to understanding how and why 
British policy evolved during the entire Mandate, but also to address this event’s 
almost inexplicable lack of scholarly attention. This is important because giving the 
domestic political environment surrounding these interwar decisions an appropriate 
level of attention reveals a pattern of decision-making processes that forms the 
nucleus of this thesis. Comparatively, the final theme has been covered in more detail 
by Mandate scholars, but again it lacks integration into the broader perspective of how 
British policy was decided throughout the period. 
 
The Mandate and the International Community 
As the British Mandate for Palestine was a trusteeship of the League of 
Nations, policy towards it always had to consider the international community. 
External involvement in Palestine politics, however, was particularly prominent in 
only two distinct time periods of Britain’s 30-year administration. These were 
following the Arab Revolt in negotiations leading to the MacDonald White Paper of 
1939 and after World War Two when United States President Harry Truman involved 
American politics in Palestine policy. 
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Although the Arab Revolt is a particular phase of British decision-making that 
has received far more attention than earlier incidences, the targeted focus of such 
studies limits their usefulness. Michael J. Cohen’s excellent analysis of the later 
Mandate, for example, highlights the domestic political constraints placed on the 
British government in the late 1930s but betrays such a study’s truncated scope by 
implying that earlier decisions were not equally the result of Realpolitik. Cohen 
writes, “The white paper was the result of diminishing options in the Arab Middle 
East on the eve of war”,109 but also that it “reflected a dramatic change from prior 
British policy in the area, in particular from the British attitude towards the Zionists, 
which previously had been at worst bureaucratically neutral and at best openly 
sympathetic”.110 In contrast, Chapter Four argues that the decision-making period 
leading up to the MacDonald White Paper was conducted in exactly the same fashion 
as policy in the 1920s and early 1930s and represented the beginning of Britain’s 
ultimate withdrawal from “the Holy Land”. 
The Second World War then created two significant developments with regard 
to British policy in Palestine. All previous Palestine policy had been relatively 
secretive – from patronage for Zionism in the 1920s to Arab self-determination in 
1939. A new post-war internationalism, however, coupled with the public outcry for 
Europe’s Holocaust survivors meant the United States and members of the fledgling 
United Nations pressured Britain for a real moral, rather than purely strategic, policy 
in Palestine.111 The British Mandate hosted two final investigative commissions that 
demonstrated this new context. First, the Anglo-American Committee of 1946 
attempted and failed to repair a rift between British and American administrations on 
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the subject of Palestine. Second, when Britain referred the problem to the UN in 1947, 
the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) conducted its own 
investigation.  
The United States President, Harry Truman, had publicly called for the 
admission of 100,000 Jewish refugees into Palestine, but the prospect presented a 
peacekeeping nightmare for British authorities. The Anglo-American report then 
reiterated this demand and concluded that the best solution was a single bi-national 
state in which, “Palestine shall be neither a Jewish state nor an Arab state”.112 The 
report, therefore, simply suggested reconciling what throughout the 1920s and 1930s 
had remained irreconcilable. Unable to solve the conflict, unaided by any practical 
American suggestions, and under financial and political pressure created by the 
plummeting post-war economy, the British cabinet approved referring the issue to the 
UN.113 The final UNSCOP report constituted both a majority and a minority opinion; 
whereas the minority suggested a federal state with a permanent but autonomous 
Jewish minority, the majority preferred partition.114 If the solution was partition, 
however, this presented a further question of its enforcement. In keeping with all 
previous negotiations, the Arabs of Palestine rejected both partition and the minority 
federal plan, but the UN General Assembly voted for partition on 29 November 1947. 
Rather than accept the responsibility, the British government decided to withdraw. 
This final Palestine policy decision has been characterised in the literature in 
several ways. Traditional Zionist history asserts that referral to the UN was a ploy 
designed to push Palestine’s Jews back into British arms once the United Nations 
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failed to offer a solution – or withdrawal would allow the invasion of Arab armies 
who would eradicate the Jewish homeland. Conversely, Arab historiography has 
viewed British withdrawal as a plot to aid the creation of a sole, Jewish state in 
Palestine.115 Alternatively, either the decision has been presented as tactical, meaning 
Prime Minister Attlee and Foreign Secretary Bevin identified the UN vote as a perfect 
opportunity to rid the Empire of costly Palestine, or British forces were withdrawn out 
of economic necessity and war wariness.116 Investigation of the inner workings of 
Westminster during this critical time period are frequently sidelined, however, in 
favour of discussing Zionist terrorist activities after the war, implying that the 
bombing of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem in June 1946 or the hanging of two 
kidnapped sergeants in 1947 provided the final impetus to leave.117 The commissions 
are mentioned only to highlight what appeared to be Britain’s ineptitude in dealing 
with the post-war crisis in Palestine.  
This “dithering” has led scholars such as Benny Morris and James L. Gelvin to 
describe referral of the Palestine question to the UN as “dumping” the issue onto 
another party.118 This is not only an unfair characterisation of Ernest Bevin’s attempts 
to reach an Arab-Jewish agreement through negotiations, but it is also an 
oversimplified analysis of British decision-making during this turbulent era. This 
perception is also part of the literature’s constant conflation of Britain’s referral to the 
UN in February 1947 with the decision to withdraw, taken in September 1947. 
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Confusing the timeline obscures any helpful understanding of the British decision-
making process at the end of the Mandate and the primary motivations of key 
decision-makers. Rather than merely plot devices or the backdrop to a Zionist 
insurgency, the final commissions of the Mandate demonstrate the British need to 
achieve a delicate and precarious balance of diplomatic interests. This is discussed in 
detail in Chapter Six. 
 
Conclusion 
Britain’s Palestine policy evolved from staunch support for the Jewish national 
home after the Balfour Declaration of 1917 to plans for an independent Arab Palestine 
in 1939 that had to be re-assessed following the Second World War. This gradual 
reversal of policy coincided with a series of riots and rebellions in Palestine between 
Arabs and Jews in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s, and Britain’s inability to devise a 
workable solution to this ongoing tension. The Mandate years witnessed periods of 
violence and these are generally used as plot devices in the established literature, 
highlighting how the British reaction to these crises worsened the burgeoning conflict. 
These periods of violence and four major themes constitute the dominant Mandate 
narrative, but it remains incomplete.  
The story sketches events in which the British government intervened or 
attempted to intervene in Palestine between Zionists and Arabs but fails to provide a 
rigorous analysis of the reasoning behind such action, especially when it repeatedly 
worsened the situation. This results in a fundamentally flawed understanding. In order 
to demonstrate an intervention on this subject, this thesis uses the Poliheuristic 
Decision Theory framework to highlight precisely what is missing from 
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aforementioned scholarship on British policy towards Palestine during the Mandate: 
the importance of domestic political constraints. 
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Chapter 2: The Poliheuristic Approach to Foreign Policy Analysis 
“We have never sought or got anything out of Palestine. We have discharged a 
thankless, painful, costly, laborious, inconvenient task for more than a quarter of a 
century with a very great measure of success.”119 
Winston Churchill, Former Prime Minister, 1946. 
 
Although the primary objective of this thesis is not to test Foreign Policy 
Analysis models, their inclusion is both necessary and important to establish the 
analytical framework necessary to generalise the analyses in the following chapters to 
a broader understanding of foreign policy decision-making. Specifically, this thesis 
utilises Poliheuristic Decision (Ph) Theory in order to employ both cognitive and 
rational approaches. Demonstrating the utility of the poliheuristic model, this analysis 
offers explanations, or “post-dictions”, rather than predictions of the British 
government’s decisions, but demonstrates the same processes that may be used to 
employ Ph Theory in a predictive manner. To illustrate this framework, this chapter 
introduces FPA before narrowing to Ph Theory. This section situates this approach 
within the body of established FPA literature.   
 
Foreign Policy Analysis and the Actor-Specific Focus 
FPA identifies the point of theoretical intersection between the most important 
determinants of state behaviour: material factors and ideational factors; the point of 
intersection is not the state, but human decision-makers.120 This focus on individuals 
and decision-making is based on “the epistemological notion of Verstehen”, that 
“action must always be understood from within”.121 An analyst, therefore, must study 
“the rules, conventions, and context governing the action” and “know what the agent 
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intended by and in performing the action”.122 This sub-discipline is characterised by 
several theoretical hallmarks, and a debate between rational and cognitive models. 
 First, the most important element that distinguishes FPA from much of IR is 
that it seeks to understand or explain the choices made by human decision-makers 
(leaders). FPA is not concerned with accidents, mistakes or decisions that lack an 
international context; this is because the action needs to be purposeful (utilising 
agency) and the framework for analysis distinct from domestic policy. To FPA 
analysts, therefore, international politics is derived from specific human beings 
making decisions individually or in groups.123 As FPA considers the factors that 
influence decision-making, its analysis is multilevel and multidisciplinary, utilising 
relevant research from fields such as psychology, sociology, anthropology and 
economics to enrich and develop FPA models. This process can help to “identify 
unique and general patterns of decisions and generate insights about leadership styles 
and personalities that cannot be revealed through a systemic approach to foreign 
policy analysis”.124  
This perspective is based on actor-specific theory, as opposed to the actor-
general, or unitary rational actor, theory of systemic primacy in understanding the 
behaviour of states.125 FPA is largely a response to the idea of a unitary rational actor 
and attempts instead to provide a useful set of tools for breaking open the black box of 
decision-making. This focus also means FPA is, to some extent, outside the agency-
structure debate because “it is assumed that causation always involves both structures 
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and agencies”, and that “the two kinds of phenomena help to constitute each other in a 
perpetual process of interaction”.126 How to achieve such an analysis, however, has 
produced some disagreement between followers of rational choice and cognitive 
models as they developed through three waves of FPA (see below).  
Having rejected the focus on system alone, there are two broad approaches to 
FPA: the rational actor and cognitive models. Rational choice is arguably the most 
important approach to emerge in the post-war study of IR. As well as helping to 
define theoretical debates about international politics, it has advanced understanding 
of subjects such as anarchy and international cooperation.127 The principle behind 
rational choice is derived from economics: “individual economic decision makers 
want to buy low, sell high, and maximize wealth […] the rational decision maker 
chooses from among a set of alternatives, the alternative that maximizes utility”.128 
Decision-makers are rational, therefore, if their preferences are connected and 
transitive, meaning if A is preferred to B, then B cannot be preferred to A at the same 
time, and if A is preferred to B and B is preferred to C, then C cannot be preferred to 
A.129 Rational choice theorists use this rationality in an instrumental rather than a 
procedural way, and its procedural limitations are the source of much criticism.130  
In contrast, the cognitive approaches generally posit that the rational actor 
model cannot be realised in practice.131 Instead of assuming people are goal-oriented 
maximisers, cognitive approaches “feature mental shortcuts and other processes 
indicative of the mind’s inability to carry out the complicated calculus of the rational 
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model”.132 These cognitive approaches are not “irrational”, but rather more detailed 
and therefore realistic descriptions of the decision-making process – attempting to 
describe how the mind really works. This is behavioural IR,133 and is discussed in 
greater detail with Ph Theory below.  
 
Three Waves of FPA 
The origins of FPA lie in three waves or generations of scholarship that built 
upon key foundation works.134 Snyder, Bruck and Sapin gave a burgeoning field of 
Foreign Policy Analysis its focus on decision-making, calling for multicausal and 
interdisciplinary explanations, and James Rosenau challenged analysts to develop a 
general, testable theory that contemporary analysis was lacking, encouraging the 
development of middle-range theory to mediate between grand principles and 
complex reality.135 Harold and Margaret Spout also addressed such complexities and 
argued that in order to understand foreign policy decisions, the analyst should 
examine the psycho-milieu of decision-makers, their international and operational 
environments, meaning the context of decision-making, as they perceive it. This key 
collection of studies helped Foreign Policy Analysis to develop as a subfield of 
International Relations through three generations of scholarship. 
The first wave, since termed “Classic” FPA Scholarship, lasted roughly from 
1954 until the early 1970s. This first generation made great strides in 
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conceptualisation, data collection and methodological experimentation, especially 
with regard to four areas of investigation: the dynamics of group behaviour, 
Bureaucratic Politics, Comparative Foreign Policy (CFP) and the beginnings of a 
cognitive approach. Building on the foundation texts discussed above, foreign policy 
analysts began to consider the factors that lead to suboptimal decision-making, and by 
extension, to inferior choices.136 This scholarship possessed a normative quality, and 
analysts tacitly sought to provide explanations of dissatisfactory decision-making 
processes in order to expose pitfalls and improve processes for future leaders. Such a 
normative ontology was not ubiquitous in classic FPA, however, and it was absent 
from both Comparative Foreign Policy – a multilevel theory subject to aggregate 
empirical testing in the attempt to develop a truly cross-national framework for 
analysis – and the beginnings of a cognitive approach to analysis – espoused by the 
Sprouts but underdeveloped until the second generation of FPA.  
The second wave of FPA scholarship (1974-1993) was a period of self-
reflection within the discipline rather than a break from its foundations. CFP dwindled 
in the course of a theoretical and methodological pruning, but the psychological 
approach enjoyed slow growth due to readily available methodological tools provided 
by the field of psychology.137 Since high quality analysis of groups or Bureaucratic 
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Politics required extensive source material and foreign policy documents often remain 
classified for many years, analysts had to question whether their work was relevant to 
current events if it concentrated on older case studies.138 Scholars responded by 
asserting that historical case studies could be used to identify patterns that could be 
generalised to modern policy-making.139 CFP suffered chiefly because analysts’ 
search for a grand theory that appreciated the importance of detail became too taxing; 
they shed features such as aggregate empirical testing and decided to forgo grand 
theory aspirations in favour of a more attainable middle range theory.  
This methodological refinement coincided with the end of the Cold War, 
which reinvigorated the FPA research agenda by irrevocably altering systemic 
variables relied upon by neorealist unitary rational choice models, making it clear that 
“it is impossible to explain or predict system change on the basis of system-level 
variables alone”.140 One of the most significant contributions of this interim period 
was the conception of a two-level game,141 which introduced the importance of 
domestic politics to understanding foreign policy decision-making, a feature that 
continues to be developed in the third wave of FPA. 
The third generation of FPA scholarship (1993-present) addresses a new post-
Cold War complexity in the international system. Whereas FPA has retained its 
distinct theoretical goals, it continues to evolve. The research questions are more 
sophisticated, asking for example, how situations are “framed” by decision makers, 
how options are developed, or whether it is possible to specify the effect domestic 
                                                                                                                                            
and a Case Study (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977); Hudson, Foreign Policy 
Analysis. 
138 Paul Anderson, “What Do Decision Makers Do When They Make a Foreign Policy Decision? The 
Implications for the Study of Comparative Foreign Policy”. In New Directions in the Study of Foreign 
Policy, eds. Charles Hermann, Charles Kegley and James Rosenau, 285-308 (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 
1987). 
139 Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis. 
140 Ibid, 31. 
141 Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games”, International 
Organization 42 (3) 1988: 427-260. 
 55 
political competition has on foreign policy?142 A new multi-polarity in the 
international system also requires expanding the range of case studies from an over-
reliance on crises between superpowers to include examples that feature the threat of 
terrorism and the question of humanitarian intervention (such as the Anglo-American 
Commission 1946).143 Also, decision-making in the absence of crisis remains largely 
unexplored, despite the fact that routine foreign policy has an equal if not greater 
propensity to affect patterns of international behaviour.144  
As well as new case studies, FPA is currently undergoing another 
methodological refinement as analysts try to bridge the gap between rational choice 
and cognitive models. This development is relatively recent, but continuing the 
détente between rational and cognitive approaches may help to develop a neo-
behavioural approach “in which the concept of rationality is informed, defined, and 
modelled by the concepts of beliefs, emotions, and motivations in applications to the 
study of international relations and foreign policy”.145 An enduring difficulty, 
however, “in predicting foreign policy behavior stems from a lack of awareness about 
which factors decision makers consider the most important”.146 One model that 
possesses the potential for flexibility needed to address these issues is Poliheuristic 
Decision Theory.  
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Poliheuristic Decision Theory 
As discussed above, the two leading paradigms in the study of foreign policy 
are the rational actor model, originally the product of Von Neumann and Morgenstern 
in the 1940s, and a second based on the cognitive, “Cybernetic perspective” 
established by Herbert Simon and refined by John Steinbruner.147 Rational choice 
models tend to pursue outcome validity at the expense of process validity, questioning 
the “why” of foreign policy decision-making but not the “how”.148 These models 
offer a unified and generalisable theory, but they lack a descriptive quality that 
reflects the complexities of reality. This is why rational choice has been challenged by 
the cognitive approach – because laboratory tests repeatedly demonstrate that real 
people do not make decisions based solely on a rational cost-benefit analysis.149 
However, Milton Friedman has observed that individuals behave “as if” they 
maximise utility, and this seems to be a valid assertion considering the success 
rational choice models have enjoyed with regard to predicting foreign policy 
behaviour.150 Cognitivists, in contrast, favour Prospect Theory and reject rational 
choice’s “expected utility” models due to their descriptive inadequacies.151 However, 
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this approach champions the “how” of process validity over the “why” of outcome 
validity and provides descriptive hypotheses but little useful generalisability.152  
These ostensibly rival models, therefore, actually highlight different aspects of 
decision-making, and possess different strengths and weaknesses. In an attempt to 
bridge the divide and attain both the descriptive accuracy of cognitivists and the 
predictive success of rational choice models, Poliheuristic Decision Theory utilises a 
two-stage decision-making process: in the first stage, alternatives are eliminated from 
the choice set, and in the second, the decision-maker goes through an analytic process 
of choosing an option that minimises risk and guarantees rewards.153 The decision-
making processes for Stage One are governed by five key characteristics: decision-
making is nonholistic, dimension-based, noncompensatory, satisficing and order-
sensitive.154 
First, the nonholistic or nonexhaustive nature of decision-making 
differentiates the poliheuristic approach from other FPA models based on utility, 
which demand that a decision-maker conducts an exhaustive search of alternatives in 
order to compare costs versus benefits between them.155 Instead, Ph Theory assumes 
the decision-maker “adopts heuristic decision rules that do not require detailed and 
complicated comparisons of relevant alternatives, and adopts or rejects undesirable 
alternatives on the basis of one or a few criteria”.156 This nonholistic approach means 
that the choice set is defined by a dimension-based rather than an alternative-based 
                                                 
152 Bryan Jones, Reconceiving Decision-Making in Democratic Politics: Attention, Choice, and Public 
Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); Janice Gross Stein and David Welch, “Rational 
and Psychological Approaches to the Study of International Conflict: Comparative Strengths and 
Weaknesses”. In Decisionmaking on War and Peace: The Cognitive-Rational Debate, eds. Alex Mintz 
and Nehemia Geva, 51-80 (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997). 
153 Alex Mintz, “Integrating Cognitive and Rational Theories of Foreign Policy Decision Making: A 
Poliheuristic Perspective”. In Integrating Cognitive and Rational Theories of Foreign Policy Decision 
Making, ed. Alex Mintz, 1-10  (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). 
154 Mintz and Geva, “The Poliheuristic Theory of Foreign Policy Decision Making”. 
155 Ibid. 
156 Ibid, 85. 
 58 
search; decision-makers compare alternatives to a cluster of variables within the same 
organising theme rather than assessing alternatives in a vacuum.157 For example, the 
political dimension might include elements such as public opinion polls, the leader’s 
popularity, the state of the economy and domestic opposition – variables used to 
evaluate the consequences of a chosen alternative on the political dimension. As the 
search is nonholistic, how many criteria and variables are used for any dimension is 
likely to vary as the decision-maker considers different alternatives along each 
organising theme.158 This means that Stage One concentrates on the most important 
dimension only and assumes that any alternative that fails to meet a certain threshold 
on this dimension will be discarded.159  
Assuming political actors operate under self-interested motivations, politicians 
see gains and losses in political terms; the most important dimension, therefore, is the 
political or domestic dimension.160 How a leader perceives the political consequences 
of his or her actions plays a crucial role in the decision-making process.161 Traditional 
rationality is purposive action seeking utility maximisation, but utility maximisation 
requires a holistic search in which no dimension can be distinguished as more or most 
important.162 Therefore, in order for decisions to be considered rational in this 
context, they must demonstrate decision-makers seeking utility maximisation on the 
same topic as the decision (i.e. a decision taken on Palestine is only rational if it is 
seeking to maximise utility on the Palestine issue). In the Ph approach, loss-aversion 
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overrules all other considerations, and so decision-making is driven by the desire to 
avoid failure rather than to achieve success.163 Consequently, “a low score in the 
political dimension cannot be compensated for by a high score in some other 
dimensions”.164 This is the noncompensatory principle, and this loss-aversion variable 
can be operationalised in several ways:  
“Threat to a leader’s survival; Significant drop in public support for a policy; 
Significant drop in popularity; The prospects of an electoral defeat; Domestic 
opposition; Threat to regime survival; Inter-party rivalry and competition; 
Internal or external challenge to the regime; Potential collapse of the coalition 
government or regime; Threat to political power, dignity, honor, or legitimacy 
of a leader; Demonstrations, riots, and so forth; The existence of veto players 
(e.g., pivotal parties in parliamentary government).”165 
 
Consequently, this model represents a process in which alternatives are 
selected or rejected based on a “satisficing” rather than maximising rule. The 
poliheuristic approach seeks acceptable options rather than maximising alternatives 
because it is likely that some dimensions will remain unconsidered even after a 
decision is made.166 Rejecting the “invariance assumption” that two alternative 
versions of the same problem should lead to the same outcome, this stage also 
considers that the order in which variables are evaluated may have an impact on the 
elimination of options from the choice set.167  These characteristics form the 
cognitivist foundation of Ph Theory’s first stage. Options are eliminated from the 
choice set that do not meet requirements on the political dimension, and then the 
remaining alternatives are assessed with a cost-benefit analysis. After options are 
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eliminated in the first stage, a second stage based on the rational choice model selects 
a final alternative that becomes the choice.  
 
Weaknesses of the Poliheuristic Model  
In applying Poliheuristic Decision Theory to four case studies, some 
limitations of the theory become apparent. Chiefly, there are problems with the central 
goal of using Poliheuristic Decision Theory as a bridging framework. There is also an 
under-specification of decision-making processes in Stage Two and some confusion 
over why Ph Theory is useful if it provides outcome validity that is equal to rational 
choice in many cases. An under-determination of both the variable choice and “cut-
off point” in Stage One creates further procedural problems, and the framework’s 
general neglect of group decision-making is a weakness in this respect as well. The 
final criticism is that Ph Theory paints foreign policy as overly reactive rather than 
proactive. Regardless, however, this section claims that Ph Theory is applicable to the 
case studies presented in subsequent chapters and then seeks to demonstrate this 
suitability, partly through the elimination of other frameworks with similar 
epistemologies.  
First, although Alex Mintz developed Ph principally as a bridging theory 
between rational choice and cognitive schools of Foreign Policy Analysis, it does not 
necessarily achieve this goal for two reasons. The frequent elimination of all options 
except one in the first stage of decision-making undermines the bridging principle. 
Although the sole viable option must satisfice key substantive dimensions in the 
second stage, the inability to conduct a cost-benefit analysis between competing 
alternatives is a theoretical flaw. James and Zhang posit that confirming the existence 
of a second stage in decision-making requires showing that the final decision is made 
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along a more diverse set of dimensions (as opposed to mostly the political), but this is 
not necessarily the case.168 In the context of dominant FPA literature, the Ph approach 
does not need to “prove” the existence of the second stage, but, rather, the first stage. 
The behavioural assumptions of rational choice are a widely accepted fiction, but if a 
decision appears to have been made principally based on political survival, then that is 
the more ground-breaking discovery. The lack of a cost-benefit analysis does not 
ultimately have an impact on outcome validity in circumstances where there are 
enough resources available to make accurate predictions about the political 
dimension, but this does demonstrate an area where greater procedural clarification 
would be beneficial. In addition, however, the second stage is also under-defined.  
DeRouen and Sprecher argue that the second stage utilises either Elimination 
by Aspect (EBA) or lexicographic (LEX) processes, but the poliheuristic model does 
not specify the conditions under which either strategy is selected.169 Whereas EBA is 
simply “a sequential elimination decision heuristic”, the LEX decision rule involves 
the selection of an alternative that provides the greatest utility for the most important 
dimension.170 The poliheuristic model “does not specify the conditions under which 
rational-analytic or lexicographic decision making is to be expected at the second 
stage” but cognitive psychology suggests this depends on the structural complexity of 
remaining choices.171 As both EBA and LEX, however, violate core principles of 
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rationality as defined by the expected utility model, using either of these decision 
rules in the second stage blurs the distinction between the two schools, which are 
ideally represented in their own separate stages of decision-making.  
This thesis has maintained use of the simplest expected utility model to avoid 
confusion, but this under-specification does create a paradox: seeking to explain and 
define Stage Two any further only limits its usefulness to the main aim of Ph as a 
bridging theory. Again, this theoretical hiccup does not have an impact on outcome 
validity because all formulations of Stage Two minimise costs and maximise rewards, 
but it is something to consider in Poliheuristic Decision Theory’s future development. 
In addition, there are three further areas that pose certain limitations on Ph Theory: 
equal outcome validity to rational choice, determining the cut-off point for evaluating 
risk and group decision-making. 
It is important to note that the Ph framework fails to provide a more accurate 
prediction than rational choice in most cases, and the necessary “scoring” of variables 
leaves research designs open to the possibility of selection bias.172 Astorino-Courtois 
and Trusty, for example, utilised Ph Theory to investigate the effect of Israeli policy 
shifts on Syrian peace decisions; they concluded that, “in none of the cases did [Ph 
Theory] anticipate strategy choices or outcomes significantly different from those 
suggested by rational analysis”.173 This is important because it is not enough to show 
that a case does not fit the rational choice model, rather it is necessary to show how 
the Ph perspective leads to a better fit.174 The fact that Ph Theory is as good as 
rational choice is somewhat of a compliment, and it does not negate the reasoning 
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behind a poliheuristic approach. Unlike rational choice, Ph Theory is compelling 
partly because it can add to our understanding of why events do not happen.175 
DeRouen, for instance, used a case study that resulted in no new policy, President 
Eisenhower’s decision not to use force at Dien Bien Phu, to demonstrate how the 
expected utility and Cybernetic models would have predicted an alternative outcome, 
whereas Ph Theory provided a compelling post-diction through use of the 
noncompensatory principle.176 Mintz uses this case study of Dien Bien Phu to 
demonstrate how Ph Theory is applicable to decisions that maintain the status quo, but 
it is important to recognise that this is only one case and, as the theory is still in its 
infancy, no further studies of this type have yet been conducted.  
This thesis does include one decision that maintained the status quo, the 
reversal of the Passfield White Paper in 1931, and employs the poliheuristic approach 
due to the flexibility it purports to possess. Rational choice is an inadequate model to 
analyse some events of this type – as argued by DeRouen – and Ph Theory provides 
as accurate an analysis as rational choice in other cases. Ph Theory, therefore, may be 
the most useful framework to study a range of cases in which some appear to defy the 
rational actor ideal (such as the Churchill White Paper of 1922) and others that appear 
to demonstrate a maximising principle (such as the MacDonald White Paper in 1939).  
Crucially, the malleable Ph approach provides a different but still widely 
generalisable understanding of rationality, one based primarily on the logic of 
political survival and the non-compensatory principle.177 As this principle is excluded 
from both rational choice and models favoured by cognitive theorists, qualitative 
applications of Ph Theory can provide a rational explanation for otherwise 
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inexplicable choices, such as various Labour politicians’ extremely pro-Zionist views 
outside government and apparently anti-Zionist actions once in power.178 
The problems of a single remaining option, equal outcome validity and the 
potential for flexibility really require confirmation through further case studies. One 
limitation that cannot be reconciled with theory development, however, is that before 
conducting any research is it not possible within the Ph framework to determine 
which variables are going to be part of the political dimension or at what point an 
alternative poses too much risk to those variables. More fundamentally, the 
poliheuristic approach assumes that politicians can identify a priori which alternatives 
are risky to their political survival. The case studies presented in subsequent chapters 
generally demonstrate that politicians do indeed possess a certain skill for identifying 
risky scenarios. The only exception is the initial publication of the Passfield White 
Paper in 1930 when the government of James Ramsay MacDonald did not anticipate 
the backlash it would create. As argued in Chapter Four, however, this was an 
understandable oversight. While the process of assessing risk does seem to take place, 
therefore, politicians may make an incorrect judgement regarding that risk. This has 
implications for the theory’s development and is discussed in detail in the Conclusion. 
For the researcher, identifying which variables British decision-makers have 
considered and how they identify which options are too risky is only possible through 
archival research, and most likely an over-collection of data. Politicians’ levels of 
sensitivity to the political dimension, which variables are included in the political 
dimension and the other dimensions under consideration are unique to each case 
study. While it may be true in the abstract to declare that “everything is political”, this 
maxim does not necessarily follow in practice. Archival research tends to reveal 
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decision-makers’ key concerns. There was, for example, during Winston Churchill’s 
tenure at the Colonial Office in the early 1920s, hardly a memorandum written about 
Palestine that did not refer to the cost of troops stationed there. The poliheuristic 
framework, therefore, relies on a high degree of specialised knowledge in order to 
yield either a post-diction or prediction.  
More nebulous, unfortunately, is the method for identifying a cut-off point – 
the stage at which the risk associated with one alternative is too great and it is 
eliminated from the choice set. While Mintz and Geva have attempted to clarify the 
cut-off point for risk through the use of a decision board, it merely papers over the 
theoretical cracks. Mintz and Geva assigned numerical values to variables within the 
political dimension in order to rank them, but this process involves the same level of 
educated estimation required in any qualitative analysis.179 Assigning numerical 
values on a decision board allows for clarification in research design, but it does not 
solve the underlying problem of context specificity and the dangers of selection bias. 
This is not a flaw unique to Poliheuristic Decision Theory, however. Just as the 
widely accepted rational choice model ranks preferences according to expected utility, 
the first stage of Ph Theory essentially ranks options according to their expected 
utility on the variables of the political dimension. Rather than selecting a winning 
option, however, this process simply eliminates the losers, but it cannot be done in a 
vacuum. This is far more problematic in predictions than in historical “explanations” 
as the historian already knows which options have been eliminated. 
While it is certainly a limitation on Poliheuristic Decision Theory that the 
framework cannot be implemented in a situation of limited available information, in 
circumstances of rich resource availability, this constraint becomes one strength of the 
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theory. Also, as all theories of human decision-making are based to some degree on 
assumptions, such as rational choice, which assumes that all humans are utility 
maximisers, Ph Theory utilises a far more realistic fundamental assumption. As the 
logic of political survival is restricted to leaders, it becomes a useful tool rather than a 
necessary fiction. This focus on national leaders means that the specific governmental 
system under consideration is also relevant. As the case studies presented in following 
chapters deal with a collectively responsible cabinet rather than a presidential system, 
the process of eliminating options in a group setting must be addressed.  
Although Redd has provided case studies in which a single decision-maker is 
influenced by bureaucratic advice, this is not the same as group decision-making.180 
Conversely, Brummer directly applies Ph Theory to the Bureaucratic Politics model, 
but rather than integrating Bureaucratic Politics into the Poliheuristic Theory, 
Brummer utilises Ph to facilitate Bureaucratic Politics’s process validity. Having 
specifically chosen a case study in which party politics was unlikely to play a role due 
to a large government majority, Brummer replaces the noncompensatory loss aversion 
variable with a “noncompensatory organizational loss aversion variable” in which the 
key dimension is not domestic politics but organisational interests.181 While useful to 
the Organizational Behaviour model within Bureaucratic Politics, this approach must 
assume the existence of multiple causal paths and so it sacrifices the predictable 
outcome validity needed to maintain the central function of Ph Theory. Instead, the 
best argument for group decision-making within a poliheuristic approach can be 
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found in the work of Brulé.182 Brulé argues that decisions made in group settings can 
be addressed “as an n-actor, m-dimensional bargaining scenario in which preferences 
are aggregated according to the two-stage process Poliheuristic Theory describes”.183 
This is based on the assumption that all members of the group possess “an effective 
veto on any decision”, so “the aggregation of group preferences into a single choice 
would, in the first stage, involve the elimination of all alternatives that are 
noncompensatory to any member of the group”.184  
Rather than every member of the British cabinet possessing an effective veto, 
however, the following chapters assume a narrowing of the group to only the key 
actors associated with Palestine in the interwar and post-war periods – principally, 
though not limited to, the Prime Minister, Colonial Secretary, Foreign Secretary and 
Chiefs of Staff. These figures dominated cabinet discussions on Palestine and carried 
the entire group, making Brulé’s characterisation of group decision-making through 
member-veto most appropriate. This, however, is an area of Poliheuristic Decision 
Theory that remains procedurally undeveloped and the problem is tied to Ph 
literature’s almost exclusive focus on politics of the United States. Mintz claims that 
the poliheuristic model is applicable wherever a political dimension is present, 
regardless of the type of government under consideration. Shifting the focus away 
from a presidency to a cabinet model, however, does require more consideration of 
the group dynamic. One way of integrating a realistic discussion of group decision-
making behaviour in the Ph approach may be to assign a more generalised description 
of Bureaucratic Politics to the political dimension as one variable among many, and 
this is discussed in greater detail under Alternative Frameworks below. 
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One final criticism of Poliheuristic Decision Theory is that it places a strong 
emphasis on domestic political constraints and the elimination of alternatives, which 
means it reflects a highly reactive rather than proactive form of policy-making. This 
critique, however, misunderstands the narrow jurisdiction of a poliheuristic approach. 
The theory is not necessarily concerned with how foreign policy options are 
developed or ideas constructed, but rather how they transition from alternatives within 
a choice set to becoming a final choice. A non-holistic search is assumed, but how 
alternatives enter the choice set is beyond Ph Theory’s current remit – it is not a 
model of foreign policy-making, but a model of foreign policy decision-making. The 
only major requirement for the researcher in this regard is to know which options are 
under consideration. The framework’s central ethos may be expanded over time, and 
this will require further case studies as well as the integration of other aspects of 
Foreign Policy Analysis, such as personality and culture – at the moment, a Ph 
approach is relatively Spartan. These are the main flaws within Poliheuristic Decision 
Theory. In comparison to the most obvious alternatives, however, it remains a useful 
and applicable framework for the purposes of this thesis. 
 
Alternative Frameworks 
In order to argue the suitability of Ph Theory to this thesis, it is necessary to 
highlight why potential alternative frameworks are less appropriate by comparison. 
As the goal of this thesis is to provide a better understanding of British decision-
making towards Palestine during the Mandate, which is based on a greater attention to 
domestic politics than that provided for by rational choice, FPA offers several 
additional frameworks that would seem applicable. These are Groupthink, 
Bureaucratic Politics, Psychobiography/Content Analysis (CA), Prospect Theory, the 
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Cybernetic model and Binary Role Theory. Each, however, possesses certain 
weaknesses that are problematic to reaching accurate empirical findings or possesses 
a procedural complexity that severely hampers their successful application.  
Since the British cabinet system is a group-based decision-making 
environment, it is necessary to address the major frameworks within FPA that deal 
with this dynamic: Groupthink and Bureaucratic Politics. First, Groupthink is a 
concept that describes decision-making within small groups as a collective 
psychological phenomenon.185 Introduced by Irving Janis in the 1970s, the theory is 
grounded in rational choice, focused more on identifying characteristics of decision-
making that may produce suboptimal outcomes than on how the processes that govern 
these decisions are operationalised.186 Under Groupthink conditions, the group in 
question seeks consensus and sacrifices the exploration of a variety of alternatives in 
order to secure it. Under these circumstances, the decision-making process is marked 
by conformity, both self- and group-imposed, and outsiders are vilified as morally 
inferior. As a result, the group disregards dissenting opinions and information that 
does not support the majority position.187 This model exhibits multiple symptoms. 
Some are observable in British decision-making towards Palestine during the Mandate 
period, but key characteristics do not appear to have been present. 
 Janis’s symptoms can be divided into three categories: 1) features that have 
been observed in groups who are susceptible to faulty decision-making, 2) 
characteristics of the search for conformity and 3) traits of the actual decision-making 
process – all of which are collectively termed “Groupthink”. The first category 
includes hallmarks such as similar ages and backgrounds within the group, isolation, 
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absence of an impartial leader, a crisis situation, an illusion of invulnerability and an 
unquestioned belief in the group’s morality.188 When these features are present, 
activities in the second category may also occur. These include collective 
rationalization efforts, stereotypes of outsiders, self-censorship, illusions of 
unanimity, direct pressure on dissenters and the existence of self-appointed 
mindguards. Finally, these features may then result in decision-making processes 
marked by traits from the third category: an incomplete survey of alternatives and 
objectives, a failure to examine risks of preferred choice, a failure to reappraise 
initially rejected alternatives, a poor information search, a selective bias in processing 
available information and a failure to work out contingency plans.189 
 In assessing the suitability of Groupthink to an analysis of British decision-
making towards Palestine, it appears that the model would have only partial 
applicability. Successive British cabinets certainly possessed some of the 
characteristics that might have made them susceptible to Groupthink, such as similar 
ages and socio-economic brackets among members, at least two instances of national 
crisis (discussed in Chapters Five and Six) and isolation due to political unpopularity 
(addressed in Chapters Three and Four). Also, as some politicians appeared to change 
their opinions on Zionism after assuming high office – most notably James Ramsay 
and Malcolm MacDonald – it would be tempting to assume that pressures of 
conformity highlighted by the Groupthink model could explain British decision-
making processes. 
However, when examining the group dynamic, features from the first two 
categories of Janis’s Groupthink symptoms merely indicate vulnerability to 
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Groupthink. If the decision-making period under investigation does not exhibit signs 
of a poor survey of information and objectives etc., then Groupthink is not an 
appropriate model.190 Crucially, in the case of British foreign policy decision-making 
towards Palestine, the investigative commissions present in every decision-making 
period represent sophisticated and independent information searches. Cabinet 
discussions were marked by both conformity and conflict throughout the Mandate 
period, but the search for information and options was never truncated. In addition, 
archival research highlighted by this thesis indicates an awareness of risk in every 
case study – political, economic and military/strategic – rather than a failure to 
examine the consequences of a preferred choice. The repeated absence of key 
Groupthink characteristics means that the model is less applicable than the 
poliheuristic framework to an analysis of British decision-making across the Mandate 
period. The model of Bureaucratic Politics, however, while posing a different 
collection of barriers, does yield several useful descriptive tools for even a Ph 
analysis.  
The model of Bureaucratic Politics, developed largely by Graham Allison and 
Morton Halperin, is a combination of three complementary frameworks: Model I The 
Rational Actor, Model II Organizational Behaviour and Model III Governmental 
Politics.191 Although the generic term “Bureaucratic Politics” is often conflated with 
organisational process and used generically to indicate structural features in decision-
making, these three components mean it is premised more on an agency-oriented than 
structural level of analysis – addressing individual, large and small group behaviour 
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respectively.192 This chapter has already highlighted how Ph Theory attempts to move 
beyond rational choice at the individual level and bridge the theoretical gap with 
cognitive models, but the case studies in this thesis do involve large organizations, 
predominantly the Foreign and Colonial Offices as well as their representatives in 
cabinet, and so the Bureaucratic Politics models would appear to be relevant. Indeed, 
Organizational Behaviour and Governmental Politics yield some useful concepts that 
increase the descriptive accuracy of British decision-making during the Mandate 
within a poliheuristic approach, but neither stand-alone model offers greater outcome 
validity than a systematic application of Poliheuristic Decision Theory.  
Within the Organizational Behaviour perspective, foreign policy decision-
making can be understood as “outputs of large organizations functioning according to 
standard patterns of behavior”.193 The model suggests a series of characteristics that 
define the nature of such organizations – a collection of traits whose existence is 
presumed constant. In their simplest descriptive forms, these are “essence” and “turf”. 
Essence is a quality that prompts organisations to claim a turf – an understanding of 
what issues it can assert an interest in – whether as a primary or lesser stakeholder.194 
As organisations develop their own identities, missions and visions based on specific 
skill sets, once entrenched this organisational culture is almost impossible to change. 
Such self-understanding is crucial to an organisation’s ability to function effectively. 
Mission and identity tells members why what they do is important; without this focus, 
an organisation may not develop a niche necessary to be influential within the 
bureaucracy.  
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Essence, however, can also breed distrust and resentment of nonconformists – 
both inside and outside the organisation – narrowing the essence over time. This 
attitude means that organisations jealously guard their turf while seeking to expand – 
more turf means more influence, a larger budget and possibly more autonomy. The 
presence of essence and turf also influences how members of the organisation behave 
towards a wide variety of issues, including morale, budgets, domestic accountability, 
career progression, use of the press and policy implementation.195  
These characteristics are observable in specific decision-making periods 
during Britain’s Mandate for Palestine. Unfortunately, however, the Organizational 
Behaviour model is not solely capable of providing causal pathways between 
bureaucratic resultants and final decisions in these and many cases – including the oft-
repeated Cuban Missile Crisis.196 Sub-cabinet activities can determine which options 
enter the choice set, but such a question falls outside of the remit of this thesis. The 
alternatives available to British decision-makers during the Mandate are readily 
available from archival research and this thesis is chiefly concern with the decision-
making process that occurred after these options were identified. This is where 
Allison interjects the model of Governmental Politics, or rather the identification of 
cabinet secretaries as key players in the decision-making environment. This small 
group dynamic is what bridges between descriptive features of large-group 
Organizational Behaviour and the causal pathways of small-group decision-making. 
The main actors in each case involving this model, therefore, “are key 
individuals sitting atop key organizations, each of which is trying to maximise its 
interests, agendas and goals”.197 In order to conduct a study taking these players into 
account, it is necessary to establish whose interests and actions played an important 
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role in governmental decision-making and determine each player’s impact on results – 
what was the actor’s relative power and how did their actions combine to influence 
decision-making?198 Essence and turf are also assumed to influence a stakeholder’s 
stance in negotiations.199 This is Miles’ Law, that “where you stand depends on where 
you sit”.200 Then, how each player or stakeholder’s input is weighted, depends on the 
dimension his or her organisation represents, and, therefore, its relative ranking for 
the issue being discussed.201  
This provides a realistic description of representative small-group behaviour, 
but the presence of a higher authority such as a president, or to a lesser extent a prime 
minister, makes it difficult to identify causal pathways between cabinet-level 
bargaining and final foreign policy choices. This has led to the open admission that 
Bureaucratic Politics may skew decision-making in another direction rather than 
explain the process from first formulation to final choice.202 The lack of causal 
pathways, however, does not eradicate any discussion of Bureaucratic Politics from 
analyses of decision-making, those that are clearly marked by cabinet-level disputes 
reflecting the interests of each participant’s respective organisation – or turf wars.  
Palestine policy decision-making during the Mandate period coincided with a 
tug-of-war between the Foreign and Colonial offices, and to ignore this would 
produce an artificial analysis. As Mintz noted how models such as Bureaucratic 
Politics “represent instances of political organizing themes during the decision-
making process”, it is possible to integrate a discussion of Bureaucratic Politics into 
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the poliheuristic approach by making the Bureaucratic Politics phenomenon a variable 
on the political dimension in the first stage of decision-making.203 This means the 
small-group behaviour Allison describes in the Governmental Politics model can be 
highlighted as an influencing factor without needing to specify the causal mechanisms 
connecting Bureaucratic Politics to the elimination of a particular alternative from the 
choice set.  
This means that the broad idea of “Bureaucratic Politics” is not artificially 
excluded from the analysis of British political infighting, but neither is it relied upon 
too heavily to “explain” decision-making. Rather than “causing” a decision, 
Bureaucratic Politics creates a negative atmosphere surrounding the decision-making 
process that leads to delay. This is evident in Chapters Three and Five in the interplay 
between rival heads of the Foreign and Colonial Offices. Consequently, these chapters 
feature a variable on the political dimension that is labelled “Bureaucratic Politics”; it 
refers to the combination of assumed characteristics present in Graham’s 
Organizational Behaviour and Governmental Politics models – the existence of 
essence, turf, and Miles’ Law – with archival evidence to demonstrate the turf-
focused rather than merely personal cabinet-level conflicts that dominate the study of 
this phenomenon.204  
It is important to note that within the group-based British cabinet system, 
individuals played a key role. Since FPA posits the importance of individuals in 
foreign policy decision-making, this has led to research investigating the role of 
personality, psychological and cognitive elements. Borrowing from the field of 
psychology, examinations of the individual decision-maker try to understand the 
relationship between the brain’s filters for information – which may include 
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stereotypes, biases, heuristics and even mental illnesses such as narcissism and 
paranoia – and foreign policy decisions.205 The main models used to investigate these 
filters have been Psychobiography and its derivative, Content Analysis (CA). 
Psychobiography emerged chiefly through the work of David Barber and 
Jerrold Post.206 Barber categorised presidents based on two axes, active-passive and 
positive-negative. The active-passive axis referred to a leader’s level of energy and 
personal belief in the power of the individual to effect change, and the positive-
negative axis addressed a leader’s world view and motivation for seeking office – 
discerning whether a leader is pessimistic, suspicious, motivated by feelings of 
neediness, shame or obligation.207 Naturally, Barber labels active-positive presidents 
such as Roosevelt, Truman and Kennedy as suitable for the highest office and 
passive-negative individuals including Wilson, Johnson and Nixon as unsuitable.208 
Barber views the most importance observable feature as “character,” which is “the 
way a person ‘orients himself towards life’ as developed through childhood” and 
highlights this as a crucial determining factor in presidential performance.209 
Post then built on this method – using a methodology he called anamnesis – to 
develop in-depth leadership profiles by examining everything from a leader’s 
childhood, personal experiences and family story, to health, habits, emotional 
stability, conscience, values and reaction to criticism and failure as well as the 
individual’s ideologies and even oratory and communication style. Post aimed to 
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produce a detailed profile and then use it to predict a president’s reactions to various 
scenarios involving international politics, most notably for the CIA.210 
These frameworks are highly useful for their descriptive detail but lack 
procedural clarity – they struggle to connect personality traits to causal mechanisms, 
which is also a criticism levelled at the “Great Man” approach to history and interwar 
IR.211 Barber’s use of Psychobiography was intended more as a pre-emptive warning 
model than an explanatory one – alerting American voters to dysfunctional 
presidential candidates – and Post’s approach is so complex that it fails to provide a 
theoretical model. Content Analysis has been used to try and simplify the process of 
identifying personality traits, but it falls into the same descriptive category. 
CA acts as a complement or alternative to psychobiography. Operating under 
the assumption that artefacts of personality appear in what a leader says and writes, 
CA attempts to uncover personality traits that influence decision-making by analysing 
a leader’s speeches and writings. There are two main forms of CA: thematic and 
quantitative (word count). Whereas the thematic approach requires a scholar to 
categorise personality themes he or she wants to investigate – meaning the analysis is 
only as meaningful as the analyst’s categorisation scheme – quantitative, or word 
count, CA rests on psychological theory.212 If words are artefacts of personality, then 
personality traits can be linked to particular word choices; “I”, “me”, “my”, “mine”, 
for example, demonstrate confidence.213  
As well as posing problems of contextual validity, however, such as the royal 
“we”, this approach faces several major hurdles: politicians do not tend to write their 
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own speeches, their speeches are audience-specific and they lie – even if only to 
protect national security – meaning that spontaneous live interviews are the only 
reliable texts for quantitative CA. Fundamentally, however, leaders cannot be 
assumed to possess many isolated traits constantly, and even if a scholar can 
demonstrate the link between word choice in a particular text and personality, this still 
does not demonstrate causal paths relating personality to decision-making. This is 
why particular biases, such as anti-Semitism, for example, cannot necessarily be 
assumed to have an impact on decision-making. Such feelings are often complex and 
seemingly contradictory. Colonel Meinertzhagen, for example, attempted to clarify 
his position vis-à-vis Zionism in 1919, writing that, “[m]y inclination towards Jews in 
general is governed by an anti-Semitic instinct which is invariably modified by 
personal contact. My views on Zionism are those of an ardent Zionist.”214  It is too 
easy, therefore, to attribute both pro- and anti-Zionist policy to anti-Semitism, and 
means that this particular causal pathway, supported by the theoretical basis that 
underpins Content Analysis, fails to hold much weight.  
The same is true of lesser-known methods for examining personal, 
psychological and cognitive traits, such as “think aloud” protocols, cognitive 
mapping, concept coding, image theory, and CA’s more technologically advanced 
cousin, ProfilerPlus.215 These cognitive frameworks are all immensely valuable for 
their descriptive contributions but struggle to satisfy the procedural needs of a foreign 
policy decision-making framework when used alone. However, research into 
individual cognitive elements does have a direct bearing on Ph Theory. 
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Since certain personality traits/mental illnesses such as narcissism and 
paranoia seem to be disproportionately frequent among national leaders (up to 13 per 
cent), analysts should consider that people drawn into politics may be those willing to 
pay any price for power, and that the pressures of high office can help pathological 
states to develop.216 This must impact how politicians perceive risk, and it may be 
necessary to assume that politicians, will, in general, accept greater risk to the 
political dimension than a control group. Alternatively, the negative feelings 
associated with losing power may be more acute among narcissists, for example, 
resulting in a lower than average threshold for acceptable political risk once in office. 
Such an issue falls outside the remit of this thesis, but it does raise the importance of 
individual characteristics even for a model that does not utilise them procedurally. In 
contrast to less theoretical cognitive approaches, Prospect Theory does connect 
cognition to decision-making but only under certain circumstances.  
Prospect Theory is the most influential cognitive model of decision-making. 
Developed by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky to predict choices that leaders 
make under conditions of risk, the theory has two phases: an editing phase of 
“framing effects” and an evaluation phase when an option is chosen.217 Although the 
poliheuristic model appears to adopt a similar structure, the main problem with 
Prospect Theory is its inability to predict frames.218 Whereas Ph Theory posits the 
domestic dimension as paramount to decision-making, Prospect Theory cannot posit 
one particular frame as constant throughout case studies, and so is only suitable for 
crisis situations in which the conditions of risk and potential loss provide the 
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appropriate cognitive boundaries for analysis. As it is not a complete theory of 
decision-making, therefore, Prospect Theory is inapplicable to cases of routine foreign 
policy – nor indeed have Prospect Theory studies been performed on groups.219 
Similar limitations are found in the Cybernetic model. 
Cybernetic decision-making is concerned with minimising uncertainty in 
conditions of crisis.220 In an ethos later adopted by Ph Theory, the Cybernetic 
approach highlights how decision-makers lack fundamental cognitive skills needed to 
carry out an exhaustive or holistic search.221 This is based on Herbert Simon’s 
concept of bounded rationality.222  Rather than optimise, decision-makers satisfice, 
monitoring only a small set of critical variables and aiming to reduce uncertainty by 
keeping these variables within tolerable ranges.223 Whereas Ph Theory complements 
this satisficing principle with a second decision-making stage involving rational 
choice, the Cybernetic model relies on a single stage, a satisficing principle alone and 
a fixed rather than evolving decision matrix.224 Again, this is why the model is useful 
only for conditions of crisis. Unable to predict which set of variables are crucial 
without the constraints of a high-risk situation, Cybernetic theory lacks the wider 
applicability necessary for case studies involving routine foreign policy decisions. 
The final alternative, Binary Role Theory, possesses the flexibility necessary to study 
both crises and routine policy, but it falls into the cognitivist trap of over-reliance on 
process without parsimony. 
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Binary Role Theory, like the poliheuristic approach, purports to bridge the gap 
between, metaphorically, “the cast-iron laws of classical physics that govern the 
behaviour of ‘clocks’ and the indeterminacy models of modern physics that govern 
the behaviour of ‘clouds’”.225 This theory focuses on two political worlds – the world 
of events “generated by the presence, power, and behaviour of other actors” and the 
world of beliefs “generated by the cognitive, emotional, and motivational processes of 
leaders”.226 In this approach, the world of beliefs (of states of mind) and the world of 
events (a set of possible actions that constitute randomness) converge in a third world 
of interactions, the process of which reduces randomness in each world, explaining 
stability and change. The operational code acts as an interface: philosophical beliefs 
represent the external world of events, and based on instrumental beliefs, the 
operational code prescribes strategies and tactics for decision-making vis-à-vis other 
actors.227 There are then two elements constituting the field of world politics: 
rationality and power, and these are “the respective conceptualisations of cognition 
and behaviour whose processes are systematically linked and offer theoretical 
explanations of patterns of continuity and change over time in the political 
universe”.228  
Although in an abstract sense this approach does utilise cognitive and rational 
factors, it does not provide a methodological structure with which to apply both. If 
rationality is simply seen as one element of cognition, then the approach is simply 
cognitivist. Binary Role Theory, therefore, is a model of how beliefs may interact 
with rationality and power as opposed to a model of decision-making. In attempting to 
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do full and complete justice to the complexity of cognition and causal pathways, 
Binary Role Theory over emphasises process validity at the expense of outcome 
validity. Like Content Analysis, Prospect Theory and the Cybernetic Model, Binary 
Role Theory lacks a crucial element that would make it a more suitable framework 
than Ph Theory to analyse British Palestine policy during the Mandate.  
Poliheuristic Decision Theory is not without its limitations and flaws, 
however, as previously discussed. The original intent of Ph Theory was to bridge the 
divide between rational and cognitive models, but as demonstrated above, this is 
undermined by the existence of a single viable alternative after Stage One and also by 
an unclear specification of decision-making processes in Stage Two. Rather than 
providing a panacea or umbrella theory, therefore, it is better to consider Poliheuristic 
Decision Theory as a pragmatic compromise. It sacrifices both the wider applicability 
of rational choice and minute detail of cognitive frameworks to allow a realistic study 
of certain specific circumstances. Instead of a theory of human decision-making, the 
poliheuristic approach is a framework for studying decision-making in the 
environment of high-stake politics. 
 
Conclusion 
In the twenty-first century, the opening of archives, and the accessibility of 
decision-makers and open source material more generally, provides a unique 
opportunity to blend useful elements of the cognitivist approach with rational choice. 
As the British Mandate for Palestine witnessed a dissimilar collection of crucial 
decision-making periods, this chapter claims that Poliheuristic Decision Theory 
provides the flexibility needed to address the entire period. As each case study 
highlights individually in subsequent chapters, the rational choice model can provide 
 83 
only an inaccurate prediction or incomplete post-diction of the British government’s 
decision-making processes. Neither Groupthink nor Bureaucratic politics provide 
adequate models for assessing cabinet-level decision-making, Psychobiography and 
Content Analysis rests upon an easily refutable assumption that personality is always 
connected to choice, Prospect Theory and the Cybernetic Model struggle to apply 
outside crisis situations and Binary Role Theory is impractical as a bridge between 
rational and cognitive schools. In contrast, Poliheuristic Decision Theory, while 
taking its weaknesses into consideration, remains useful in the specific decision-
making instances highlighted in this thesis – choices that resulted in changes to policy 
as well as one that maintained the status quo, and decisions taken in environments of 
both routine and crisis policy-making – a diverse collection of cases for which 
alternative frameworks lose their applicability.  
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Chapter 3: The Balfour Zeitgeist 1917-1928  
 
“The Arabs believe that in the next few years they are going to be swamped by scores 
of thousands of immigrants from Central Europe, who will push them off the land, eat 
up the scanty substance of the country and eventually gain absolute control of its 
institutions and destinies. As a matter of fact these fears are illusory.”229  
Winston Churchill, Colonial Secretary, 1921. 
  
The Balfour Declaration of 1917 became the first in a chain of events 
committing the British government to a Jewish national home in Palestine. Extended 
in the draft Mandate for Palestine and confirmed in the Churchill White Paper of 
1922, this national home policy continued almost unquestioned until the Palestine 
riots of 1929 prompted a reassessment. This period, therefore, represented a “Balfour 
Zeitgeist”, but it was a phase of British foreign policy that was not without frustration 
and confusion regarding its implementation. Rather than drawing a linear timeline 
from 1917 onwards, it is vital to recognise that the 1922-decision to confirm the 
principles of the declaration was highly uncertain. Using a traditional expected-utility 
foreign policy analysis, this decision was also inexplicable. Between the declaration 
and its affirmation, two British commissions of enquiry uncovered fundamental and 
irresolvable flaws in the national home policy, making a cost-benefit analysis 
incapable of recommending its continuation.  
In order to provide a cogent explanation and “post-diction” of this decision, 
therefore, it is necessary to invoke the more nuanced Poliheuristic Decision (Ph) 
Theory. This chapter applies the Ph Theory’s two-stage decision-making framework 
to the national home policy, demonstrating how and why the British government 
decided to affirm the policy in 1922. It argues that in the first stage of the decision-
making process, the government rejected alternatives that failed to meet requirements 
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on the most important, political dimension. Key variables the British government 
considered in the critical time period of 1920-1922 reflect criteria outlined in Mintz 
2004: prestige, bureaucratic politics, post-war economic decline and inter-party 
rivalry. Once options were eliminated, the government chose among the remaining 
alternatives in the second stage of decision-making by seeking to minimise costs on 
the substantive, strategic dimension. Finally, this chapter highlights how the national 
home policy remained untouched by both Conservative and Labour governments in 
the 1920s due to sunk costs. Rather than a Palestine policy based on interests, events 
and people in the territory under consideration, this analysis reveals a Palestine policy 
based primarily on the need to satisfy political concerns unrelated to the tiny 
Mediterranean territory.  
 
Defining the Choice Set 
 In the Rational Actor, or Expected Utility (EUT) model, the decision-maker 
chooses the option with the most preferred consequence. Rationality then, is a 
“consistent, value-maximizing choice within specified constraints”.230 Therefore, 
when explaining the British decision to affirm the national home policy in 1922, it is 
first necessary to acknowledge that several factors make this decision “irrational” as it 
failed to demonstrate purposive action seeking utility maximisation.231 A simple cost-
benefit analysis based on information available to decision-makers at the time would 
have predicted a renunciation of the national home policy. This is evident from the 
reports submitted in 1920 and 1921 by two commissions of enquiry. Following the 
Nebi Musa Riots of April 1920, the Palin Commission pinpointed fundamental flaws 
in the policy of supporting a Jewish national home, and following the Jaffa Riots of 
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May 1921, the Haycraft Commission independently reiterated many of the same 
concerns.  
The first major riots under British rule occurred roughly two-and-a-half years 
after the Balfour Declaration was first issued, but the Palin Commission found it was 
“undoubtedly the starting point of the whole trouble”.232 The Arabs of Palestine were 
struggling to reconcile an Anglo-French Declaration of self-determination with the 
promise of a Jewish home in Palestine, “giving rise to a sense of betrayal and intense 
anxiety for their future”.233 The announcement of Jewish, Zionist Sir Herbert Samuel 
as Palestine’s first High Commissioner was thought to exacerbate the situation. 
General Allenby in command in Palestine believed “that appointment of a Jew as first 
Governor will be highly dangerous”.234 He anticipated that “when news arrives of 
appointment of Mr. Samuel general movement against Zionist will result, and that we 
must be prepared for outrages against Jews, murders, raids on Jewish villages, and 
raids into our territory from East”.235 In contrast, many British and French politicians 
were concerned about the actions of Zionists rather than Arabs. To reassure the 
French Prime Minister, Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill “expatiated on the 
virtues and experience of Sir Herbert Samuel, and pointed out how evenly he was 
holding the balance between Arabs and Jews and how effectively he was restraining 
his own people, as perhaps only a Jewish administrator could”.236 
Although the Palin report pointed towards “provocative” Zionist behaviour as 
an immediate cause of the riots, it more importantly highlighted the real doubts 
underlying Arab animosity; “at the bottom of all is a deep-seated fear of the Jew, both 
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as a possible ruler and as an economic competitor”.237 These anxieties became a 
familiar theme in all riots during the British Mandate. Also, in blaming Zionists for 
the disturbances, the commission report could not avoid implicating British support 
for Zionism in the violence. It asserted that “the Administration was considerably 
hampered in its policy by the direct interference of the Home Authorities”, a thinly-
veiled criticism of policy emanating from the Foreign Office.238 Major-General Palin 
and his fellow commissioners warned the British government “[t]hat the situation at 
present obtaining in Palestine is exceedingly dangerous” and “a very firm hand” was 
necessary to “hold the scales as between all parties with rigid equality” to avert “a 
serious catastrophe”.239 However, as Samuel took charge of Palestine from the 
military administration before the Palin report was complete, he issued a general 
amnesty and declared the matter closed. On 15 July 1920, and before he had read it, 
Samuel telegraphed the Foreign Office to advise against publishing the Palin 
Commission “irrespective of contents”.240 The dangers, fears and tensions highlighted 
in the report might have been inconsequential if another riot on a worse scale had not 
erupted the following year in Jaffa. These disturbances were also the subject of an 
investigation, headed by Chief Justice of Palestine, Sir Thomas Haycraft. 
Although the Haycraft Commission did not question the national home as a 
viable policy, its report reiterated the fundamental tensions between Arabs and 
Zionists in Palestine. The immediate cause of the Jaffa riots was a clash between 
Jewish Labour demonstrators: Achdut HaAvoda, the powerful majority organisation 
which possessed a permit to conduct a rally, and Miflagat Poalim Sozialistim (MPS), 
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an inflammatory and banned group which did not.241 The Labour dispute finished 
relatively quickly, but police found Arabs smashing windows in Menshieh and “a 
general hunting of the Jews began”.242 It was recognised immediately that the 
underlying cause was Arab hostility towards the Jewish national home, and on 14 
May, Samuel announced a temporary prohibition on immigrants landing at the port of 
Jaffa and began preparations for another commission of inquiry.243 Haycraft posited 
that, “the Bolshevik demonstration was the spark that set alight the explosive 
discontent of the Arabs, and precipitated an outbreak which developed into an Arab-
Jewish feud”.244 Although appalled by the violence, Haycraft and his fellow 
commissioners believed that Arab antipathy in Jaffa resulted in part from a perceived 
Jewish arrogance, since newly arrived young men and women tended to stroll the 
streets arm-in-arm in “easy attire”, holding up traffic and singing songs. This did not 
fit with conservative Arab ideas of decorum. Haycraft detected, therefore, “no 
inherent anti-Semitism in the country, racial or religious”.245  
The report concluded that, “the fundamental cause of the Jaffa riots and the 
subsequent acts of violence was a feeling among the Arabs of discontent with, and 
hostility to, the Jews, due to political and economic causes, and connected with 
Jewish immigration”.246 Politically, the main fear was “that the Jews when they had 
sufficiently increased in numbers would become so highly organised and so well 
armed as to be able to overcome the Arabs, and rule over and oppress them”.247 
Economically, the influx of skilled Jewish labourers and artisans was seen as a threat 
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to Arab livelihoods.248 The Haycraft Commission provided the British government 
with another accurate illustration of Arab-Jewish tension in Palestine, but it could not 
offer a solution without extending beyond its remit and questioning the overarching 
policy: “Much, we feel might be done to allay the existing hostility between the races 
if responsible persons on both sides could agree to discuss the questions arising 
between them in a reasonable spirit, on the basis that the Arabs should accept 
implicitly the declared policy of the government on the subject of the Jewish national 
home, and that the Zionist leaders should abandon and repudiate all pretensions that 
go beyond it”.249 Without suggesting a political change, the commission had no 
practical advice to offer.  
In light of the tensions highlighted by these commission reports, the 
government in London was presented with three options: continue supporting the 
creation of a Jewish national home in Palestine – imposing it with the threat or use of 
force, limiting the national home policy in a manner acceptable to its critics, or 
repudiating the policy altogether. The General Staff articulated these options in 
practical terms: “(a.) An alteration of policy as regards Jewish immigration; (b.) An 
increase in the British garrison; or (c.) The acceptance of serious danger to the Jewish 
population”.250 The cabinet agreed their courses were to “withdraw from their 
Declaration, refer the Mandate back to the League of Nations, set up an Arab National 
government and slow down or stop the immigration of Jews: or they could carry out 
the present policy with greater vigour and encourage the arming of the Jews”.251 Far 
from a simple continuation of the Balfour Declaration policy, the entire question of 
Britain retaining Palestine was under review. In June 1921, the new Middle East 
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Department of the Colonial Office advised “it is idle to consider what steps should 
now be taken […] until we have made up our minds whether we wish to retain the 
Mandates”.252 As Colonial Secretary, Winston Churchill found the situation highly 
troubling, writing how “[b]oth Arabs and Jews are armed and arming, ready to spring 
at each other's throats”.253 By August, it was obvious to the cabinet that “peace was 
impossible on the lines of the Balfour Declaration”.254 The situation required some 
form of action, not least to protect the British officials administering Palestine. 
Governor of Jerusalem Sir Ronald Storrs wrote in his diary at the time, “we remain, 
all of us, in unstable equilibrium until, after two years and a half, somebody can be 
found to take any decision”.255 As the following analysis will argue, however, the 
decision taken to affirm the national home policy in 1922 was the result of options 
eliminated in the first stage of decision-making that failed to meet requirements on the 
political dimension, followed by a satisficing principle in the second stage. These 
variables and dimensions at no point included consideration of either Zionist or Arab 
interests in Palestine. 
 
Stage One 
 According to the poliheuristic theory, the first stage of decision-making is 
presumed to be based on political survival rather than a complete assessment of costs 
and benefits.256 A decision-maker is first concerned with the political implications of 
a decision, so variables such as public opinion, the economy and domestic opposition 
“may be used to evaluate the consequence of a chosen alternative on this organizing 
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theme”.257 Using the list of variables to be considered as part of the political 
dimension from Mintz258, this section demonstrates how the “noncompensatory loss 
aversion variable” was operationalised in British decision-making regarding Palestine 
through prestige, bureaucratic politics, post-war economic decline and inter-party 
rivalry; options were eliminated from the choice set by discarding those that failed to 
meet requirements on the political dimension.  
 
Variable: Prestige 
 The threat to dignity, or prestige, is one of the variables outlined by Mintz259 
that can be considered on the political dimension because of its inherent danger to 
political survival. In the context of British decision-making in the early 1920s, the 
threat to prestige emanated from stature within the international community. Although 
British policy on the Jewish national home was officially made in Westminster, it 
acquired an international element first as a wartime promise approved by the Entente, 
then in the draft Mandate assigned to Britain by the Principled Allied Powers in 1920 
(Britain, France, Italy and Japan with a US representative present), and finally in 
negotiations with the League of Nations and the United States for the Mandate’s 
approval.260 These complicating factors meant that concerns for international prestige 
led the British government to eliminate the option of repudiating the national home 
policy in the first stage of decision-making. 
Palestine’s retention by the British Empire was not a foregone conclusion, but 
became more likely after the First World War ended. Ultimately for Britain, the 
problem of Palestine’s trusteeship was less an issue of imperial expansionism and 
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more about avoiding unwelcome intrusions. British military, strategic and energy 
interests in Egypt, Arabia and Mesopotamia made the prospect of a rival power in 
Palestine immediately following a world war decidedly unattractive. British Prime 
Minister Lloyd George and French Prime Minister Clemenceau agreed in secret that 
Britain would annex Palestine and oil-rich Mosul in Mesopotamia in exchange for an 
exclusively French Syria and share of the Mosul oil.261 Through this bargaining and a 
pledge of good faith towards the published Balfour Declaration, which allowed more 
general League of Nations approval, the principle of a British Palestine became 
diplomatically entrenched very early, before British officials had time to appreciate 
the potential difficulties this entailed. 
A further complication was the Treaty of Sèvres with Turkey, signed in 
August 1920. Article 95 of the Turkish peace treaty reinforced the draft Mandate in 
committing Britain to supporting a Jewish national home in Palestine.262 Since the 
document carried signatures from Britain and the Dominions (including India), 
France, Italy, Japan, Armenia, Belgium, Greece, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, 
Czechoslovakia and Turkey, the scale of international agreement essentially prevented 
repudiation of the national home without creating a legal quagmire.263 The Balfour 
Declaration had rapidly become the entire public basis of a British Palestine, and the 
length of negotiations with the French and other powers made it less and less likely 
that the national home could be reversed without substantial international humiliation, 
if the necessary agreements from League members could be achieved at all.264 
Churchill noted that the French were feeling the same about Syria and Lebanon as 
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British politicians were about Palestine and Mesopotamia: “utterly sick of pouring out 
money and men”265. Both powers, however, had bargained for the new territories 
through a larger international framework that was nearly impossible to reverse. 
By June 1921, the power of this international body to inflict humiliation on the 
British Empire became readily apparent. There was “serious risk” that when the 
Council of the League of Nations next met to vote on the final mandates, they would 
be rejected on the basis of Italian and American objections.266 Italy was raising the 
concerns of the Vatican regarding guardianship of Christian holy places in Palestine, 
and the American State Department, despite its position outside the League, formally 
objected to their exclusion from the consultation process.267 In light of this diplomatic 
deadlock and the problems Britain was already facing in Palestine, the option to 
withdraw from the territory altogether was considered.268 On a diplomatic level, the 
British government considered taking the opportunity to repudiate the terms of the 
national home policy while the entire Mandate was in question by “publicly 
confessing that they [the terms] are insecurely based and rebuilding them on a firmer 
foundation”.269 Unfortunately for the policy’s opponents, however, the Council of the 
League agreed to postpone a final vote from 1921 to July 1922 rather than create a 
situation in which all prior negotiations were void. This meant that after June 1921, 
any modifications to the Mandate would have required separate approval from the 
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great powers within the prohibitively short period of one year.270 American support 
for the draft Mandate was forthcoming on 3 May 1922 – in a joint resolution by the 
United States Congress – but this meant Britain was merely further entrenched in the 
national home policy.271  
Between this public American declaration of support and the final League vote 
on 22 July 1922, the Churchill White Paper was published. It not only confirmed the 
national home policy, but also specifically cited the diplomatic ties preventing its 
alteration: the “Declaration, reaffirmed by the Conference of the Principle Allied 
Powers at San Remo and again in the Treaty of Sèvres, is not susceptible of 
change”.272 By incorporating the language of the Balfour Declaration into the 
Mandate and Treaty of Sevres, Britain had officially recognised a legal obligation to 
serve two masters. Governor of Jerusalem Sir Ronald Storrs, for example, referred to 
the highly unsteady first civilian administration in Palestine as “making a bicycle and 
riding it at the same time”.273 Ultimately, the loss of prestige associated with 
reversing the Balfour Declaration meant this option failed to meet requirements on the 
political dimension and was eliminated from the choice set in the first stage of 
decision-making. Removing this alternative, however, was also influenced by the 
political dimension’s variable of “bureaucratic politics”. 
 
                                                 
270 CAB 24/126, 29 June 1921, “The Recent Meeting of the Council of the League of Nations. Note by 
Mr. Fisher”, TNA.  
271 CAB 24/159, 17 February 1923, “Palestine. Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies”, TNA. 
272 Cmd 1700, 1922, Palestine. Correspondence with the Palestine Arab Delegation and the Zionist 
Organisation. 
273 Storrs, Orientations, 458. 
 95 
Variable: Bureaucratic Politics 
Utilising the description of bureaucratic politics developed by Allison and 
Halperin,274 this section argues that a turf war between the Foreign and Colonial 
Offices over the Middle East contributed to an option being eliminated from the 
choice set in the first stage of decision-making. Repudiating the national home policy 
may have been discarded as an option due to both departments claiming expertise in 
the decision-making process. This was the product of earlier and lingering tensions – 
if not fully developed turf wars – between the Foreign and War Offices as well as the 
Foreign Office and 10 Downing Street. The actors in this case were secretaries of 
state “sitting atop key organizations, each of which is trying to maximize its interests, 
agendas and goals”.275 Rather than representing a stand-alone variable that directly 
led to an option being removed from the choice set, bureaucratic politics created the 
conditions under which it was very difficult to repudiate the national home policy, 
contributing to the rejection of this alternative. 
Immediately after the First World War, responsibility for Palestine was 
divided between two cabinet offices. The War Office administered the Occupied 
Enemy Territories Administration (O.E.T.A.) in Palestine following the invasion in 
December 1917. The organisation acted under a Chief Administrator taking his orders 
from the Commander-in-Chief (General Allenby) through the General Officer 
Commanding.276 While the War Office was responsible for executing policy, it acted 
on instructions from the Foreign Office, which received intelligence on the O.E.T.A. 
administration directly from a Chief Political Officer stationed in Palestine.277 
Colonel Meinertzhagen was the last to serve in this awkward position and wrote, 
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“such work is tantamount to that of a spy on Allenby’s staff”.278 When the military 
administration gave way to the civilian High Commissioner Sir Herbert Samuel in 
July 1920, Samuel also began his tenure under direction from the Foreign Office.279 
This monopoly on Palestine policy, however, was challenged directly by the 
formation of a new Middle East Department in the Colonial Office. Lord Curzon of 
Keddleston was Foreign Secretary at the time, and his specific expertise was Eastern 
affairs. This, coupled with simmering rivalry between Lord Curzon and Prime 
Minister David Lloyd George in the search for a post-war peace settlement in Europe, 
made the Middle East even more important to the “essence” of the Foreign Office at 
this time, and contributed to a propensity to fight for the Middle East as its “turf”.280 
Between the resignation of Lord Arthur Balfour as Foreign Secretary in 1919 
and Lloyd George’s downfall in October 1922, there was tension between the Foreign 
Office and the Office of the Prime Minister over European peace negotiations. Lord 
Curzon inherited a weakened Foreign Office, partly as a result of wartime conditions, 
but also due to Balfour’s apparent tendency to concede control over Foreign Policy 
relatively easily.281 Rather than using the traditional Foreign Office channels, Lloyd 
George dominated post-war foreign affairs through presidential-style summit-
diplomacy, keeping close control of the agenda and minutes, and leading War 
Secretary Winston Churchill to complain that the record bore little resemblance to his 
memory of discussions.282 The lack of information coming out of the Paris Peace 
talks, for example, was a matter of great contention at the Foreign Office, which 
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complained that, “we rarely receive, except occasionally through private channels on 
which it is not often easy to take prompt action, any official intimation of the 
decisions reached by the Councils of four or five”.283 This personal and semi-
secretive style of diplomacy caused a certain amount of antagonism within the British 
government at large, leading Conservative statesman Andrew Bonar Law to promise 
specifically in his 1922 election address that all future international conferences 
would be handled by the Foreign Office and not by him personally.284 This came too 
late, however, to have any effect on relations between the Foreign and Colonial 
Offices over Palestine policy. 
Between December of 1920 and the Churchill White Paper of 1922, there was 
a turf war between the Foreign and Colonial Offices over control of the Middle East. 
As early as February 1918, Lord Curzon had suggested a new department for Middle 
East affairs, but he had always intended it to be an entirely independent new ministry 
or part of the Foreign Office.285 Although the initial universal desire was for an 
entirely new ministry, it was prohibitively costly.286 Players with a stake in foreign 
affairs subsequently lined up in support behind either a new department in the Foreign 
Office under Lord Curzon or one in the Colonial Office under the next Colonial 
Secretary Winston Churchill – as India Secretary Sir Edwin Montagu removed his 
ministry from consideration because “India expected her Secretary of State to mind 
her own affairs, [and] it was derogatory to her dignity to be treated as a part-time 
job”.287 What ensued was an argument regarding expertise. Curzon wrote to the 
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cabinet that “Mr. Churchill prefers the Colonial Office, but I think must be very 
imperfectly acquainted with the views or interests of the States of the Middle East, if 
he thinks that such a transference […] would lead to an immediate solution of the 
difficulties by which we are confronted”.288 Rather than highlight problems of correct 
administration, Curzon tried to paint Palestine as a diplomatic issue, irremovably 
connected to “the jealous and complex interests of foreign Powers arising out of their 
ecclesiastical pretensions, their commercial interests, and their acute rivalry”, 
reiterating claims to the region as part of Foreign Office “turf”.289 If the new 
department for the Middle East was not installed in the Foreign Office, Curzon 
concluded, “it would merely mean that the work would have to he done twice over, 
and that there would be general confusion”.290  
However, on 31 December 1920, the new department was, by a majority vote, 
assigned to the Colonial Office.291 This appears chiefly to have been the result of 
bullying from Churchill. A revolt had broken out in the Iraqi region of Mosul in May, 
and Churchill issued the cabinet with an ultimatum requiring either withdrawal to 
Basra and ignoring the chaos in the rest of Iraq – “a grave political blunder” – or 
giving the Colonial Office a new department for the Middle East with the political 
authority needed to restore order in the two mandates of Palestine and 
Mesopotamia.292 This meant, however, that true to Lord Curzon’s predictions, since 
the Foreign Office could not realistically stop being a player in the Middle East, the 
two departments vied for control during the diplomatic wrangling described above 
and the Parliamentary infighting demonstrated below. Kozak notes that policy made 
under these conditions is characterised by bargaining and accommodation, creating 
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“resultants” rather than decisions, and it certainly appears that the turf war between 
the Foreign and Colonial Offices in 1920 created a situation unconducive to decisive 
change.293 Even after the final division of responsibilities was in place, Churchill 
continued to agitate for complete control within the Colonial Office: “The more I 
study the Middle Eastern problem”, he wrote to Lloyd George, “the more convinced I 
am that it is impossible to deal with it unless the conduct of British affairs in the 
whole of the Arabian peninsula is vested in the Middle Eastern Department […] I 
must have control of everything in the ringed fence”.294 Churchill was convinced that 
the split had produced nothing but  “paralysis and confusion of action”.295 This was 
because “Feisal or Abdullah, whether in Mesopotamia or Mecca; King Hussein at 
Mecca; Bin Saud at Nejd; Bin Rashid at Hail’ the Sheikh of Kuwait; and King Samuel 
at Jerusalem are all inextricably inter-woven, and no conceivable policy can have any 
chance which does not pull all the strings affecting them”.296 
The issue was not differing opinions between departments on the moral or 
practical value of the Jewish national home – the Palin and Haycraft Commissions 
both demonstrated the grave problems inherent in the Balfour Declaration. Instead, 
the bureaucratic politics of the Foreign and Colonial Offices meant they were already 
predisposed to reject large or sweeping potential solutions. Consequently, this 
atmosphere contributed to eliminating the option to repudiate the national home 
policy in the first-stage of decision-making. 
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Variable: The Economy 
 The economy may seem more like a substantive dimension in the second stage 
of decision-making, but in times of hardship it serves as a variable on the political 
dimension. This is because the variable under consideration, though ostensibly 
dealing with issues related to the economy, is really concerned with strategic political 
manipulation of perceptions of the economy, and as such, it requires consideration on 
the political dimension. The post-war coalition under Lloyd George was faced with 
the major task of reconstruction. As a prolonged economic crisis hit Britain by 1920-
21, the government was under pressure to spend less abroad and more at home. One 
of the most expensive elements of Britain’s Empire was the troop numbers needed to 
maintain it. This meant that post-war economic decline removed an option from the 
choice set in the first stage of decision-making regarding the Jewish national home in 
Palestine. Imposing it with the threat or use of force – i.e. the stationing of troops 
sufficient in number to protect a very small Jewish minority from the Arab majority – 
presented far too much risk to the political dimension.  
In December 1918, the coalition manifesto emphasised economic 
development, cutting the war debt and making “the inevitable reductions in our 
military and naval establishments with the least possible suffering to individuals and 
to the best advantage of industry and trade”.297 However, the severe contraction of 
markets during the war (including the loss of Britain’s largest trading partner, 
Germany) meant Britain slid quickly into its first globalised economic crisis. An 
industrial recession struck in May 1920 and Britain was facing a high unemployment 
problem by the end of the year. More than two million were out of work in December 
1921, and the average unemployment rate stayed over 10% for several years, higher 
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than anything recorded before the war.298 These economic problems also brought 
large-scale industrial action. A “triple alliance” of workers from the mining, railway 
and transport industries provided continual unrest.299 As well as the demonstrations, 
marches and occasional violence of British workers, the government was also trying 
to deal with complaints from big business and institutions such as the Bank of 
England, all clamouring for cuts.300 However, a complicating factor was Britain’s 
victory in 1918 position at the centre of imperial authority combined with communal 
responsibility as part of the Supreme Allied Council and then the League of Nations. 
This meant a continental commitment to deploy troops in border regions of Germany 
as well as vast and diverse new sections of the Empire, which conflicted with the 
election priorities of reduced military spending.  
In terms of the Middle East, this conflict between maintaining an empire and 
satisfying the domestic need for economies was embodied by Winston Churchill’s 
time at the War and Colonial Offices. Churchill pushed the new Middle East 
Department “towards a curtailment of our responsibilities and our expenditure”.301 
Before the new department was assigned to the Colonial Office, Churchill complained 
bitterly about the waste created by the War Office, which followed instructions from 
the Foreign Office in the Middle East.302 He charged that the result was villages 
“inhabited by a few hundred half naked native families, usually starving”, being 
occupied by “garrisons on a scale which in India would maintain order in wealthy 
provinces of millions of people” and that this waste would continue “as long as the 
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department calling the tune has no responsibility for paying the piper”.303 Churchill 
was only prepared to invest in fertile territories, such as East and West Africa, where 
development could contribute rapidly to British coffers.304 For the Middle East, he 
recommended placing responsibility for maintaining order on the air force; this would 
be much cheaper than army garrisons or cavalry because it required only a few 
airstrips with no earth-bound lines of communication or animals.305  
This focus on spending cuts meant considerations of cost came before the 
safety of Britain’s Zionist subjects in Palestine. Chief of the Imperial General Staff 
(C.I.G.S) Henry Wilson called the cabinet’s attention to the weakness of British 
garrisons in the Middle East in May 1920. This was due to the delay in a peace 
settlement with Turkey, the inability to enforce its terms, French problems with Turks 
and Arabs in Cilicia – “disasters which have obliged the French government to 
reinforce that theatre up to 48 battalions (reinforcements which are not sufficient to 
avoid still further disasters)” – and “the very unsettled interior condition of both 
Palestine and Egypt”.306 The General Staff feared the boundaries of economy would 
leave them unable to fulfil imperial policy. They pointed to a “real danger” and how 
the government’s pro-Zionist stance was “likely to increase our difficulties with the 
Arabs, and there are already indications that military action may be necessary, both to 
maintain the frontier and concurrently to preserve peace internally”.307  
These warnings were issued one month after the Nebi Musa Riots in Palestine, 
but Churchill made no reference to either the army’s advice or the violent outburst in 
Jerusalem in policy discussions regarding the Middle East or Palestine specifically. 
The issue of cost became important even before the draft Mandate was complete. 
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Lloyd George believed “that the raising of money for the development of Palestine is 
a most important matter, and that the government should do all it reasonably can to 
facilitate this”.308 As a result, Foreign Secretary Curzon was advised to “have a talk 
with the representatives of the Zionist Organization and find out whether it is possible 
to meet some of their views without modifying the principles upon which the 
Mandate it based”.309 This was because the bulk of financing for development of the 
Jewish national home was expected to come from Zionist fundraising, easing the 
future burden on the British Treasury. 
On 26 January 1921, Churchill called for the further reduction of troops from 
Palestine, which the General Staff advised was too low and invited rebellion.310 The 
Jaffa Riots broke out three months later. Nevertheless, in assuming responsibility for 
Palestine first in the War Office and then in the Colonial Office, the only relevant 
issue to Churchill remained spending cuts. A means to this end was a series of Middle 
East conferences where various regional leaders and officials could be summoned to 
“effect economies in the Middle East”.311 This was a source of frustration to Zionist 
supporters who wanted active British involvement in building the national home. 
Colonel Meinertzhagen for example – a professed Zionist advocate who worked in 
both the O.E.T.A and Middle East Department – declared, “Winston does not care 
two pins, and does not want to be bothered about it. He is reconciled to a policy of 
drift. He is too wrapped up in home politics”.312 Even the people seconded to Cairo 
for the conferences demonstrated Churchill’s priorities. Rather than Arabists or policy 
experts, the guests from London were Chief of the Air Staff Sir Hugh Trenchard, 
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Director of Military Operations Major-General Radcliffe, J. B. Crosland from the 
Finance Department of the War Office and Sir George Barstow of the Treasury.313 
The word “Zionism” was left off the Conference agenda; that it was discussed at all is 
only implied by two minutes: “Policy in Palestine under the Mandate” and “Special 
Subjects”.314 Churchill did travel to Palestine and met with both Arab and Jewish 
consultations, but he merely urged them to get along for the benefit of all.315 This was 
not a political discussion that could result in reduced expenditure. Instead, the 
Colonial Secretary focused his Palestine discussions on Transjordania.316 In order to 
save money, the Sharifian Prince Abdullah would administer Transjordania with 
British advisers and a small contingent of troops, refrain from attacking French Syria 
and prevent cross-border raids; in return, the British would cut Zionism off at the 
River Jordan, thereby sparing them the soldiers and administrators needed to extend 
it.317 This also allowed Churchill plausibly to claim that he was honouring the 
Hussein McMahon correspondence.  
The Jaffa Riots themselves did not alter Churchill’s position on this issue of 
cost. General Congreve submitted a memo to the Colonial Office in June 1921 
entitled “Situation in Palestine”; it said Palestine was in “increasing danger” that 
would require “heavy expenditure” and meet “bitter resentment” from Zionists “for 
not protecting them better”.318 “I do not think”, Congreve concluded, “things are 
going to get better in this part of the world, but rather worse”.319 Churchill circulated 
this memo to the cabinet, but only to highlight how he disagreed with it. This was one 
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month after the Jaffa Riots, but neither the unrest nor advice from local officials 
appeared in policy discussions on cuts.320  
Indeed, despite troop reductions, Churchill still saw Palestine as too 
expensive. When a danger arose in the summer of 1921 that the League of Nations 
would refuse Britain her mandates, Churchill suggested complete withdrawal on the 
basis that “His Majesty's Government have spent over one hundred million pounds in 
Palestine and Mesopotamia since the armistice”.321 Churchill even suggested to Lloyd 
George, believing he would agree, that Britain should offer “to hand over to the 
charge of the U.S. either or both of the Middle Eastern Mandates we now hold, if they 
should desire to assume them”.322 The Colonial Secretary advocated this course of 
action in cabinet where, to everyone’s surprise, Lord Balfour supported the idea, 
noting that it “ought to be very seriously examined”.323 Cutting costs in Palestine 
became one of the Colonial Secretary’s favourite topics: “But whatever may be done 
about it”, Churchill wrote, “the fact remains that Palestine simply cannot afford to pay 
for troops on the War Office scale”.324  
Instead, the Colonial Secretary recommended getting rid of British troops 
altogether and relying instead on police, Indian troops “and lastly upon arming the 
Jewish colonies for their own protection”.325 Churchill’s enterprise in economy was 
so comprehensive that even the infamous Geddes Committee on National 
Expenditure, which called for huge sweeping cuts across Whitehall’s already nervous 
departments, confessed that while it found “very heavy expenditure” in Palestine, 
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Egypt and Constantinople, there was little more Palestine could afford to give up.326 
Geddes recognised the problem characterised by “the maintenance of internal order in 
a comparatively small country, and [how] the difficulties which have arisen are due to 
the attitude of the Arab population toward the Zionist policy adopted by the 
Government”.327 While many Secretaries of State called the Geddes “axe” 
irresponsible, it perfectly complemented Churchill’s own policy within the Colonial 
Office. 
As War and then Colonial Secretary, Winston Churchill’s singular drive to 
reduce spending reflected the political situation faced by the entire coalition 
government. The expense associated with troops meant Palestine could not receive the 
necessary reinforcements needed to protect the Zionist experiment from violence. In a 
time of widespread industrial action, high unemployment and general economic 
downturn, the political cost was too high and this option was removed from the choice 
set. In this sense, the economy variable was closely connected to inter-party politics, 
which is discussed below. 
 
Variable: Inter-party Politics 
One of the most important aspects of Britain’s early Palestine policy was the 
relationship with inter-party politics. This section argues that criticisms coming 
mainly from the Conservative Party led to an option being eliminated from the choice 
set in the first stage of decision-making. The “coupon” election of December 1918 left 
the Liberal David Lloyd George as Prime Minister at the head of a majority 
Conservative coalition. Dissension with his leadership grew steadily, and virulent 
Parliamentary criticism of the government’s Palestine policy meant the coalition was 
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unable to continue the national home as it stood in the Balfour Declaration and draft 
Mandate (which included a commitment to put it into effect).328 
The coupon election of December 1918 was a means to extend Lloyd 
George’s prime ministerial tenure. After he ousted fellow Liberal Asquith in 1916, 
Lloyd George relied heavily on Conservative support. The  “coupon”, a derogatory 
term employed by Asquith, was a letter of endorsement signed by the Prime Minister 
and the Conservative leader Bonar Law, recognizing its recipient as the official 
coalition candidate in his constituency.329 Owing to the immediate post-war 
popularity of the Prime Minister and the significant expansion of voting rights in 
1918, the coupon was a powerful tool. The majority of recipients were Conservatives 
(364 as opposed to 159 Liberals), which reflected the reality of the Liberal Party as a 
spent force.330 As the post-war political climate was marked by a significant swing to 
the right – the main issues were the fate of Germany and the Kaiser, with many 
calling for his trial and execution along with the expulsion of Germans from Britain – 
the atmosphere among the electorate favoured a Conservative victory. Liberal leader 
Asquith lost his seat to an “uncouponed” Conservative, and the Conservative Party 
even swept the vote in the traditional Liberal stronghold of Manchester.331 This 
climate placed a great deal of right-wing pressure on Lloyd George at the head of his 
coalition cabinet. 
After violence erupted in Palestine in 1920 and 1921, the government’s 
handling of Zionism became one of several key issues with which to criticise Lloyd 
George. Although there had been a substantial amount of backbench support for the 
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Balfour Declaration in 1917, this had merely reflected a need for wartime coalition 
solidarity that was hardly critical by 1920.332 The idea of cost versus benefit was a 
recurring political theme, and Conservative MPs Sir Frederick Hall, Sir Harry Brittain 
and Sir Henry Page-Croft raised the issue in July 1920 and again in December that 
“an enormous amount of money has been expended in this direction for which we are 
not getting any return”.333 Opposition to the national home then began in earnest in 
March 1921 (with Sir Joynson-Hicks calling for publication of the Palin Commission) 
and continued in the House of Lords following the Jaffa Riots334  
Complaints included the unlimited nature of Zionist immigration and how this 
led to Bolshevik infiltration, with the Conservative MP Joynson-Hicks highlighting 
how advice to “be very careful about introducing the right class of immigrants, and 
about not introducing too many at a time” had been “totally disregarded”.335 The issue 
of native rights was also brought up in both Houses in defence of Palestinian Arabs. 
Conservative Peer Lord Lamington, for example, defended British control of Palestine 
while criticising the Zionist element: “whilst it might be quite possible to give to a 
child a spoonful of jam containing a lot of noxious medicines, the child would not be 
pleased with the jam in that condition. That is practically an analogy in regard to this 
Mandate as held by us.”336 
The main inter-party dispute, however, remained costs. On 8 June, Joynson-
Hicks had raised the point that “[b]efore we occupied this little country there was 
harmony, and the Turks only kept 400 regular troops in Palestine. We appear now to 
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require at least 8,000, for whom this country has to pay”.337 This was a prevalent 
theme, and Sir Esmond Harmsworth added, “[t]he Jews are a very wealthy class, and 
should pay for their own national home if they want it […] As representing a portion 
of the British taxpayers, I do protest most strongly that any money of theirs should be 
thrown away in Palestine”.338 In response, Colonial Secretary Churchill advised, 
“[w]hile the situation still fills us with a certain amount of anxiety […] I believe it is 
one that we shall be able to shape […] within the limits of the expense I have 
mentioned”.339 Later that month, he advised the cabinet to withdraw from 
Palestine.340 This was because the Liberal Churchill and the rest of the coalition were 
beginning to feel a great deal of pressure on the Palestine issue. The criticisms they 
faced were potent because they reflected political issues masquerading as substantive 
concerns, and these fell largely under the Conservative banner of “Anti-Waste”.  
The coalition government tried to downplay inter-party differences, so many 
policy debates raged in the press instead.341 An overwhelming majority of the 1918-
enfranchised population (79.1%) had never voted before and were clamouring for 
information about politics – enhancing the role of newspapers, especially with regard 
to foreign affairs, for which the press was one of very few public sources of 
information.342 Consequently, the press outlets that were highly critical of the Lloyd 
George government were also quite powerful. This was demonstrated by the Anti-
Waste League, a campaign led by Conservative Peer and press baron Lord 
Rothermere, and championed in the House by his son, the above-mentioned MP 
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Esmond Harmsworth. Using an axe as its symbol to represent spending cuts, it was 
credited with winning two by-elections in Conservative seats.343 One sign that Lloyd 
George felt under pressure from this movement was the formation of The Committee 
on National Expenditure under the chairmanship of Conservative politician and 
businessman Sir Eric Campbell Geddes, which, as expected, called for major 
spending reductions across most departments.344 Rothermere’s brother, Lord 
Northcliffe, was also using his papers The Times, the Daily Mail and the Daily Mirror 
to criticise Palestine based on its cost, as well as the idea that handing Muslim Holy 
sites to Jews would inflame India. Northcliffe’s death in 1922 meant these papers 
passed to Rothermere and they too became direct proponents of Anti-Waste.  
In the same period, previously supportive Lord Beaverbrook also abandoned 
Lloyd George and used his Daily Express and Sunday Express to propagate the myth 
of a Jewish conspiracy and to claim British politicians were being manipulated by 
Chaim Weizmann and other “mystery men”; also included in this press revolt were 
The Spectator and the Morning Post, which questioned the loyalty of Jewish Liberal 
politicians such as Palestine High Commissioner Sir Herbert Samuel and India 
Secretary Sir Edwin Montagu.345 This was particularly unsound since Montagu had 
been one of few politicians adamantly opposed to the Balfour Declaration in 1917, 
arguing that it placed the status of Jews around the world in jeopardy.346 However, it 
would be a mistake to view these anti-Semitic attacks outside their political context. 
Montagu was a target principally because he opposed the Anti-Waste League and 
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Geddes’s spending cuts.347 The sheer virulence of such press attacks made many 
members of the coalition cabinet nervous. In an exchange with Samuel in February 
1922, Churchill fought with Samuel over responsibility to fund the Palestine 
gendarmerie. Due to the “growing movement of hostility, against Zionist policy in 
Palestine” Churchill as Colonial Secretary struggled to afford the new expense 
politically rather than financially.348 
Opposition to the national home continued to grow, and there was a major 
debate in the Commons on 9 March 1922.349 Churchill requested extra funds for 
salaries and expenses (including the gendarmerie) in the Middle East and was careful 
to stress that Palestine had been quiet and immigration was more closely monitored, 
since “[w]e cannot have a country inundated by Bolshevist riffraff”.350 He was met 
again with accusations of cost versus benefit in Palestine. Unionist MP Sir J.D. Rees 
asked “whether the Palestine Mandate is absolutely irrevocable, because the 
advantages to us I for one cannot see, and it seems to me a deplorable thing that we 
should be keeping down the Arabs in their own country at a large expense to our own 
country”.351 The Conservative MP Frederick Macquistan added, “to the question of 
Palestine, I must say that that is a great mystery to the average Briton, especially if he 
is unemployed and sees good money going for the benefit of people who he always 
thought knew far more about money than he did”.352 The same points were being 
raised time and again. This discussion, however, was only the precursor to a more 
controversial debate in the House of Lords in June. 
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Lord Islington introduced a motion against the Palestine Mandate on the basis 
that the national home policy broke promises made to the Arabs and “unless it is very 
materially modified, it will lead to very serious consequences. It is literally inviting 
subsequent catastrophe.”353 To the government’s chagrin, Islington’s motion carried 
by 60 votes to 29.354 This had symbolic more than legal importance and was followed 
by a Commons debate less than two weeks later. Joynson-Hicks called for a motion to 
decrease the Colonial Secretary’s salary as a procedural ploy to introduce a vote on 
Palestine, on the basis that the Mandate had never been referred to the House for 
approval.355 It had the opposite outcome to that which Joynson-Hicks intended. 
Churchill secured a vote of confidence 292 to 35.356 Crucially, one vital document 
had been published on 1 July 1922, between the two debates, and this was the 
Churchill White Paper.357  
In publishing the white paper with records of communication between the 
Colonial Secretary and Arab as well as Zionist leaders, the government was 
addressing domestic political challenges rather than the tangible problems of 
governing Palestine under a dual obligation. The Churchill White Paper answered 
accusations that Britain was depriving Palestine’s Arabs of their own home: 
“Unauthorized statements have been made to the effect that the purpose in view is to 
create a wholly Jewish Palestine. […] His Majesty's Government regard any such 
expectation as impracticable and have no such aim in view”.358 To demonstrate this, 
the white paper formally linked immigration to the Palestine economy, following the 
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example set by Samuel immediately after the Jaffa riots.359 It also addressed the 
charge of broken promises: “The whole of Palestine west of the Jordan was […] 
excluded from Sir Henry McMahon's pledge”.360 Answering allegations that the 
national home would inflame Indian opinion, the white paper highlighted how “the 
present administration has transferred to a Supreme Council elected by the Moslem 
community of Palestine the entire control of Moslem Religious endowments (Waqfs), 
and of the Moslem religious Courts”.361 Against lingering claims of Bolshevist 
infiltration – as described in the Haycraft Commission – the document stressed that 
“[i]t is necessary also to ensure that persons who are politically undesirable be 
excluded from Palestine”.362 Lord Islington had declared in June that the national 
home policy could not continue unaltered, and he was correct. Under the pressure of 
inter-party politics played out in Parliament and in the press, the coalition was forced 
to eliminate the option of continuing with a policy based solely on the Balfour 
Declaration.  
 
Stage Two 
 After the first stage of decision-making eliminated all options from the choice 
set that failed to meet requirements on the political dimension, only one alternative 
remained. The British government could neither entirely support nor repudiate the 
national home, leaving the single option of continuing, but imposing limitations 
designed to address its substantive weaknesses and political critics. Although the 
noncompensatory decision-making process does not always continue until only one 
alternative is left, it is possible that all options except one are eliminated due to their 
                                                 
359 Ibid. 
360 Ibid. 
361 Ibid. 
362 Ibid. 
 114 
unacceptably high costs on the political dimension.363 The British government had no 
choice but to continue with the national home policy by imposing limitations on it. As 
the poliheuristic approach seeks “acceptable” options, a remaining alternative is 
compared “to predetermined values along a selected set of dimensions”.364 In the case 
of post-war Palestine, a single dimension emerged as substantive for decision-makers. 
Rather than seeking to maximise in this case, the remaining alternative was found to 
“satisfice” the sole substantive dimension, which was the military, or strategic, 
dimension.365 
 
The Military/Strategic Dimension 
In the context of the Jewish national home, the only dimension decision-
makers considered outside those variables constituting the political dimension, was 
the military, or strategic, dimension. Rather than maximise rewards, the second stage 
of decision-making ensured that the remaining option did not incur “costs”. Palestine 
was debateable as a military asset, but any options remaining after the first stage of 
decision-making had to satisfice British military and strategic interests in the region. 
During and after the First World War, the British cabinet frequently 
considered the prospect of another similar conflict. Safeguarding routes to India, 
including lines of communication through Egypt and the Suez Canal, was paramount. 
These lines of communication became even more important after the war because 
Britain’s Empire had grown in Asia and Africa as well as the Middle East. These new 
holdings included former German territories (Tanganyika, South-West Africa, New 
Guinea and Samoa), Turkish territories (Palestine, Transjordan and Mesopotamia 
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including Mosul) and the need to station British troops in Persia and in 
Constantinople to defend the Dardanelles Straits, as well as increase troop numbers in 
Egypt to combat the rise of a powerful national movement in 1919 and in India to 
protect borders from the emerging Soviet Union as well as battle insurgency.366 The 
importance of Palestine in this geo-political worldview, however, was a matter of 
opinion.  
In June 1918, Lloyd George asserted that “if we were to be thrown back as an 
Empire upon our old traditional policy of utilising the command of the sea in order to 
cut off our enemies from all the sources of supply and from all possible means of 
expansion, north, east, south, and west, Palestine would be invaluable”.367 It “secured 
the defence of Egypt” and losing Palestine “would not only involve the interruption of 
a main artery of our imperial communications, but would react upon our whole 
situation in the East, and even in India”.368 Immediately post-war in December 1918, 
the army agreed with maintaining Palestine as a buffer state, but only “so long as it 
can be created without disturbing Mohammedian sentiment”.369  
As British policy of a Jewish national home did indeed inflame Arab and 
Muslim opinion, however, the army and key members of the cabinet began to express 
doubts regarding its military value. By November 1920, C.I.G.S advised the cabinet 
that Palestine “has no strategical interest for the British Army” but it “constitutes a 
serious potential drain on its resources”.370 Winston Churchill retained the post of 
War Secretary at this time, and he agreed: “[s]o far as the security of the Empire is 
concerned, we are the weaker, rather than the stronger, by the occupation of 
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Palestine”.371 His successor at the War Office, Sir Worthington-Evans, espoused the 
opposing view, that uprisings in Egypt and Mosul increased Palestine’s importance, 
and the debate continued in Parliament into 1923.372 Even those such as Churchill 
who openly questioned Palestine’s strategic value in private, publicly supported the 
“buffer state” line of reasoning. It provided a simple and convenient explanation for 
British entanglement in Palestine. Both sides of this debate, however, understood that 
Palestine could not be allowed to fall to a hostile or potentially challenging power. 
The tiny country was not necessarily crucial to British strategic defence of the 
Empire, but a foreign obstruction there could be devastating.373  
Therefore, as long as Palestine remained in friendly hands, the military 
dimension was satisficed. The remaining option from Stage One was to continue with 
the national home policy by imposing limitations on it. This alternative left Palestine 
in British hands, which was acceptable on the military, or strategic dimension, 
allowing it to become the final choice. 
 
Sunk Costs 
The years 1920-1922 were crucial in bringing about the confirmation of the 
national home policy in the Churchill White Paper, but the “Balfour Zeitgeist” 
continued throughout most of the 1920s despite a rapid turnover of British 
governments during this time. This continuing commitment was the result of sunk 
costs. The phenomenon of sunk costs is explained as an escalation of commitment 
that is non-rational because “cost-benefit calculations should not include resources 
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already expended”.374 One assumption of the poliheuristic theory is that “the 
presentation of information will affect how this information is evaluated and what 
choices are made. Mintz et al. found that “in an experimental setting […] decision 
makers were more likely to disregard new information due to sunk costs”.375 This 
“irrational” process occurred under a new Conservative administration in 1923, under 
a Labour government in 1924 and again in 1926 under Conservative direction. 
Four months after the Churchill White Paper was published, Prime Minister 
Lloyd George suffered a political mutiny that led to a General Election in November 
1922. For those Conservative backbenchers who had vigorously campaigned against 
the Middle East mandates, it was an opportunity to exert influence in favour of 
withdrawal. However, as the Anti-Waste League and Parliamentary condemnations of 
the coalition government’s Middle East policies had largely been directed politically 
at Lloyd George, the issue did not maintain its potency once he had left Downing 
Street. Press baron Lord Beaverbrook told the Conservative Leader Bonar Law he 
would be using his newspapers to pressure Conservative candidates, urging the tax-
paying public to ask who was in favour of leaving Palestine and Mesopotamia. The 
World Zionist Organization monitored this “bag and baggage” campaign carefully, 
but they found that a mere 26 candidates supported it and out of those, only 17 were 
elected.376  
Bonar Law privately wrote to Foreign Secretary Curzon referring to the 
Palestine Mandate and saying, “you know how keen I am to get rid of it”, but at an 
election address in London, declared he would “not be stampeded on the issue by 
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Beaverbrook and Rothermere”.377 During the campaign, prominent Conservative 
politicians Leopold Amery, Austen and Neville Chamberlain expressed a desire to 
continue the national home pledge, as did former War Secretary Worthington-Evans, 
former Chancellor Horne and 27 Conservative MPs.378 Despite the fear and 
intimidation that anti-Zionist Conservatives in the Anti-Waste League had previously 
inspired, Lloyd George’s departure left them largely neutralised. 
However, the Conservative victory in 1922 led many Arab politicians to 
believe the policy would be overturned.379 The immediate result was the return – after 
unsuccessful negotiations with the Colonial Office under Winston Churchill – of an 
Arab Delegation to London in January 1923.380 Although the new Colonial Secretary, 
the Duke of Devonshire, received them and insisted there would be no departure from 
the white paper policy, the cabinet fully expected a new lobbying campaign.381 In 
February 1923, the Middle East Department submitted a memo to the cabinet 
explaining to the new government how “[w]e are, in fact, committed to the Zionist 
policy before the whole world in the clearest and most unequivocal fashion” and 
stressed how repudiation of the Balfour  Declaration meant returning the Mandate to 
the League of Nations and evacuating Palestine immediately.382 On 27 March, Lord 
Islington revived the opposing argument by introducing a motion in the Lords to 
change Palestine’s constitution on the basis that Arabs had boycotted the vote.383 The 
motion failed, but when Conservative Prime Minister Bonar Law resigned in May 
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1923 and was succeeded by Stanley Baldwin, the new Prime Minister dealt with the 
Palestine uncertainty by calling for a new committee to report on policy.384  
This committee, however, was a political exercise and not a comprehensive 
review of policy. Members were under pressure from supporters of the Palestine Arab 
Delegation – whose memorandum to the British government secured the signatures of 
more than 100 Conservative MPs including 40% of backbenchers  – but this anti-
Zionism posed no political danger to any member of the committee, which consisted 
of secretaries of state and ministers previously associated with both sides of the 
Palestine argument.385 These included Devonshire, Curzon, Amery, Worthington-
Evans and Joynson-Hicks.386 Despite the wide swathe of views this group had 
expressed as individuals at an earlier date, they heard evidence from High 
Commissioner Sir Herbert Samuel only.387 Predictably, no member seriously 
considered reversing the national home policy because it possessed “a cumulative 
weight from which it is well-nigh impossible for any government to extricate itself 
without a substantial sacrifice of consistency and self-respect, if not of honour. Those 
of us who have disliked the policy are not prepared to make that sacrifice”.388 They 
decided it was no longer pertinent to discuss the original promise made in 1917: 
“There are some of our number who think that that Declaration was both unnecessary 
and unwise, and who hold that our subsequent troubles have sprung in the main from 
its adoption. But that was nearly six years ago. We cannot ignore the fact that ever 
since it has been the accepted policy of His Majesty's Government”.389 The cabinet 
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accepted these conclusions, marking an official Conservative commitment to the 
national home. This, crucially, de-politicised the issue for the 1920s.  
When a Labour government was elected in 1924, the national home was 
reviewed again. Like the Liberal Churchill and Conservative Devonshire before him, 
Labour Colonial Secretary Thomas agreed there was no option but to continue: “My 
own view is that we have no alternative but to adhere to the policy of carrying out the 
terms of the Balfour Declaration as interpreted by our predecessors. I do not underrate 
the difficulties, but I am satisfied that the difficulties of any alternative course would 
be even greater” and the cabinet agreed.390 Similarly, when Conservative Stanley 
Baldwin became Prime Minister again later that year, Palestine policy remained 
unchanged. Sunk costs meant the British government, regardless of party platform, 
could find no benefit in altering the commitment to a Jewish national home in 
Palestine. 
Indeed, a period of tranquillity in Palestine – actually caused by a Polish 
recession and a substantial reduction in Jewish immigration and settlement – meant 
British officials viewed the white paper policy as a success.391 The effective de-
politicisation of the national home coupled with the absence of riots meant Palestine 
became less and less important as the decade progressed. In 1927, only 3,034 new 
Jewish immigrants were recorded in Palestine and 5,071 left.392 All was quiet, and so 
Samuel’s successor as High Commissioner, Lord Plumer, saw little need for the 
inflated troop and police numbers stationed in Palestine since 1921, and with Colonial 
Secretary Amery’s approval, began to disband them.393 When riots and widespread 
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violence erupted in Jerusalem in 1928-29, the illusion and the Balfour Zeitgeist came 
to an end. 
 
Conclusion 
The “Balfour Zeitgeist” was a phase of British foreign policy marked by a 
commitment to the Jewish national home in Palestine. There was no period of linear 
policy that continued from 1917 until Palestine’s major riots in 1929. Rather, there 
was a crucial episode of decision-making in 1920-1922 when the policy was 
questioned and then confirmed, albeit with limitations, in the Churchill White Paper. 
Considering the findings of two commissions of enquiry following the 1920 Nebi 
Musa Riots and the 1921 Jaffa Riots, the decision to confirm Britain’s commitment to 
the national home in 1922 failed to fit an expected utility model. Instead, the 
Poliheuristic two-stage decision-making process provides a better fit, demonstrating 
the domestic political variables that give a post-diction of how and why the British 
government came to its decision to affirm the national home.  
In the first stage of the decision-making process, the government rejected 
alternatives that failed to meet requirements on the most important, political 
dimension. Taking prestige and bureaucratic politics into account meant the option to 
repudiate the national home was eliminated. The state of the post-war economy meant 
the option to impose the national home with the threat or use of force failed to meet 
requirements on the political dimension and was also eliminated. Finally, inter-party 
rivalry left the government unable to continue the national home as it stood in the 
Balfour Declaration and draft Mandate. Consequently, the first stage of the decision-
making process left only one alternative in the choice set. This option was then 
compared to the single substantive dimension to ensure it would not incur costs. The 
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option to continue with the national home with key limitations designed to satisfy 
domestic critics was found to be acceptable on the military/strategic dimension, 
allowing it to become the final choice. Due to the sunk costs, this policy was then 
continued throughout most of the 1920s under governments representing all shades of 
the mainstream political spectrum. 
As this chapter demonstrates, the poliheuristic framework offers a cogent 
analysis for the British government’s decision. Rather than a Palestine policy based 
on consideration of the territory affected, this post-diction reveals a Palestine policy 
based primarily on the need to satisfy domestic political concerns. What this meant in 
the 1920s, however, was that the Jewish-Arab tensions in Palestine remained 
unresolved, as did their propensity to effect, and be impacted by, British domestic 
politics.  
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Chapter 4: The Passfield Reversal 1929-1935 
 
“If there were any question that the 600,000 Arabs should he ousted from their homes 
in order to make room for a Jewish national home; if there were any question that 
they should be kept in political subordination to any other people: if there were any 
question that their Holy Places should be taken from them and transferred to other 
hands or other influences, then a policy would have been adopted which would have 
been utterly wrong. It would have been resented and resisted – rightly – by the Arab 
people. But it has never been contemplated.”394 
Herbert Samuel, Former High Commissioner of Palestine, 1930. 
 
 As discussed in the previous chapter, the Churchill White Paper of 1922 
cemented a period in British policy towards Palestine marked by a commitment to the 
Balfour Declaration. This “Balfour Zeitgeist” coincided with a period of calm in 
Palestine, during which British politicians were able to ignore lingering Jewish-Arab 
tensions, leading to rapid reductions in costly troops and police. However, a conflict 
over Jerusalem’s ‘Wailing Wall’ in 1928 roused the passions of both Jews and Arabs 
in Palestine, leading to violence on a horrific scale the following year.395  
In preparation for Yom Kippur in 1928, the Jewish beadle erected a screen at 
the Western Wall to separate male and female worshippers. This action was 
interpreted in the Muslim community as a sign of ownership, and since the Temple 
ruins were legally part of Muslim waqf property, British forces forcibly removed the 
screen to prevent rioting. This incident created an atmosphere of political tension that 
continued to simmer. On 15 August 1929, a group of young, right-wing Jewish 
activists demonstrated at the Wall – followed by Muslims counter-demonstrating – 
and British efforts to mediate the approaching crisis failed, leading to a bloodbath 
only days later.396 The following week Muslim activists streamed into Jerusalem 
armed with sticks and knives, and rumours that Jews were killing Arabs inspired mass 
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murder, looting and destruction elsewhere in the country. Raymond Cafferata, for 
example, Hebron’s British Police Superintendent, reported mob attacks on Jewish 
homes that led to murder and mutilation, but he possessed only a fraction of the force 
needed to restore the peace. Only the kindness of 28 Arab households saved Jewish 
lives in Hebron, a fact that thoroughly shamed British administrators who prided 
themselves on maintaining order.397 The British government responded with two 
commissions of enquiry that directly resulted in the Passfield White Paper of 1930.  
This document represented the first attempt to limit the Jewish national home 
in Palestine, not indefinitely, but to an extent designed to cool Arab hatreds and 
prevent rioting in the future. Nevertheless, this new policy was reversed. The volte-
face was articulated in a letter sent from Prime Minister James Ramsay MacDonald to 
Chaim Weizmann in February 1931, giving rise to the belief that Zionist lobbying had 
successfully harnessed the British Empire’s foreign policy.398 This historiographical 
phenomenon was discussed in Chapter One, and demonstrating a more realistic and 
coherent post-diction of the reversal decision requires examining the British 
government’s political pressure points in more depth. The two commissions of 
enquiry highlighted dangerous levels of Jewish-Arab antagonism in Palestine as a 
direct result of Arab unemployment and landlessness, which was blamed locally on 
Jewish immigration and land purchase.399 This meant the Passfield White Paper was 
predictable based on the expected utility model specifically because it limited Jewish 
immigration and land purchase. The decision to reverse it, however, was inexplicable 
if using the same framework.  
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In contrast, the two-stage decision-making process of Ph Theory allows a 
cogent post-diction, not only of the initial decision to issue the Passfield White Paper, 
but also of the subsequent decision to undermine it. This chapter applies Ph Theory to 
the passage and reversal of the Passfield White Paper of 1930, demonstrating how and 
why the British government decided to abandon its policy in 1931, until the Arab 
Revolt in 1936-1939 prompted a re-evaluation. It argues, that in the first stage of the 
decision-making process, the government rejected alternatives that failed to meet 
requirements on the most important political dimension. Key variables the British 
government faced during the critical time period of 1930-1931 mirror criteria outlined 
by Mintz:400 internal party politics and parliamentary politics.  
Once options were discarded, the government chose among the remaining 
alternatives in the second stage of decision-making by maximising on the key 
substantive dimension: the economy. Finally, this chapter highlights how the British 
government’s handling of Palestine policy, between the MacDonald letter of 1931 and 
the beginning of the Arab Revolt in 1936, was crystallised. Following the political 
storm underlying Passfield’s reversal, no options met requirements on the domestic, 
political dimension and so did not pass into the second stage of decision-making. 
Rather than a Palestine policy based on a narrow interpretation of the role played by 
Zionist lobbying, this analysis reveals a Palestine policy based primarily on the need 
to maintain a modicum of unity within government and across parties, which was 
threatened by the strategic pro-Zionist activism of opposition leaders as well as more 
sincere Zionist sympathies of some Labour Party backbenchers. 
   
Defining the Choice Set 
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 As discussed previously, the rational actor, or expected utility (EUT) model 
requires a decision-maker to choose the option with the most preferred 
consequence.401 Like the decision to affirm the Mandate in 1922, the decision to 
reverse the Passfield White Paper was also irrational according to the traditional 
model. Rather than purposive action seeking utility maximisation, the decision to 
reverse the white paper fails to fit a simple cost-benefit analysis based on information 
available to decision-makers at the time.402 Such an analysis would have predicted 
either investment in Palestinian Arab agriculture or a restriction on Jewish 
immigration and land purchase. This is evident from the reports submitted in 1930 by 
two commissions of enquiry, and indeed was fulfilled by the issuing of the Passfield 
White Paper.  
In the immediate aftermath of violence in Palestine, these two commissions of 
enquiry were charged with investigating the root of the problem and recommending a 
solution. The first was led by distinguished jurist Sir Walter Shaw and the second was 
composed of only one man, Sir John Hope-Simpson. Just as earlier commissions 
investigating violence had concluded in the early 1920s, all but one member of the 
team led by Sir Walter Shaw identified that “the difficulties inherent in the Balfour 
Declaration and in the Mandate for Palestine are factors of supreme importance in the 
consideration of the Palestine problem”.403 The fundamental cause of rioting was “the 
Arab feeling of animosity and hostility towards the Jews consequent upon the 
disappointment of their political and national aspirations and fear for their economic 
future”.404  
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Palestine had suffered severe economic problems during the mid 1920s, and 
despite provisions of the Churchill White Paper of 1922 having stipulated that 
immigration should be based on economic capacity, this had largely been ignored.405 
The Shaw Commission found that both immigration and Jewish land purchase during 
the 1920s meant “a landless and discontented class is being created”.406 This was 
potentially a very dangerous development, and the commission decided that the only 
solution was a radical overhaul of agriculture and expansion of cultivation.407 The 
report then recommended a scientific enquiry “into the prospects of introducing 
improved methods of cultivation in Palestine” so a new land policy could be based on 
science rather than politics.408 The problem was considered acute enough that the 
Colonial Office temporarily halted Jewish immigration into Palestine under the 
Labour Schedule in May 1930, pending the scientific land report.409 As Sir John 
Hope-Simpson was considered experienced in ethnic conflicts, having acted as the 
League of Nations’ Vice-Chairman of the Refugee Settlement Commission in Greece, 
and was neither demonstrably pro-Arab nor pro-Zionist, he was entrusted with the 
task.410 
After two months of researching scientific reports written during the Mandate, 
as well as conducting interviews and travelling the country, Sir John Hope-Simpson 
concluded that “there is at the present time and with the present methods of Arab 
cultivation no margin of land available for agricultural settlement by new immigrants, 
with the exception of such undeveloped land as the Jewish Agencies hold in 
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reserve”.411 Many Jews and some British officials in Palestine regarded Arab 
unemployment and landlessness as a myth, but Simpson affirmed the growing 
problem – also manifest to a lesser degree in the Jewish community – after hearing 
testimony from employers who said they could meet their labour needs multiple times 
over. These misfortunes, Simpson noted, were then ascribed, “probably quite 
erroneously, to Jewish competition”.412 Like the Shaw Commission, Hope-Simpson 
saw the only solution as intensive development, and to that end, “drastic action is 
necessary”.413 Hope-Simpson also included a huge host of small, practical suggestions 
from limiting the orange crop and encouraging the cultivation of other fruits, to 
reducing fees and taxes in line with the fall of the price of crops, and even ensuring 
schoolmasters received agricultural training.414 Fundamentally, however, he found 
that “[t]here exists no easy method of carrying out the provisions of the Mandate. 
Development is the only way. Without development, there is not room for a single 
additional settler”.415 In light of these two commission reports, the cabinet committee 
on Palestine, led by Colonial Secretary Lord Passfield, was faced with the necessity of 
action.  
The government in Westminster had several key options: do nothing, 
repudiate the national home, amend the Mandate, reinforce the national home, invest 
in Arab agriculture, or limit Jewish immigration and land purchase. Palestine’s High 
Commissioner, Sir John Chancellor, outlined these alternatives as 1) removing the 
privileged position of the Jews and allowing a measure of self-government or 2) 
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installing enough military in Palestine to protect the Jews.416 Conversely, Shaw 
Commission member MP Harry Snell defined the choice set as either allaying “Arab 
anxiety by the easy device of restricting Jewish immigration, in which ease you lay 
yourself open to a suspicion of evading the Mandate”, or “you should rescue the Arab 
farmer from his situation of indebtedness”.417 Furthermore, Sir John Hope-Simpson 
himself stated the options as, “[u]nless Great Britain is prepared to surrender the 
Mandate (and I understand that the Dutch are willing to accept it), she will be 
compelled to undertake the expense of development. These are the two alternatives, 
and there is no avenue of escape”.418 A brief analysis of the decision-making process 
behind the Passfield White Paper demonstrates how, as well as fitting the expected 
utility model, options were eliminated in the first stage of decision-making under the 
Ph framework before a utility maximisation analysis took place in the second stage. 
The option to do nothing was most likely discarded immediately because it 
would have resulted in a surge of political criticism accusing the government of 
evading fundamental responsibilities to keep the peace. Due to sunk costs, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, the option to repudiate the national home was also 
discarded immediately. Unlike the machinations surrounding the development of the 
Churchill White Paper in 1922, no official seriously suggested returning the Mandate 
to the League of Nations. Amending the Mandate was also eliminated from the choice 
set very early; this would have required consent from the League and a great deal of 
time spent lobbying other members for their support while the situation remained 
unresolved. Passfield himself noted that “[t]he objections to a revision of the actual 
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terms of the Mandate seem to me insuperable”.419 Reinforcing the national home 
meant pouring in funding for security, and while the Palestine Administration did 
increase security measures following the riots in 1929, this was an impractical long-
term solution even before the Great Depression. All of these options failed to meet 
requirements on the political dimension as they would have initiated intolerable 
domestic political criticism. Investing in development or limiting Jewish immigration 
and land purchase were the only politically viable options remaining after Stage One.  
In terms of parliamentary politics, Passfield understood that the general policy 
of the white paper would not be welcomed warmly, but he did not predict the outrage 
it would produce from Zionists and members of every party. This was because 
criticism directed at the white paper, such as Hailsham and Simon’s letter to The 
Times outlined in Chapter One, was couched in the language of international law but 
created a political rather than a legal quagmire. The Colonial Secretary had warned 
Weizmann beforehand, giving him an overview of the Hope-Simpson report and the 
policy under consideration, and Passfield believed that Weizmann “took it very well 
indeed” while stressing that “there should be no numerical limitation on the ultimate 
number of Jews”.420  
Prime Minister MacDonald had even reiterated Britain’s commitment to the 
Jewish national home and the dual obligation on 3 April 1930, and the text of this 
speech was included in the white paper; it was “an international obligation from 
which there can be no question of receding”.421 Taking into account Weizmann’s 
reluctant but nevertheless apparent acquiescence, MacDonald’s reiteration of Britain’s 
commitment to the national home and Passfield’s regular communications with the 
Prime Minister during cabinet committee deliberations, there was no warning of the 
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political storm that followed.422 Believing the two options of restricting Jewish 
immigration and investing in Arab agriculture satisfied requirements on the political 
dimension, the government allowed these alternatives to pass into Stage Two, where 
they needed to satisfice the key substantive dimension: the economy. 
As the American stock market crash of 1929 was developing into an 
international financial crisis that heralded stagnation and unemployment for British 
voters, development in Palestine necessitated either a guaranteed loan or grant-in-aid 
from the Colonial Office.423 When the cabinet committee on Palestine submitted their 
first report to the cabinet on 15 September 1930, it was a detailed plan for the 
development that Hope-Simpson had advised was urgently necessary. However, the 
cost of Hope-Simpson’s plan was unknown until a further financial committee 
delivered the blow: “Sir John Hope-Simpson’s scheme involved the expenditure of 
some £6,000,000, spread over ten years, the interest on which would have to be 
guaranteed by the Exchequer. This would probably necessitate a loan spread over 
twenty years, the service of which would require £400,000 a year. This sum, however, 
did not include the capital cost of the land”.424 These amounts were much higher than 
anything the cabinet committee had considered and they were advised to re-assess the 
situation in light of this new information.425 The state of the economy was so dire that 
in late 1930 the Treasury re-imposed its control over Palestine’s finances and sent an 
investigator, Sir Simon O’Donnell, to rate the Palestine Administration’s efficiency 
and judge where economies could be made.426 The committee prepared a new report 
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following this financial information, and concluded that, “in present circumstances a 
proposal to spend many millions on land settlement of Jews and Arabs in Palestine 
would meet with serious opposition in Parliament and the country”.427  
Consequently, the committee returned to the cabinet on 24 September with 
new suggestions. They decided that Britain was under a moral if not legal obligation 
to recompense Arabs dispossessed by British policy in Palestine, that the Jews should 
be allowed, at their own expense, to continue developing the land they already owned 
and that this should suffice to permit Jewish settlement for the following five years.428 
Jewish immigration would be restricted to numbers suitable for those reserve lands or 
immigrants who could be absorbed comfortably into the industrial population.429 
Unfortunately, there is no full transcript of this meeting, and the minutes merely 
record that after “considerable discussion” the cabinet agreed to approve the 
committee’s draft policy including their new points following the realisation of the 
cost of Hope-Simpson’s scheme.430 The outcome was a compromise of some very 
limited development and compensation, as well as limits on the rate of expansion of 
the Jewish national home. The draft policy was subject to many minor alterations and 
was published as the Passfield White Paper on 21 October 1930.  
Regarding the question of peace, Passfield’s new policy articulated the belief 
that, “so long as widespread suspicion exists, and it does exist, amongst the Arab 
population, that the economic depression, under which they undoubtedly suffer at 
present, is largely due to excessive Jewish immigration, and so long as some grounds 
exist upon which this suspicion may be plausibly represented to be well founded, 
there can be little hope of any improvement in the mutual relations of the two 
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races”.431 This prompted condemnation from both the Conservative and Liberal Party 
leaders that both Passfield and MacDonald failed to predict.432 
By February 1931, the white paper had been undermined so severely as to 
constitute reversal. This was done in a published letter from MacDonald to Weizmann 
offering an “authoritative interpretation” of the Passfield White Paper and British 
policy in Palestine.433 Far from limiting land purchase or Jewish immigration, the 
MacDonald letter stressed that centralised control over land purchase would be 
“regulatory and not prohibitive” and that “His Majesty’s Government did not imply a 
prohibition of acquisition of additional land by Jews”, which of course was the entire 
point of Passfield’s policy.434 Regarding immigration, the letter asserted that “His 
Majesty’s Government did not prescribe and do not contemplate any stoppage or 
prohibition of Jewish immigration in any of its categories”,435 which again, ran 
counter to both the Shaw and Hope-Simpson commission reports, as well as the 
deliberations of the cabinet committee on Palestine and the approval they received in 
cabinet. 
As the final text of the letter  “had been agreed upon between representatives 
of the Jewish Agency and [another] Committee appointed by the Cabinet on the 6th 
November, 1930”, Zionist leaders appeared to have exerted a great deal of influence 
on the decision, contributing to the belief in the power of lobbying.436 However, the 
decision-making process behind the reversal of the Passfield White Paper was more 
nuanced. Weizmann did orchestrate a campaign by writing letters to prominent 
newspapers as well as the League of Nations’ Permanent Mandates Commission and 
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encouraged his supporters and friends – of which he had many among the British elite 
– to do the same, but these efforts always constituted more of a public show of protest 
than an exercise in secret diplomacy.437 Negotiations with Zionists from November 
1930 until January 1931 began with the Foreign Office trying to convince Weizmann 
and his colleagues that the white paper was a sound, legal policy and ended with a 
volte-face. In these short months between the publication of the white paper and the 
MacDonald letter, the government came under severe criticism internationally, but 
most importantly, domestically from opposition Liberal and Conservative parties. The 
polarising nature of Passfield’s new policy meant that the choice set for dealing with 
its aftermath was narrowed to only two options: to continue with the white paper, or 
to reverse it. 
 
Stage One 
The Poliheuristic Decision Theory presumes that options are eliminated from 
the choice set in the first instance based on whether they meet requirements on the 
most important, political dimension.438 Those that fail, meaning they present 
intolerable risk to political survival, are eliminated from the choice set. In terms of the 
Labour government’s decision-making from 1930-1931 regarding Palestine, the 
variables that made up the political dimension were internal party politics and the 
closely linked variable of parliamentary politics – in keeping with the criteria outlined 
by Mintz.439 In analysing how these variables presented risk to the Labour 
government, this section demonstrates how the “noncompensatory loss aversion 
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variable” was operationalised, leaving only a very narrow choice between options to 
be maximised in the second stage of decision-making.440 
 
Variable: Internal Party Politics 
A key variable on the political dimension in 1930-1931 was internal party 
politics. The minority Labour government held only a fragile grip on power, and a 
variable that presented high levels of risk to that power was disunity within the 
Labour Party itself.441 Labour foreign policy was marked by a commitment to the 
League of Nations, the credibility and stature of which was, therefore, highly 
important.442 As Labour’s traditional stance towards Zionism was staunchly 
supportive, James Ramsay MacDonald’s government also faced the added 
complication of rebellion by key Labour Party backbenchers. Both of these issues – 
attitude to the League and party sentiment for Zionism – became dangerously 
inflamed due to inter-party rivalry, which is discussed in detail below. Labour’s 
precarious unity combined with the government’s numerical weakness meant that the 
option to continue with the Passfield White Paper was eliminated in the first stage of 
decision-making. 
In terms of foreign policy, the Labour Party’s League of Nations focus 
constituted support for a program of arms limitation, eradication of outstanding 
grievances, arbitration of international disputes and collective security.443 The point 
was to prevent further global conflicts and – although this goal proved impractical – 
Labour leaders viewed their time in office as an historic opportunity for peace.444 This 
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foreign policy, however, did not reflect the party’s grassroots priorities; instead, it was 
the brainchild of Labour’s intelligentsia, most notably Foreign Secretary Arthur 
Henderson (described by Lady Davidson as “that prim old Methodist”).445 The policy 
was then sold to the rest of the party.446 In addition, by the autumn of 1930 there was 
a general problem with “[d]iscontent and disillusionment” along the front bench. Lady 
Passfield remarked how the Labour leaders were “strangled by the multitudinous and 
complicated issues raised in government departments; and by the alarming gravity of 
two major problems – India’s upheaval and the continuous and increasing 
unemployment”.447  
As such, the intellectual commitment to the League was a potentially weak 
point in the armour of Labour Party unity. Paradoxically, as the Palestine Mandate 
was granted and theoretically supervised by the Council of the League of Nations, it 
was also divisive for British Palestine policy to even appear in contravention of 
League authority. This Labour Party commitment to the League faced its first 
criticisms from the Permanent Mandates Commission (PMC) – the body appointed to 
oversee all mandates – in the summer of 1930. To further complicate matters, when 
various politicians wrote their letters to The Times months later to protest against the 
Passfield White Paper, their criticisms were more poignant because they echoed 
accusations levelled by the PMC. 
Following the Shaw Commission report, although Foreign Secretary 
Henderson assured the Council of the League of Nations that Britain had no intention 
of deviating from a policy based on the Balfour Declaration, the Council requested 
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that the PMC conduct a thorough examination of this new document.448 Prime 
Minister MacDonald received a copy of the PMC’s report on 28 July 1930, and said it 
“was not pleasant reading”.449 The report contained a very grave charge, “that the 
partial inaction of the Mandatory Power as regards its obligations to the Palestinian 
population both Arab and Jewish is the fundamental cause of the friction which 
eventually culminated in the serious disorder of August 1929”.450 Charging Britain 
with negligence, the PMC was discarding the Shaw Commission’s evidence and 
conclusions as well as any new policy they inspired. In response, Colonial Office 
Under-Secretary Sir Drummond Shiels tried to reassure the Council; he advised that 
“there is no new policy; there is no secret to be disclosed; and that the British 
government stands today where it did when it accepted the Mandate, and with the 
same policy”.451  
Months later, however, in the face of criticism following the publication of 
Passfield’s new white paper, Shiels’s statement, in hindsight, could easily have been 
interpreted as a lie told directly to the Council of the League. Tension built in October 
immediately following the white paper’s publication. Allegations arose that it 
“crystallised” the Jewish national home.452 This term had come directly from the 
report of the Permanent Mandates Commission: “The Policy of the Mandatory would 
not be fairly open to criticism unless it aimed at crystallising the Jewish national home 
at its present stage of development”.453 The PMC’s opinion that Britain had been 
responsible for Jewish-Arab tensions, its preference for Zionist arguments over an 
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official British investigation and Shiels’s apparent dishonesty with regard to policy all 
contributed to an atmosphere in which Britain’s relationship with the League of 
Nations was mutually wary. This meant that the minority Labour government did not 
relish the thought of further censure from the League, a development that would risk 
creating rifts within a party already potentially divided ideologically on the Palestine 
issue.  
The Labour Party had been officially pro-Zionist since two-and-a-half months 
before the Balfour Declaration by approving the War Aims Memorandum, which 
called for a Jewish return to Palestine.454 Its main proponent was Sydney Webb, who 
became Lord Passfield and the future Colonial Secretary, and reflected the party’s 
general support for self-determination among national ethnic groups, including in 
India.455 By 1930, the strongest Labour supporters of Zionism were Joseph 
Kenworthy in the House of Commons and Josiah Wedgewood in the Lords.456 
Kenworthy, for example, wrote to Weizmann immediately after the white paper’s 
publication, assuring him he had the support of many non-Jewish MPs and would 
correct this “blunder”.457  
Kenworthy had a general commitment to pragmatism in ethnic conflicts and 
did not consider British conciliations in the face of violence to be good policy unless 
they actually solved the problem at hand. He released a book in 1931 called India: A 
Warning highlighting all of the problems to finding a constitutional solution in India; 
his attitude was not partisan but intended to warn fellow politicians that succumbing 
to the violence of one particular ethnic group would not solve fundamental obstacles 
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to peace and stability.458 As discussed further below, this sort of reasoning was also 
directly relevant to perceptions of Palestine. 
In the House of Lords, Wedgwood had been a friend to Zionism since the 
1920s, joining with both James Ramsay MacDonald and future Chancellor Philip 
Snowden in organising the Palestine Mandate Society, a pro-Zionist lobby group.459 
MacDonald had even visited Palestine in 1922 and subsequently argued that the Arab 
claim to self-determination was invalid because “Palestine and the Jews can never be 
separated” and “the Arab population do not and cannot use or develop the resources 
of Palestine”.460 MacDonald, Passfield and Snowden, therefore, had all been involved 
in promoting the Zionist movement with their likeminded colleagues before attaining 
high office. Once confronted with the Shaw and Hope-Simpson reports, however, 
they all approved a new policy based on limiting Jewish immigration to Palestine.461 
This pre-existing sentiment juxtaposed against the Passfield White Paper of 1930 had 
the potential to create a split within the Labour Party that, if left uncorrected, posed a 
real danger to the government’s political survival.  
When the white paper was published on 21 October 1930, the criticism it 
attracted seemed to have an impact on MacDonald’s thinking relatively quickly. On 6 
November, the cabinet decided to create a new committee for Palestine policy.462 
Primarily, the new committee was tasked with legal clarification of Palestine policy in 
cooperation with an authority such as the Lord Advocate. It would also “get in touch 
with the representatives of the Zionists in the most politic and tactful manner possible 
in the circumstances and should make recommendations as to the attitude to be taken 
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up by the government in view of the reception of the recently issued white paper”.463 
MacDonald then met with Chaim Weizmann the same day, when he reportedly told 
the Zionist leader, “There is no white paper”.464 This unequivocal comment was most 
likely an off-the-record exclamation and there is little other indication that the 
decision to reverse the white paper had been made by 6 November. Indeed, 
MacDonald had written to Weizmann the day after the document’s publication to 
advise him that, “a closer study of what is laid down in the statement of policy will 
show you that it is far better than you seem to imagine, and that whatever you may 
object to in it is a very reasonable price to pay if we can secure closer cooperation in 
Palestine”.465 In addition, the Prime Minister wrote again a week later to stress that 
their differences over the policy were minor and based on misunderstandings and 
phraseology.466 Weizmann had understood this to mean, “that some amending 
interpretation of the White Paper is being considered” and he telegrammed his 
American counterpart, Felix Warburg to this effect immediately after meeting 
MacDonald.467  
Bringing the Zionists into discussions in this manner undoubtedly began with 
the aim of making absolutely sure that the new policy was legal and sound. This is 
why the cabinet wanted “clarification” conducted in conjunction with the Lord 
Advocate and why the initial approach was kept secret – the announcement of Zionist 
participation in the new Palestine subcommittee remained classified until the 
Parliamentary debate on 17 November.468 Gestation of the reversal idea, therefore, 
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had only just begun, and the government would have been unlikely to proceed with a 
difficult Commons debate and an impassioned defence of the white paper had the 
decision to reverse it already been made.  
Rather, the main issue remained correcting any appearance that Labour 
intended to undermine League authority and placing Foreign Secretary Arthur 
Henderson as Chair of the new committee facilitated this aim.469 This also went on to 
serve a second purpose of soothing internal politics, as Henderson was far more 
popular within the party than MacDonald, especially when the extent of backbench 
antipathy for the white paper became clear during the debate.470 This parliamentary 
debate is discussed in more detail below, but Kenworthy, for example, publicly railed 
against his own party leadership and advised the House that, “Colonial secretaries 
have come under the lash of my tongue in the past and others will do the same unless 
the Colonial Office policy is changed”.471  
This added Palestine to the lengthy list of issues with which Labour 
backbenchers already took issue under MacDonald’s leadership. The Prime Minister 
found himself at the mercy of  “rumours of dissensions, intrigues and crises in the 
government ranks” and Conservative politician Austen Chamberlain believed this was 
“a case in which the proverb is true that there is no smoke without fire”.472 Under this 
strain, Conservatives believed “Ramsay is terribly overworked, shows some signs of 
fretfulness which attacks him in such conditions, and might be upset by an 
accident”.473 Before the Palestine issue could become such an “accident”, reaching 
out to representatives of the Zionist movement to liase with a new cabinet committee 
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on Palestine was less a direct reaction to their demands and more of a safety measure 
intended to guard against party divisions over the League of Nations; later in 
November, December and January it became a way to plaster over the fissures left by 
the Labour leadership’s shifting commitment to Zionism.  
As the Prime Minister would have recognised this rebellious streak among his 
own backbenches after the white paper’s publication, why did the cabinet not 
anticipate a breaking of ranks beforehand? Although it is very difficult to explain why 
a particular threat did not occur to decision-makers, it is likely that the new policy’s 
internal effect was considered manageable. The threat became dangerously 
exacerbated, however, by the vocal and unrelenting opposition raised by Conservative 
and Liberal leaders. Internal party politics was not necessarily enough on its own to 
constitute too much danger on the political dimension, but it primed the situation, 
most likely lowering the threshold of what constituted acceptable risk. Once 
combined with parliamentary politics described below, the internal politics variable 
meant the option to continue with the Passfield White Paper was removed from the 
choice set in the first stage of decision-making. 
 
Variable: Parliamentary Politics 
The two variables of internal party politics and parliamentary politics are 
closely related in this case because the latter represented an adroit, if not entirely 
purposeful, manipulation of the former. The minority Labour government depended 
foremost on its own unity to maintain power, but also relied heavily on Liberal Party 
support.474 This weakness was exploited effectively following publication of the 
Passfield White Paper by the appearance of a Liberal-Conservative alliance that 
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heightened and prolonged the divisive debate that was identified as dangerous to 
Labour’s unity in the above section. The approaching India Conference in mid-
November 1930 exacerbated the white paper problem, and despite its critics across 
the aisle posing emotional and even fallacious arguments against Passfield’s policy, a 
coherent and comprehensive governmental rebuttal proved unpersuasive. MacDonald 
was already in a precarious position; India policy had proved dangerously divisive the 
previous year, a parliamentary debate on the Passfield White Paper demonstrated 
these continuing divisions – which were confirmed by a diminished majority in the 
Whitechapel by-election – and finally, these factors accumulated to ensure that 
discussions with Zionists that had begun as legal “clarification” resulted in a complete 
reversal of the offending policy. These features of the parliamentary politics variable 
combined with Labour’s internal party politics to make the option of continuing with 
the Passfield White Paper untenable on the political dimension, and it was eliminated 
in the first stage of decision-making. 
As well as unstable levels of support for foreign policy within his own party, 
MacDonald had to contend with the inherent difficulties of minority governance; he 
relied on varying degrees of cross-party support for foreign policy initiatives to 
prevent polarised parliamentary debates that risked splitting his own party.475 In 
March 1930, for example, MacDonald wrote to Passfield to arrange some discussion 
on whether a new white paper on Palestine policy was urgently required, but stressing 
that “it could only be […] with the general support of all parties in the House of 
Commons”.476 Likewise, the Prime Minister’s son, Malcolm MacDonald, noted how 
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it was always “important that the Liberals at any rate should support their 
proposals”.477 
Labour had inherited an Empire in disarray, and with the coming of a global 
depression, stronger dominions and colonial nationalisms, as well as the rise of the 
United States as a world power, imperial policy had become an exercise in calculated 
control through concession and compromise – a balance between firmness and 
conciliation – and these issues had the power to arouse great parliamentary passions 
within, as well as across, parties.478 Conservative Chairman Leopold Amery called 
this problem Labour’s “paralysing ineptitude”.479 In this atmosphere, however, all 
party heads recognised the importance of some degree of cooperation in private 
negotiations.480 As such, MacDonald had conferred with both Conservative leader 
Stanley Baldwin and Liberal de facto leader David Lloyd George in March 1930 – 
specifically with regard to the Shaw Commission – to ask for “the guidance of your 
views on what should be done now”.481 Although no notes from this meeting exist, it 
was necessary because the consequences of trying to move ahead without cross-party 
support had proved nearly disastrous for India policy the previous year, in 
circumstances highly similar to the debate that followed the Passfield White Paper.  
When Labour came to power in 1929, the existing legislation on India’s 
internal government was the Montagu-Chelmsford Act of 1921, which was due for 
review.482 To this end, a Statutory Commission chaired by Liberal MP Sir John 
Simon had been formed to investigate and recommend the next stages of 
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constitutional development.483 Differences of opinion regarding the degree and pace 
of this self-rule cut across parties.484 India had growing provincial nationalisms, and 
Lord Irwin, a Conservative peer cooperating with the government, suggested giving 
Indian politicians a veneer of responsibility and proto-independence to produce a 
sedative effect.485 Before the Simon Commission could present its report, however, 
the government issued the Irwin Declaration based on this principle on 31 Oct 
1929.486 
Whereas both Conservative and Liberal leaders had agreed to this Labour 
government policy adopted from Irwin, the problem was with the declaration itself.487 
Liberal Lord Reading, former Viceroy to India, criticised the wording as dangerously 
ambiguous, sacrificing long-term stability for short-term pacification.488 Reading’s 
stature commanded a great deal of authority, and his objections allowed Lloyd George 
and other Liberals to refuse consent for the declaration, stiffening the instinctive 
opposition of Peel, Austen Chamberlain, Churchill and other Conservatives whom 
Baldwin was unable to restrain once it became known that the declaration had not 
received Simon Commission approval.489 This meant Baldwin also had to withdraw 
his support since diehard Conservative opposition (mostly Churchill who was looking 
for an issue with which to revive his career) placed the Conservative leader’s own 
position in profound peril.490 
The result was a major hardening against minority-Labour’s India policy 
among both Conservatives and Liberals.491 The cabinet issued a communiqué 
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specifically stating what Irwin’s ambiguity had attempted to conceal, that the 
declaration involved no change of policy, which sparked outrage in India – leading to 
the need for repressive measures by May 1930, and leaving bitter and substantial 
divergences between parties in Westminster.492 In the year following the Irwin 
Declaration, however, there was a subtle and tenuous shift within Parliament back 
towards a more bipartisan line. Labour stood firmly behind the declaration and, 
despite a flurry of Liberal uncertainty, was ultimately supported by Lloyd George 
with Conservatives acting as a check on hurried constitutional development.493 India 
remained a crucial issue, however, and the cabinet was meeting twice a day in the 
summer of 1930 to discuss it.494 The situation remained tenuous for MacDonald and 
Lady Passfield recorded in her diary during this time that “the Labour government is 
on the rocks and may any day be wrecked”.495  
This tense situation continued throughout 1930 when the government had to 
deal with the Imperial Conference and the India Round Table only to be blindsided 
politically by the subsidiary issue of Palestine. This convergence of similar crises left 
the Prime Minister “overwhelmed with work” and in a terribly exposed political 
position.496 Cross-party cooperation was vital but shaky. Austen Chamberlain 
expressed an opinion common among the Prime Minister’s supporters and rivals, that 
“there is too much trouble ahead; Ramsay is not, I think, the man to deal with it”.497 
The uneasy consensus on India policy built up the previous year was the product of 
luck rather than adroit political manoeuvring on the part of the Labour government, 
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and approaching the first of in series of India Round Table conferences in November 
1930, was directly threatened by the fallout from Passfield’s white paper.  
While it would be overly simplistic to state that Palestine and India policy 
were decided in tandem, the period 1929-1930 marked one of the few occasions when 
India policy coloured all of British politics.498 In addition, the conflict in Palestine 
bore some of the hallmarks British politicians associated with India, such as ethnic 
conflict and “natives” agitating for political rights. Conservative Party Chairman 
Leopold Amery remarked how the violence in Palestine would be “familiar to most 
Indian administrators”.499 This meant that attitudes to Palestine among the British 
political elite were, to some extent, informed by how they viewed the India problem, 
with which they were far more familiar. Who were the “natives” in Palestine, and 
which group required suppressing and which protecting? Neither Palestine’s Jews nor 
Arabs escaped the paternalistic racism emanating from the House of Commons that 
was associated with British imperialism more generally and the India question in 
particular in 1930.  
In this context, any perception of weakness to imperial subjects around the 
world had to be considered very carefully. It would be a mistake, however, to 
consider that the two issues held equal weight in British politics: “little Palestine with 
its troubles – insignificant to the rest of the world”, Lady Passfield wrote, “is likely to 
be forgotten in concern over the revolution which some say is going on in India. For 
the next six weeks the P.M. and other Cabinet Ministers, having finished with the 
Dominions, will be absorbed in the Round Table Conferences to settle the fate of 
India – or rather the British in India.”500 Palestine was, paradoxically, both important 
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– because it threatened to disrupt Labour’s cross-party support for the India Round 
Table conference – and insignificant – as India was the chief and all-consuming 
concern. This meant that although the government’s and certainly Passfield’s early 
concern when formulating the new Palestine policy had been avoiding any appearance 
of capitulation to either outside lobbying or parliamentary pressure, the political storm 
created by its publication altered their priorities.501 
At first, the dominant voice within cabinet on this issue was that of the 
Colonial Secretary, who stressed the need to remain firm against any and all external 
parties. This meant ignoring both the borderline anti-Semitic complaints of Palestine’s 
High Commissioner Sir John Chancellor as well as “the persistent bombardment by 
the Jews, in personal intercourse, in formal interviews, in newspaper propaganda, in 
insidious threats of ulterior action, notably electoral pressure at home and 
international public opinion abroad, and all the rest of it […]”.502 Passfield seemed, 
for example, to take great pride in resisting Zionist lobbying to lift a ban on 
immigration under the Labour schedule imposed by Chancellor with cabinet approval: 
although “very strong pressure has been brought to bear upon His Majesty’s 
Government to rescind the suspension without awaiting the Report of Sir John Hope-
Simpson”, he wrote, “[s]o far, all demands to rescind or modify the suspension have 
been resisted by His Majesty’s Government”.503 This unwavering position was 
justified within the Colonial Office by the argument for a stable empire.  
Crucially, this attitude of forbearance against the “Jewish hurricane”, as 
Passfield referred to it, endured during the new policy’s preparation in cabinet 
committees in the summer of 1930 and obviously did not prevent its publication on 21 
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October. Weizmann, for example, threatened to resign on 13 October but the white 
paper was still published two weeks later.504 In contrast, the political danger following 
publication of the Passfield White Paper emanated chiefly from within the British 
political establishment, and stemmed from many criticisms levelled at the white paper 
that represented more political strategy than principled objection.505 Accusations 
directed by Liberal and Conservative leaders against the Labour government, for 
example, were not really about the text of the white paper or the policy it contained. 
Before outlining the attacks made by Conservative and Liberal party politicians, 
however, it is necessary to sketch a portrait of these opposition leaders’ own 
precarious careers in 1930 to illustrate their motives.  
Conservative leader Stanley Baldwin had barely survived the Irwin 
Declaration debacle by appeasing his vocal critics within the Conservative Party. 
When Baldwin spoke in Parliament on the India issue, for example, “there had been 
no word of approval from his own colleagues and as soon as Lloyd George got up 
Winston and Worthington-Evans on each side of him leant forward and punctuated 
every sentence with emphatic ‘hear hears!’”506 The Conservative leader was in danger 
of having to resign because “[i]f the matter had gone to division half his colleagues 
would have voted against him”.507 A moderate facing diehard backbench opinion, 
especially with regard to India, the Conservative leader could ill afford to support any 
government policy that appeared to acquiesce in the face of demands even remotely 
similar to those of the India Congress. In the case of Palestine, Arabs were 
comparable to Indians – not because British politicians viewed Jews as non-
indigenous, but because they were Caucasian, European, and therefore perceived very 
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differently in the interwar imperial mindset. Approaching the India Round Table in 
1930, Baldwin deliberately retreated from frontline politics and declined to serve on 
Britain’s delegation to the conference.508 He wrote to Lord Irwin on 16 October to say 
that in preparing for the conference, he “kept off, partly to keep L.l.G. off and partly 
because the political situation is far too tricky to allow me to be immersed in a 
Conference when every crook in the country is out for my scalp”.509  
In this environment, the Conservative Party Chairman and former Colonial 
Secretary Leopold Amery was highly concerned with keeping Baldwin in his 
leadership position.510 Amery was a known Zionist sympathiser who had been 
involved with securing Palestine’s advantageous borders in 1920, but did not support 
the cause at the Arabs’ expense – he simply did not believe that the Arabs were losing 
anything. This is evident in an article Amery wrote for The Pioneer in December 
1929. He was, first and foremost, a British imperialist:  
“The terms of the Balfour Declaration make it plain that the creation of the 
Jewish national home did not imply the setting up of a Jewish nationalist state 
or the support, in favour of the Jews, of that essentially intolerant type of racial 
or linguistic nationalism which has devastated Europe by its conflicting claims 
for political domination. Equally it left no room, in Palestine at least, for the 
assertion of that type of nationalism by the Arabs”.511 
  
His motivations may be clearer when considering Amery’s recollections after a dinner 
party the previous year; Amery admitted “[…] our object is to have Palestine 
permanently within the ambit of our commonwealth of peoples”.512 Fundamentally, 
however, Leopold Amery’s first loyalty was to the party, and at that moment to 
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Baldwin, who also felt the opposition of Conservatives who still favoured coalition 
with Lloyd George and had been marginalised by his removal in 1922. These had 
included Austen Chamberlain, making the former Foreign Secretary an important man 
to court.  
The policy that joined many along the Liberal and Conservative benches was 
free trade within the Empire, which was the particular cause of press barons, Lord 
Beaverbrook and Lord Rothermere, who formed the United Empire Party to split the 
Conservative vote and pressure against India reform.513 These two characters opposed 
Lloyd George when he was Prime Minister on the basis of an anti-waste campaign 
discussed in the previous chapter, but by 1929, they were undermining Stanley 
Baldwin’s leadership of the Conservative Party over India and the free trade issue, the 
latter of which was championed by David Lloyd George and aroused suspicions of 
collaboration between the three men. Baldwin, for example, asked his shadow 
cabinet, “[w]hat is your reading of the Beaverbrook-Rothermere game? And under 
which thimble is the pea, or in other words Ll.G.?”514  
In a moment of frustration in dealing with this situation, Amery suggested the 
Baldwin-loyalists within the party should sign a letter to their leader saying “All your 
old colleagues conscious of each other’s senility desire to tell you that not one of them 
has any objection to any of the others being bumped off […]”.515 While assassinating 
the diehard Conservatives was not an option, their various outrages were at least 
relatively predictable. Baldwin and Amery were determined to beat the press lords 
and the diehards at their own game: “I am fighting with beasts at Ephesus”, Baldwin 
wrote, “and I hope to see their teeth drawn and their claws broken before the battle is 
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over!”516 On 23 October, one tactic for this war became apparent. The Conservative 
leadership penned a letter to The Times signed by Baldwin, Amery and Chamberlain 
to protest against the Passfield White Paper.517 Rather than being aimed solely at the 
Labour government’s apparent anti-Zionism, however, the letter also targeted divisive 
factions within Conservative ranks. It was part Zionist sympathy and part political 
strategy.  
The letter was first constructed in conjunction with Arthur Balfour’s niece and 
Zionist campaigner Baffy Dugdale. Amery recounted how “Mrs Dugdale […] came in 
very much concerned about the Palestine White Paper” and believed that the 
Conservative Party should “dissociate themselves as promptly as possible from the 
government in this matter”.518 Amery agreed and ushered Mrs Dugdale in to see 
Stanley Baldwin, inviting her to begin “drafting something before she came back and 
lunched with us”.519 Mrs Dugdale then took Baldwin’s “general instructions as to the 
points to be brought out in a letter”, which she drafted and then Amery revised and 
amended with Baldwin and Austen Chamberlain.520 Weizmann credited his colleague 
Namier with inspiring Mrs Dugdale, but it was Leopold Amery who organised the 
Conservative opposition to the white paper.521  
Amery even recruited Austen Chamberlain for this purpose. As well as being a 
known Zionist sympathiser, Chamberlain had opposed Baldwin over the Irwin 
Declaration and had no confidence in him as a leader, noting how, “to recall an old 
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cartoon of “Punch”, a manifesto in his hands becomes ‘a wet blanket’”.522 
Chamberlain, however, did not relish the thought of a party run by the press barons 
and opposed attempts to force Baldwin’s resignation on the grounds that it “would be 
hailed as a triumph for themselves by Rothermere and Beaverbrook” and “would lend 
itself to every form of misconception and be deeply wounding […]”.523 Baldwin was 
not a passive observer in this political infighting, but he found it very draining and 
sympathised with James Ramsay MacDonald’s similar situation, seeing the Prime 
Minister as “a good man and true, fighting for his life”.524 The same was not true for 
Baldwin’s opinions of David Lloyd George: “no constitution can stand public life 
today when you get near seventy”, Baldwin wrote, “unless you are made like L.l.G. 
with no bowels, no principles, no heart and no friends”.525 The Liberal leader was, 
incidentally, also under pressure from his own party. While Amery did not necessarily 
want a parliamentary debate on the Palestine white paper, “fearing that it would show 
divisions in our own ranks”, it was members of David Lloyd George’s Liberal Party 
who pushed for a date and organised it.526 
It is important to note that Lloyd George had been a divisive figure for Liberal 
politics since 1916 when he ousted Prime Minister Asquith and then fronted a 
majority Conservative government against the wishes of many within his party. Until 
Lloyd George suffered a similar coup at the hands of his Coalition partners in 1922, 
the former Prime Minister lent broad support to the Zionist enterprise. As discussed in 
the previous chapter, however, this was the less the result of sentiment and ideology 
                                                 
522 AC39/2/1-56, 9 October 1930, Austen Chamberlain to Neville Chamberlain, Cadbury Research 
Library: Special Collections, University of Birmingham.  
523 Ibid.  
524 Gwynne to Louis Grieg, 11 November 1930, Gwyne Papers 20, in Williamson, Baldwin Papers, 
245. 
525 Baldwin to Salisbury, 19 Jan 1931, Hatfield House Archives 4M/139/45, in Williamson, Baldwin 
Papers, 250. 
526 Amery, 6 Nov 1930, The Empire at Bay, 88. 
 154 
than the opportunities and constraints created by post-war diplomacy. Regardless, 
whenever the Palestine issue surfaced subsequently in debate, Lloyd George 
vociferously defended the Zionist movement – and thereby his own tenure as Prime 
Minister.  
By 1930, his unofficial position as leader of the Liberal Party was also 
tenuous. Lloyd George had led a vote against the government in July 1930 and lost, 
simply because many Liberal MPs had defied the whip and sided with the 
government.527 Sir John Simon, of the Simon Commission in India, was also close to 
challenging Lloyd George for the leadership of the Liberal Party, and the letter he sent 
with Conservative politician Lord Hailsham to The Times, protesting the Passfield 
White Paper, was a tacit challenge to the Liberal leader’s authority.528 Lloyd George 
was also bitterly frustrated with the Liberal Party’s marginalised position and support 
for a Socialist party that was failing to live up to its radical reforming intentions.529 As 
MacDonald refused to supply an arrangement that gave the dwindling Liberal Party 
any lifeline, Lloyd George attempted to exploit Conservative dissatisfaction with 
Baldwin to win back some of his former coalitionists and attract younger, more 
progressive Tories into his sphere.530  
Baldwin recognised the tactic, noting that, “The Goat has finally failed to get 
any real arrangements with Labour and rumour has it he is going to make another 
attempt on us”.531 Baldwin’s assessment was that “[t]he Liberal Party is cracking 
badly and Labour is running about with its’ tail between its’ legs. Ramsay is tired and 
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rattled. An election may come any day but I still feel they will see the New Year in 
[…]”.532 Lady Passfield recognised, however, that “all three parties are in a devil of a 
mess”.533 This was the political context in which the Passfield White Paper was 
published on 21 October 1930 and then debated in the House of Commons on 17 
November. Both Baldwin (through Amery) and David Lloyd George had previous ties 
to Chaim Weizmann and Zionism more generally, and this meant they were also well 
placed to use Zionist arguments in order to guard against internal criticism (in the case 
of Baldwin) or undermine a disappointing government usurping the Liberal Party’s 
position in British politics.  
As mentioned previously, the initial criticisms came in the form of two letters 
to The Times and these were followed by the crucial Parliamentary debate. The first 
letter came from Baldwin, Amery and Austen Chamberlain. It accused the Labour 
government of abandoning the Jewish national home policy, stating, “they have laid 
down a policy of so definitely negative a character that it appears to us to conflict […] 
with the whole spirit of the Balfour Declaration and of the statements made by 
successive governments in the last 12 years”.534 The effect of this policy, the letter 
charged, was “to create a feeling of distrust in that British good faith which is the 
most precious asset of our foreign Imperial policy”.535 The letter was relatively brief, 
and as such made no reference to the Shaw or Hope-Simpson Commissions nor to any 
of the specific arguments utilised by the white paper. 
Following this, on 4 November, two lawyers and former cabinet ministers, 
Lord Hailsham and Sir John Simon, wrote their letter to The Times, which purported 
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to compare provisions of the white paper to the terms of the Mandate.536 Hailsham 
was a Conservative, the former Lord Chancellor, and Simon, of the aforementioned 
Simon Commission in India, had served as a Liberal Home Secretary.537 As a 
Conservative, Hailsham was predictably opposed to Labour, and the Irwin 
Declaration had seriously undermined Simon both politically and personally. 
Described by Lady Passfield as “[t]hat smooth faced, slim and ingratiating 
personage”, Simon was not characterised as a politician who accepted such insults to 
his stature with ease; he and his wife were “admirable citizens; but they have far too 
much contempt for other people and are far too obstinate and dogmatic, too assured of 
their own enlightenment”.538  
Hailsham and Simon’s letter accused the government’s new Palestine policy 
of flouting Britain’s international obligations as a member and trustee of the League 
of Nations.539 Furthermore, it called for “the Council of the League of Nations to 
obtain from the Hague Court an advisory opinion on the questions involved”.540 As 
the Labour government’s League of Nations policy was a potentially divisive issue 
and the report from the PMC had been damning in places, this was hardly an 
attractive proposal in Downing Street. As with the Irwin Declaration, however, such 
criticism of the Passfield White Paper was not concerned with the actual policy, but 
instead, “[a]lleged ambiguities and unfriendliness”, how it looked and sounded.541 
Following these letters to The Times, a debate in Parliament on 17 November shook 
the government’s already unstable foundations. 
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Comprised of targeted attacks from Liberal and Conservative MPs designed to 
embarrass the government rather than clarify points of policy, the debate was centred 
on issues like anti-Semitism and breaches of faith. The government’s response, 
however, had been prepared in advance by the Colonial Office and so was directed 
against the substance of these complaints rather than their political motivations. This 
led to a situation in which “the facts” of the white paper were immaterial to its 
survival.  
Speaking first, Lloyd George led the attack, accusing the government of anti-
Semitism and hypocrisy, and he attempted to drive a wedge between the Prime 
Minister (who was present) and the Colonial Secretary (who was not) by questioning 
“whether the Prime Minister himself was fully consulted before this document was 
issued”. 542 Chancellor’s comments on this speech were as blunt as ever: “L.G.’s 
speech was typical – all sentiment and hot air”.543 Lloyd George also struck at the 
heart of Labour’s commitment to the League, specifically highlighting how the PMC 
“was full of the most severe criticism of their administration” and “[t]heir answer was 
practically to tear up the Mandate”.544 During the debate, Amery echoed Lloyd 
George’s sentiments, remarking that, “no one wishes to acknowledge the parentage of 
this undesirable child. I do not suppose that the Prime Minister is prepared to 
elucidate this problem of disputed parentage”.545 MacDonald never answered these 
comments, but of course he had approved the policy – as had a cabinet committee, the 
full cabinet and, as far as Lord Passfield was concerned, Chaim Weizmann.546  
It is important to note that this was routine parliamentary antagonism, and was 
not necessarily unanimously designed to try and topple the government on this 
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relatively minor issue. Amery wrote, for example, that “[i]t was important to push the 
Govt. hard but not to have a division which might either have finally confirmed the 
White Paper or alternatively defeated the Govt. and committed the Socialist Party to 
Passfield’s anti-Zionist policy”.547 Nevertheless, the danger to Labour was 
cumulative. 
In response to these attacks, it was Colonial Office Under-Secretary Shiels’s 
assignment to speak in defence of the government, which in principle was not a 
difficult task.  The Prime Minister had originally charged Henderson with the duty, 
but defending the government’s policy so publicly would have placed him in an 
awkward position vis-à-vis the beginning of Anglo-Zionist talks.548 Shiels highlighted 
that “[t]here seems to have been some obvious misunderstanding” of the Passfield 
White Paper, but he was merely being polite.549 The vociferous nature of the 
opposition from Liberals and Conservatives in The Times had already been identified 
as both fallacious and underhanded. Palestine High Commissioner Sir John 
Chancellor openly expressed this opinion, writing to O.G.R. Williams directly at the 
Colonial Office to say he was “greatly concerned about the letter which Baldwin, 
Chamberlain and Amery have written to the Times. If all parties would accept 
H.M.G’.s statement of policy, there would be some prospect of future peace in 
Palestine. If they are going to make it a party question, Palestine will become a 
running sore and a potential danger to the safety of the Empire, like Ireland”.550 In 
correspondence with Shuckburgh in the Colonial Office’s Middle East Department, 
Chancellor added, “I share your view as to the mischievous character of the Baldwin-
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Chamberlain-Amery letter. No doubt it was inspired by Amery.”551 After both letters 
had been published, the Colonial Office prepared a defence of the white paper, and 
their memoranda formed the basis of Shiels’s defence.  
At the Colonial Office, O.G.R. Williams was responsible for the full rebuttal 
to Hailsham and Simon’s letter. Williams noted that the letter purported to compare 
the white paper with the official Mandate, but mentioned only the Mandate’s 
preamble, Article II and Article VI, omitting any reference to protecting non-Jewish 
populations.552 As well as misleadingly paraphrasing the white paper, Hailsham and 
Simon also ignored the findings of Hope-Simpson and created an impression of the 
new policy that was “quite untrue”.553 Williams did highlight, however, how 
Hailsham and Simon’s reference to The Hague was purely political since “it would be 
so framed as to be exceedingly unfavourable and humiliating to His Majesty’s 
Government […] owing to the peculiar composition of the Hague Court”.554 This was 
the only part of the letter that was troubling, not because the issue really would 
necessitate referral to The Hague, but because dealing with the threat exposed the 
government’s financial motivations for cutting Jewish immigration rather than 
investing in development.555  
Other than revealing this slightly mercenary policy-making process, the 
arguments opposed to the white paper prompted only incredulity at the Colonial 
Office. Passfield himself drafted a letter to The Times, stating “[i]t is reassuring to 
find from their letter published in your columns […] that such high authorities as Lord 
Hailsham and Sir John Simon do not indicate anything in the Palestine White Paper 
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inconsistent with the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate save in so far as they seek 
to draw from language used in paragraphs 15, 19 to 23 and 28 three inferences, not 
one of which is justified”.556 These inferences, Passfield added, “are made plausible 
only by an inaccurate representation of the contents of the paragraphs referred to, not 
one of which is quoted verbatim”.557 High Commissioner Chancellor echoed the 
absurdity of this situation, noting that “[t]he local Jewish criticisms of the statement of 
policy, for the most part, condemn it for things that it does not contain”.558  
In Parliament, Shiels reiterated polite versions of these sentiments and stressed 
his earlier opinion that the “White Paper makes no change whatever in the 
interpretation of the Mandate”, but rather, “[w]hat it does is to emphasize the 
necessity for a more exact application of the absorptive capacity principle”.559  
Therefore, Shiels argued, “[i]t is obvious that the suggestion that this government is 
seeking to crystallise the Jewish national home in its present position is without a 
shadow of foundation”.560 Although the Prime Minister spoke very little during the 
debate, to this point he did add that “I have said again and again and I say now that 
the Mandate is to be carried out. But when we come to the condition of Palestine we 
must admit that the Mandate has to be carried out in such a way that civil disorder is 
not going to result from its operation.”561  
In this sentiment, the usually competitive Foreign and Colonial Offices were 
in agreement. Foreign Secretary Henderson had received the full text of Zionist 
objections to the white paper the week before the debate via the Prime Minister’s pro-
Zionist son, Malcolm MacDonald. The Eastern Department of the Foreign Office had 
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then prepared a full rebuttal that raised almost identical points to the defence written 
by the Colonial Office without conferring between the two.562 Both ministries agreed 
that there was “no intention to crystallise the status quo”.563 The Foreign Office noted 
how “it is clear that, so long as an acute unemployment problem exists in Palestine 
(whether of Jews or Arabs), it is the duty of the Mandatory, under Article 6 of the 
Mandate, to restrict immigration into Palestine (whether Jews or Arabs)”.564 The 
bureaucracy, therefore, was united on the Palestine issue. The disagreements over 
Passfield’s white paper were between politicians.  
During the parliamentary debate, it was Leopold Amery who brought up the 
subject of India. Amery declared that Palestine’s 1929 riots were “an old-fashioned 
religious outbreak of the type with which the Indian administration is only too 
familiar”.565 He was trying to draw a comparison between “giving in” to Arabs in 
Palestine and acquiescing to Indian self-rule, hinting at the Irwin Declaration. “This is 
not the first White Paper of this kind that has appeared”, Amery declared, and pointed 
to unrest throughout the world “because of the White Papers which are poured out 
from the Colonial Office and which we are afterwards told do not mean what they 
appear to say”.566 Amery’s speech was aimed at a continued appeasement of the 
diehard, anti-Baldwin group within the Conservative Party. This is why the arguments 
against the white paper had little relation to the document’s actual contents. Even 
Malcolm MacDonald admitted that “[t]he substance of the white paper is all right […] 
its embroidery is all wrong”.567  
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While the rank and file of the House of Commons indulged in emotional 
arguments for and against the new policy, party leaders were also calculating. The 
outcome of the debate was not necessarily instrumental for Amery and Baldwin, 
merely their noted opposition to a white paper that appeared to reward Arab violence 
in Palestine with decreased Jewish immigration. No majority was necessary, and so 
the plethora of opinion expressed during the debate posed no fundamental problems 
for Conservative leaders other than the slight embarrassment Amery originally hoped 
to avoid. 
As expected, condemnation and support was not unanimous among any party. 
Colonel Charles Howard-Bury, for example, was Conservative MP for Chelmsford 
and spoke in support of the government, which he believed had “acted very 
courageously and impartially in producing that White Paper”.568 Another 
Conservative MP, Sir George Jones, admonished the character of the debate, stating 
“that it would be a calamity if the Palestinian question were involved in party politics 
in this country”.569 The Liberal MP Sir Rhys Hopkin Morris defied his own leader by 
highlighting how “it would be a moment of very grave importance in the history of 
this country if it were recognised that international events of this kind are to be part of 
the ordinary battle of party conflict”.570 Labour MP Frederick Cocks also called 
attention to the political machinations underway, saying Lloyd George “had one eye 
on the Mount of Olives and the other on a part of the East End of London where a by-
election is about to take place and where there is a population of very hard-working 
and able Zionists”.571  
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Other Labour members lent support to the Opposition. Daniel Hopkin, for 
example, raised the spectre of anti-Semitism, asserting that “[a]ccording to this White 
Paper, if a Jew buys land he is wrong. If he is a farmer, he is wrong. It seems to me 
that to some people Trotsky is always a Jew but Einstein is always a German. Every 
time he is wrong.”572 To Hopkin, this made the white paper “the greatest mistake of 
any Minister since the time when we lost the American colonies”.573 Although both 
Liberal and Conservative parties were relatively untroubled by backbench dissent in 
this debate, Labour could ill-afford such breaking of ranks. Amery understood this 
and gave his assessment of the debate as follows: 
“My speech drew the PM who was thoroughly woolly; full of general gush 
about the Zionists but not really precise as to what the government meant to do 
[…] Walter Elliot wound up for us quite effectively, and then Alexander 
replied, a meagre ill formed speech which did not satisfy the House. 
Kenworthy rose full of indignation, was cut short but re-opened after the usual 
reading of bills, to ask questions which Alexander dodged by walking away 
leaving poor Shiels, sick and sorry, to make as good a defence as he could to a 
series of persistent questions as to whether the government stood by the White 
Paper or not. My summary of the debate was ‘From White Paper to white 
sheet’.”574 
 
First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Alexander, had argued that based on the 
debate, the government was undefeated, asserting that, “the so-called case against the 
government as stated to-night had been a very damp squib”.575 Alexander challenged 
“any impartial Member of the House who has sat right through this debate and heard 
all the speeches, to summarise the arguments […] and to say if he does not agree with 
me that, in the main, the debate has not shown that there is a strong feeling in this 
House on the part of a majority against the position of the government”.576 This is 
where Labour’s problem arose, however.  
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The government needed more than a majority on this single issue as it required 
its own unity as well as cross-party support for foreign policy in general. This 
situation left the Prime Minister “cross about Palestine” and particularly annoyed with 
the Colonial Secretary. Lady Passfield wrote how, “the Shaw Commission and Hope-
Simpson, with his report, both nominees of Sidney’s, have been too pro-Arab; a 
White Paper (which the P.M. saw and approved) was ‘tactless’ – indeed he allowed 
Lloyd George in his virulent attack on the White Paper, to assert that the P.M. has not 
seen it’ – which was mean of MacDonald”.577  
Although the beleaguered Shiels, late in the evening debate, was badgered into 
asserting that  “[i]t is quite obvious, surely, that the answer to the question put to me 
is that the White Paper, as explained and amplified today, certainly stands”, this was 
unlikely.578 The Labour government was fragile on foreign policy, had already been 
undermined by criticism from the League of Nations, was threatened over the 
potential loss of cross-party support on India and was faced with the realisation that a 
few key pro-Zionist Labour MPs also opposed the white paper.  
The younger MacDonald noted how the main problem was that “[i]f you 
dispute Hope-Simpson then certainly disagree with White Paper; that is a fundamental 
controversy”.579 Like many British Zionist sympathisers, however, he did not tend to 
speak out against the two investigative commissions but instead took offence 
principally because the white paper seemed to focus unnecessarily on criticising the 
Jews: “Document is typical of Colonial Office accustomed to take paternal interest in 
self-helpless native race […] White Paper shows lamentable and disastrous 
imbalance”.580 MacDonald Junior vehemently defended Zionism during this period, 
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writing that “[i]f such censures are to be written, how many pages might be written 
about Arab assassins!”581 The young Labour politician’s own legacy on Palestine, 
however, would prove even more unpopular and controversial during his tenure as 
Colonial Secretary in the late 1930s (see Chapter Five).  
In addition, supplementing this internal split and external antagonism was the 
very tangible Whitechapel by-election results of 3 December 1930, which showed a 
significantly reduced Labour majority. These different factors combined to deliver the 
death knell to Passfield’s white paper, but it was a slow-burn decision that did not 
materialise until protracted talks between Zionists and the Palestine cabinet 
subcommittee disruptively spilled into the next calendar year.  
Immediately after the debate, James Ramsay MacDonald was still clinging to 
the official interpretation of the white paper. He wrote to Dr Myer Solis Cohen in 
Philadelphia: 
“I am in an awful state of pressure. You will have seen the repeated 
contentions of the government that, as a matter of fact, the White Paper is no 
upset of the Mandate. The position in Palestine has got very dangerous, and 
the responsibility has to be shared by both the Jews and the Arabs on the spot. 
We must get things a little quieter; otherwise, nothing but disaster is ahead.”582  
 
Following the by-election, however, the government needed to end the white paper 
debate that was being extended by protracted Anglo-Zionist discussions and nullify 
the dividing impact of Liberal and Conservative opposition on Labour’s own unity, 
the dangers of which had already been raised in cabinet on 11 November.583 The 
Prime Minister had ceded this issue to Foreign Secretary Arthur Henderson on 6 
November to organise a cabinet sub-committee, which did include Lord Passfield, and 
confer with Chaim Weizmann and other Zionist leaders to “clarify” the white 
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paper.584 Although this clarification did result in an effective reversal of the white 
paper, this was certainly not the original intention. As noted above, the talks began as 
a legal exercise and a means of convincing the policy’s Zionist critics that it did not 
violate the Mandate. 
Henderson’s notes for the negotiations demonstrate his confidence in the 
government’s stance. “If ‘the position’ of the Arabs is ‘positively changed for the 
worse’”, Henderson wrote, “the government must take steps to put things right”.585  
Zionist criticisms, he decided, therefore, “lose a good deal of their force because they 
assume intentions on the part of His Majesty’s Government which are contrary to the 
facts”.586 The Foreign Secretary was also annoyed by Zionist memoranda’s prolific 
citations of Hailsham and Simon’s letter to The Times without a single reference to 
Lord Passfield’s rebuttal of 5 November.587  
In addition, Henderson criticised Zionist negotiator Leonard Stein’s selective 
and misleading quotes, how he represented the policy as more anti-Zionist than it 
really was by eliminating the government’s references to working with the Jewish 
Agency.588 The oft-repeated accusation that the white paper blamed Arab 
unemployment solely on Jewish immigration, for example, was one instance “of 
incomplete quotation and misinterpretation of the white paper. Great stress was laid 
on this particular misinterpretation in the ingenious perversion of it contained in a 
letter to Lord Passfield from Dr Weizmann, which Dr Weizmann published in ‘The 
Tines’.”589 That part of the white paper, Henderson noted, spelled out Arab suspicions 
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but in no way endorsed them.590 The Foreign Secretary believed another tactic was to 
minimise the problem of dispossessed Arabs cultivators because Weizmann and his 
colleagues, “for political reasons” had to go “as far as possible towards satisfying 
their more extreme supporters who sympathise with the revisionist policy of a Jewish 
state in their time”.591 Lady Passfield offered a simple explanation of Zionist 
opposition to the white paper despite all the government’s assurances: “It was not the 
Statement of Policy but the facts revealed by Hope-Simpson’s report that he was up 
against”, she wrote, “it was these facts that were so damning. Weisman is in the 
difficult position of a Company Promoter, confronted with an adverse expert’s report, 
damaging to his prospective enterprise.”592  
As it was not the British government’s priority to establish a Jewish state, 
Henderson believed it was Britain’s duty to issue the white paper.593 It is important to 
preface these opinions, however, with the knowledge that Henderson entered into 
these Anglo-Zionist talks with an eye on the League of Nations where his top priority 
throughout the autumn of 1930 was German disarmament. The Foreign Secretary was 
wary of and slightly bitter about Zionism’s international activities. “On the 
publication of the Shaw Report”, he wrote, “there is reason to suppose that every 
effort was made by the Jews to influence the Permanent Mandates Commission 
unfavourably against His Majesty’s Government”.594 Another member of the Foreign 
Office later scribbled an additional note: “though it must be admitted that there is no 
documentary or other proof”.595 
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The Palestine subcommittee first met Zionist representatives on 17 November 
and the initiation of these talks was announced that day. It was hoped that the 
beginning of the subcommittee’s discussions would provide some inoculation against 
criticisms anticipated at the debate, but Shiels was unconvinced: “I am rather doubtful 
about the electoral help we shall get”, he wrote to Henderson, “as Amery, L.l.G. and 
Co. are heavily in with Weizmann […]”.596 This first meeting had been postponed at 
Weizmann’s request, but it was merely a procedural affair and the group adjourned 
after an hour to observe the debate in the Commons.597 What followed was a series of 
face-to-face meetings and negotiations via correspondence until late January 1931. 
Throughout these talks, Chaim Weizmann alternated between confidence in his ability 
to secure a reversal of the white paper, and gloom and uncertainty regarding the 
direction of negotiations with Henderson’s committee. Two days after the debate, for 
example, Weizmann informed Amery that “[a]lthough the government is retreating 
very slowly and with not too much grace, a retreat it is”.598 However, a few days later 
Weizmann wrote that, “I don’t know exactly what will be the result of our present 
negotiations with the government – I am writing at a time when events are about to 
break […] I do not know how our negotiations will end. This is no easy matter”.599  
The first draft of what became the MacDonald letter was received by 
Weizmann on 29 November, and he remarked that the “impression here is 
unfavourable”.600 This first draft, labelled “the Henderson letter” at this stage, was 
very long and essentially constituted the full rebuttals already made by Passfield, 
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Shiels, the Colonial and Foreign Offices.601 It did contain some of the key reversing 
phrases found in the final letter, but these were accompanied by extensive contextual 
caveats. While noting that the Passfield White Paper made land control “regulatory 
and not prohibitive” the first draft also included a section saying, “it does involve a 
power to veto transactions which are inconsistent with the tenor of the general 
scheme”.602 As well as assurances there would be no stoppage of immigration in any 
category, the first draft included sprawling provisos asserting the government’s right 
to restrict immigration in line with economic capacity.603  
Weizmann considered that Passfield was poisoning the atmosphere against 
them, believing “the old man malignantly sabotages everything”.604 Lord Passfield’s 
relationship with the Zionist negotiators was indeed extremely strained at times. Lady 
Passfield wrote that her husband partially admired Weizmann, stating the Zionist 
diplomat was “a disinterested idealist, a clever administrator, an accomplished 
intellectual – all rolled into one. But he is a champion manipulator – and uses 
arguments and devices, regardless of accuracy, straightforwardness or respect for 
confidence, or other honourable undertakings […] ‘A clever devil: I take my hat off to 
him’”.605 Mostly there was frustration between them. Although “Sidney started with a 
great admiration for the Jew and a contempt for the Arab”, Lady Passfield wrote, “he 
reports that all the officials, at home and in Palestine, find the Jews, even many 
accomplished and cultivated Jews – intolerable as negotiators and colleagues”.606  
From the Zionist delegation’s perspective, the problem was that Henderson 
and two other committee members, Alexander and Shaw, had no prior dealings with 
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their cause, creating long, drawn-out meetings in which the intricacies had to be 
explained and the busy Henderson in particular became very irritable.607 In contrast, 
Weizmann wrote, “Passfield does know the thing, but he is so artful and shifty that 
you never know when you have got him to agree to something”.608 Looking at the 
meeting transcripts and Henderson’s notes, it does seem that he was well versed in the 
problems of Palestine but simply refused to yield on the government’s right to issue 
the white paper and his belief that the Zionist criticisms were unfounded. Henderson 
told Weizmann he was being “supersensitive”, and quoted Shiels’s parliamentary 
defence of the white paper during meetings.609 The Foreign Secretary challenged 
Weizmann on every point, demonstrating how these talks were originally intended to 
persuade and intimidate rather than placate Weizmann and his fellow Zionists. “[O]ur 
whole object”, Henderson stated, is “to clear up matters that are ambiguous, that have 
been misstated or misunderstood […] I want you and your colleagues to be quite clear 
in your mind that the fullest possible opportunity is given to you to state every 
possible objection your people have to this White Paper. You can expect nothing 
more.”610 The Foreign Secretary specifically wanted to avoid any action that looked 
like a withdrawal of the original white paper.611 
By mid-December, Weizmann complained that “[t]he negotiations with the 
government drag on rather inconclusively”.612 A redraft of the Henderson letter 
reached Weizmann, but it included only minor changes following advice from a legal 
committee, and the alterations constituted technical changes to language in two 
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paragraphs of a document more than 20 pages long.613 There was still no agreement 
by the end of December.614 Weizmann, however, had met with MacDonald on 
Christmas Eve and found that “the prime minister seems really anxious that our 
negotiations should end in a successful agreement”.615 Malcolm MacDonald records 
this meeting slightly differently, noting that nothing much was said about the 
subcommittee conference other than it needed to be complete before Weizmann could 
bring up other subjects like Palestine Administration staff and the development 
scheme.616  
The Palestine subcommittee was achieving very little, and Henderson was due 
to leave London for Geneva on 9 January.617 In preparation for his absence, the 
Foreign Secretary authorised another redraft of the letter. This was written by the 
Lord Advocate and Malcolm MacDonald, both identified by Weizmann as friends of 
their cause, in conjunction with Leonard Stein and Louis Namier, another Zionist 
named Major Hind and even Weizmann himself.618 It was finished on 7 January in 
time to be circulated to the cabinet committee and to Henderson before he left for 
Geneva, resulting in a few further amendments and a fourth draft of the letter.619 It 
was during these January meetings that the final letter took shape by cutting out all of 
the caveats and provisos concerning Britain’s right to limit Jewish immigration and 
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land purchase that Henderson had defended since the previous November. Further 
changes were agreed via written correspondence on 22 January 1931, but they were 
all superficial – all offending wording had already been removed from the British 
draft.620 There was a final meeting between Zionists and the Palestine subcommittee 
on 30 January and suddenly they had complete agreement. The fifth draft of the letter 
was finalised during this session and was approved by the cabinet on 4 February 
1931.621 By this time Weizmann admitted to Malcolm MacDonald that “I am afraid 
you are sick of the sight of my blue paper […]”622, which the Zionist leader almost 
always used for his flourishingly handwritten correspondence. 
The reversal of the Passfield White Paper, therefore, did not occur until 
January and evolved slowly during that month. It is likely that as Henderson pressed 
on doggedly in discussions with Zionists, James Ramsay MacDonald worried more 
about the depressing statistics of the Whitechapel by-election and the negotiations’ 
anticipated affect on upcoming parliamentary business. The India issue was due to 
resurface early in the new year. On 23 January, the Prime Minister officially closed 
the first stage of the India Conference, which was due to continue within a few 
months. Palestine could be tidied away, but  “[d]uring the next year, whichever party 
is in power, it is India that will claim attention”.623 Lady Passfield called the closing 
speech “a gorgeous success” but India’s constitutional development would remain an 
ongoing concern.624 The same was true of Labour’s internal divisions. The Prime 
Minister, for example, expressed how he was “getting very tired […] of the number of 
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letters I get from colleagues ending, for one reason or another, with a threat that they 
must resign. I think it is about time that I started playing the same sort of card.”625 It 
appears that the weight of holding the Labour Party together on an issue made more 
divisive by the arguments of Conservative and Liberal politicians, who were partially 
motivated by preserving their own leadership positions, was simply too tiresome. The 
minority Labour government found it less politically risky to concede to the terms of a 
letter drafted and amended by the Prime Minister’s own son and a legal authority in 
the Lord Advocate than to continue to defend the Passfield White Paper against what 
both the Foreign Office and Colonial Offices agreed were unfounded accusations. 
Baldwin wrote that “[t]he government is decaying daily and I can’t see how in any 
way they can hold on much longer […]” and he was correct.626 There may have been 
no official alliance between Baldwin, Amery and Lloyd George, but the effect on 
MacDonald was the same.627 In a bid to maintain Labour unity and avoid derailing 
Indian policy, the government was unable to continue with the Passfield White Paper 
and this option was eliminated in the first stage of decision-making.  
 
Stage Two  
Although Stage One of this poliheuristic analysis provided only a single main 
option of reversing the white paper, there were also two subsidiary alternatives for the 
second stage: the government could reverse the Passfield White Paper and replace it 
with extensive development as originally intended, or reverse the Passfield White 
Paper without extensive development. One of these options provided the greater 
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utility on the most important substantive dimension which, in 1930-31, was the 
economy. 
 
The Economy 
Unlike in the analysis of the Balfour Zeitgeist, the economy for the Labour 
government during the Passfield debacle was a substantive dimension rather than a 
variable on the political dimension. Distinct from the embattled Lloyd George 
Coalition, the minority Labour government was not facing a campaign like “Anti-
Waste” – as the Press Barons, Lords Beaverbrook and Rothermere were largely thorns 
in Baldwin’s side. Since the period of decision-making did not fall close to a general 
election, the economy was not overly politicised in this specific decision-making 
process. Rather, over the period and subject in question, specifically October 1930-
February 1931, the financial crisis following the collapse of the United States stock 
market in 1929 was a constant, looming, material fact rather than a chiefly political 
problem in which the issue was a matter of perception.628  
As a result of these substantive financial constraints, the option to reverse the 
Passfield White Paper was not dependent on a commitment to the development 
programme of Sir John Hope-Simpson, already rejected once due to its high costs 
when the white paper was first published. The original cabinet committee on Palestine 
had determined that Britain was under a moral if not legal obligation to recompense 
Arabs dispossessed by British policy in Palestine, but the expenditure required was 
open to substantial manipulation because it depended entirely on how the number of 
dispossessed Arabs was calculated.629  
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During the Parliamentary debate, MPs such as Lloyd George, Samuel and 
Amery called for extensive development of Palestine along the lines originally 
proposed by Hope-Simpson.630 Ultimately, however, extensive development failed to 
satisfy the substantive economic dimension for a second time, and the option to 
reverse the white paper without a large development programme generated far greater 
utility. Incidentally, these MPs raised no objections when the white paper’s provisions 
relating to Jewish immigration and land purchase were rescinded but not replaced 
with the agricultural development that Hope-Simpson had identified as urgently 
necessary. Therefore, just as the Passfield White Paper began as a programme to 
prevent violence in Palestine but was restrained by the substantive economic 
dimension, so too was its reversal, prompted by a need to maintain political power 
and limited in viability due to financial pressures.   
 
After 1931 
Even though Passfield’s policy was reversed in this somewhat humiliating 
spectacle, he wrote to Henderson that, “I think you were thoroughly justified in 
embarking on the discussions in the political emergency”.631 After 1931, the 
constraints that led to this decision only grew, meaning that the British government’s 
handling of Palestine policy between the MacDonald letter of 1931 and the beginning 
of the Arab Revolt in 1936 remained stagnant. Following the political storm created 
by the Passfield White Paper, and the re-emergence of the economy as a variable on 
the political dimension later in 1931, no option ranked well enough to pass into the 
second stage.632 The India problem continued within British politics, notwithstanding 
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a tense settlement reached between Irwin and Gandhi in March 1931.633 The Labour 
government then fell in August as the financial crisis reached new heights and the 
Conservative Party orchestrated a takeover, succeeding in splitting Labour in the 
process.634 As the crisis deepened and London’s financial sector called for cuts in 
government spending, continued tensions in Palestine failed to materialise on the new 
government’s agenda.635 Although the cabinet discussed individual issues such as a 
Palestine trade preference, forming a legislative council and the rise in immigration 
following Hitler’s ascension in Germany, the question of overall policy remained un-
addressed.636  
In 1932, the Colonial Secretary again placed the issue of Jewish immigration 
before the cabinet and, rather than proposing a change of policy, he suggested that the 
determination of economic capacity be left entirely in the hands of the High 
Commissioner. Another committee was formed to consider the question.637 This 
adroitly removed Westminster from the immediate realm of responsibility and safely 
ignored the findings of the Hope-Simpson Commission.638 In addition, the Colonial 
Office pressured the Palestine Administration to develop a greater budget surplus, 
which meant less spending on development.639 Although “[n]ew agricultural stations, 
demonstration plots, research, etc., were provided for”, such schemes were tiny in 
comparison to the needs Hope-Simpson had identified.640 Whereas the one-man 
commission had found thousands of Arab families either directly or indirectly 
dispossessed or made unemployed by British policy in Palestine, in February 1933 the 
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Colonial Secretary asked that compensation should be restricted to ex-tenants.641 
Tensions in Palestine continued to mount. 
Unlike the period between the Jaffa Riots in 1921 and those in 1929, the interlude 
between the Passfield White Paper and the next great outbreak, what became the Arab 
Revolt, was not calm at all. On 15 April 1931, the High Commissioner “reported that 
in several areas, of which he gave details, the Zionists had bought property and were 
undertaking eviction proceedings against Arab families”, which Weizmann was 
unable or unwilling to prevent.642 Riots broke out in October 1933, the Palestine 
police opened fire, and Arab hostility resulted in frequent demonstrations through 
Jerusalem and Jaffa.643 Sir Arthur Wauchope, the new High Commissioner, even 
expressed concern over delays to his shipments of tear gas by 1934.644 Wauchope 
expressed, however, that such demonstrations were not “serious as a threat to the 
State” until the “fellaheen” peasant farmers joined the riots.645 “Should religious as 
well as political cries be raised”, Wauchope warned, “a number of the fellaheen, many 
of whom are landless and many very poor, will join; […] Our difficulties therefore are 
liable to be far more formidable in the future than they have been in the past”.646 The 
High Commissioner then went on to list exactly the same political, religious and 
economic grievances that the Shaw and Hope-Simpson reports highlighted following 
the 1929 riots.647 By the late 1930s, violence in Palestine erupted on a hitherto 
unfathomable scale. 
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Conclusion 
The “Passfield Reversal” was a period in Britain’s decision-making towards 
Palestine that marked the first stages of Britain’s withdrawal from the Jewish national 
home policy. Following the riots of 1929, two commissions of enquiry highlighted the 
need to invest in Arab agriculture, and limit Jewish immigration and land purchase, in 
line with economic capacity in order to keep the peace. These investigations resulted 
in the Passfield White Paper that was subsequently reversed following Conservative 
and Liberal opposition, and lengthy consultations with prominent Zionists. Unlike 
many previous works on the Mandate that have characterised this decision-making 
process as little more than a triumph of Chaim Weizmann’s diplomatic skills, this 
analysis highlights the role played by Conservatives’ and Liberals’ use of Zionist 
arguments for their own political ends.  
Baldwin feared the Conservative diehards who equated Arabs of Palestine 
with Indians agitating for self-rule and vociferously opposed both. Lloyd George was 
acutely aware of the Liberal Party’s rapidly declining status and sought to defend his 
own prime ministerial record, which witnessed both the Balfour Declaration and 
official Mandate, as well as simply to grapple for position. MacDonald’s government 
was placed in jeopardy by the divisive nature of this ongoing debate and sought to 
solidify the new policy’s legal standing and also placate key backbenchers by 
assigning Henderson to confer with the Zionists. Henderson was focused on Europe 
and disarmament, and concerns for the ongoing India conference and poor 
performance in the Whitechapel by-election combined to make the Passfield White 
Paper too risky on the political dimension. The threshold seems to have been 
significantly lower than previous Palestine decision-making episodes, and this can be 
attributed to Labour’s much more fragile hold on power than the Lloyd George 
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Coalition government of the early 1920s. Following February 1931, no policy options 
met requirements on the political dimension that would have allowed them to pass 
into the second stage of decision making, effectively crystallising the British 
government’s own Palestine policy until tensions erupted again in 1936. 
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Chapter 5: The MacDonald Betrayal 1936-1939 
“We cannot treat a million Arabs in their own country as though they did  
not exist”.648  
Malcolm MacDonald, Colonial Secretary, 1939. 
 
The Arab Revolt (1936-1939) preceded what appeared to represent a major 
shift in British policy towards Palestine. Despite a commitment to the Jewish national 
home expressed in the Balfour Declaration, the official Mandate, the Churchill White 
Paper and the “Black Letter” of 1931, the MacDonald White Paper of 1939 seemed to 
abrogate any further obligation to Zionism. Instead, this new policy committed Britain 
to an independent Palestine with a permanent Jewish minority. Considering the 
difficulties faced by previous British governments in attempting to withdraw from the 
Jewish national home, this new direction was highly controversial. Labelled 
“betrayal” and “appeasement”, the MacDonald White Paper was in many ways a 
direct result of the violent uprising of the Arab Revolt; demonstrating why, however, 
is more complicated than a simple analogy with Munich.649 
Unlike the cases presented in previous chapters, this decision to end the 
Jewish national home does indeed fit the traditional expected utility model. Between 
the beginning of the Arab Revolt and the publication of the MacDonald White Paper, 
two commissions of enquiry resolutely presented the British government with the 
same fundamental and irresolvable flaws in the national home policy that had 
characterised all previous investigations, leading the government first to pursue 
partition of Palestine and then to decide in favour of a single state solution. In the 
context of imminent war in Europe, a rational cost-benefit analysis reflected the 
adoption of advice from two pre-eminent committees in order to end rebellion in the 
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empire and refocus attention and resources closer to home. This, however, is an 
incomplete analysis, not least because similar reasoning fails to explain previous 
British behaviour towards Palestine. In contrast, invoking Poliheuristic Decision 
Theory lends an additional insight, a multi-layered analysis that demonstrates 
specifically which variables influenced the decision to abandon Zionism and why this 
sudden shift in policy actually represented far more continuity than change in British 
Palestine policy.  
Accordingly, this chapter applies the Ph Theory’s two-stage decision-making 
framework to the abrogation of the Jewish national home, demonstrating how and 
why the British government decided to issue the MacDonald White Paper in 1939. It 
argues that in the first stage of the decision-making process, the government rejected 
alternatives that failed to meet requirements on the most important, political 
dimension. Key variables on this dimension reflect criteria outlined in Mintz 2004: 
diplomacy, bureaucratic politics and parliamentary politics. Once options were 
eliminated, the government chose among the remaining alternatives in the second 
stage of decision-making by seeking to minimise costs on the substantive, strategic 
and economic dimensions. Rather than a sudden U-turn in Palestine policy as the 
result of appeasement, this analysis reveals a rebalancing of diplomatic interests in the 
Middle East necessitated by the Italian/German threat and made possible by a large 
Conservative majority in the House of Commons.  
 
Defining the Choice Set 
In the time period under consideration, the British government was presented 
with a severe problem in the form of the Arab Revolt in Palestine, and their choice set 
for dealing with this situation was determined by the essentially contradictory reports 
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of two commissions of enquiry, the Peel Commission in 1937 and the Woodhead 
Commission in 1938. 
These investigations both identified the Arab Revolt as a severe intensification 
of previous neglected disturbances. Unrest in the early 1930s had been a direct result 
of increased legal and illegal Jewish immigration into Palestine due to the rise of 
Hitler in Germany. This immigration had exceeded 50,000 in 1933 and peaked at 
62,000 in 1935, doubling the Jewish population in a very short time period that 
coincided with severe drought and agricultural hardship in Palestine.650 These levels 
of Jewish immigration did not threaten to reverse the Arabs’ large demographic 
majority, but the new influx of German Jews was perceived as a dangerous precedent, 
the latest anxiety in a cumulative response to Zionism that inspired Palestine’s Arabs 
to fear for their future. When the uprising began in April 1936, it evolved as a 
response to this increased Jewish presence, a series of reprisal murders between Jews 
and Arabs, Parliamentary rejection of a Palestine Legislative Council and refusal to 
grant three demands presented by the Arab Higher Committee: cessation of Jewish 
immigration, prohibition of land sales to Jews and the creation of a national 
government.651 The rebellion began in the form of a general strike accompanied by 
outbreaks of violence and sabotage directed at Jews, British officials and fellow 
Arabs, and the British government’s response entailed both repressive measures and 
authorisation of the Palestine Royal (Peel) Commission to make recommendations for 
a political solution.  
The answer, according to Lord Peel’s commission, was decisive; the 
recommendation was partition of Palestine, which far exceeded the committee’s terms 
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of reference.652 While the committee was charged with finding both the causes of and 
solutions to Palestine’s problem, it was not technically empowered to undermine the 
Balfour Declaration. This original statement of intent and the official Mandate had 
accepted a British obligation to Zionism, but commissioners found that violence in 
Palestine during the 1920s and 1930s was consistently caused by an Arab desire for 
independence coupled with fear and hatred for the Jewish national home.653 This had 
been exacerbated by the strides towards independence achieved by Iraq, Transjordan, 
Egypt, Syria and Lebanon as well as the pressure of immigration from Germany, the 
perceived injustice of McMahon’s correspondence with Sharif Hussein and “the 
intensive character of Jewish nationalism”.654 Finding that “[n]either Arab nor Jew 
has any sense of service to a single state”,655 the commission report concluded that 
any measures taken to ease the situation “might reduce the inflammation and bring 
down the temperature, but they cannot cure the trouble”.656 This was because an 
“irrepressible conflict has arisen between two national communities within the narrow 
bounds of one small country”.657 Peel, therefore, viewed repression as the only other 
way to maintain peace in Palestine, which was an expensive and morally 
objectionable course, a “dark path” that would also exacerbate the problem.658 “While 
neither race can justly rule all Palestine”, the committee members decided, “we see no 
reason why, if it were practicable, each race should not rule part of it”.659  
At the time, this was considered not only the best plan, but the only viable 
solution. Peel’s partition proposals, however, amounted to nothing more than a 
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preliminary sketch, recommending a very small Jewish state in the north of Palestine, 
and an Arab entity joined to Transjordan with an exchange of population between the 
two and a British enclave from Jerusalem to the sea.660 Designed to address what they 
viewed as “fundamentally a conflict of right with right”, this partition principle was 
readily accepted by the Colonial Office and cabinet, tentatively approved by Zionist 
leaders but totally rejected by Palestine’s Higher Arab Committee.661 Partition was 
based on an English idiom: “Half a loaf is better than no bread”, but the idea of giving 
even a square inch of Arab land to Zionists was objectionable enough to ignite a 
second and more intense phase of the Palestine rebellion in autumn 1937.662 District 
Commissioner Lewis Andrews was murdered and Arab rebels took control of large 
swathes of territory; government forces evacuated Beersheba and Jericho, and the 
rebels besieged Jaffa – for a few days in October 1938, the rebels even had de facto 
control of the Old City of Jerusalem.663 These successes prompted a harsher British 
response.  
By the inter-war period, Britain had established its self-image as a humane 
empire, having avoided brutalities akin to the Belgian Congo, German Southwest 
Africa or French Algeria, and many British officials prided themselves on their 
empire’s focus on the rule of law.664 This does not, however, mean tactics were 
humane by modern standards, simply that in the 1930s they were legal. Army 
manuals forbade stealing from or mistreating civilians but provided for shooting 
rioters, collective punishment and “retribution”.665 The violence, property damage and 
humiliation inflicted by British forces during this period of suppression were of a 
                                                 
660 Ibid, 377-389. 
661 Ibid, 2. 
662 Ibid, 394; Abboushi, “The Road to Rebellion”, 42. 
663 Segev, One Palestine, Complete, 414. 
664 Matthew Hughes, “The Banality of Brutality: British Armed Forces and the Repression of the Arab 
Revolt in Palestine, 1936-39”, English Historical Review 124 (507) 2009: 313-354, 315. 
665 Ibid, 316. 
 185 
harrowing nature, and threatened to destroy all relations between the Arabs and the 
civilian government in Palestine. By 1938, High Commissioner Sir Arthur Wauchope 
was barely managing to temper the actions of British armed forces. When he looked 
for a political solution to the revolt and challenged army efforts to institute martial 
law, the Colonial Office replaced him with the more compliant Sir Harold 
MacMichael.666 An even greater repressive effort was thought to be required, but the 
need for and purpose of a second investigating commission also gradually evolved in 
cabinet during the autumn of 1937. 
Chaired by Sir John Woodhead, the technical or partition commission was 
ostensibly charged with determining the best route towards implementing partition. Its 
verdict, however, undercut the principle. The Woodhead Commission returned three 
plans, A, B and C, with varying borders, levels of subsequent British responsibility 
and economic integration. This report concluded that any partition scheme that 
involved population transfer was doomed to failure due to the necessity of 
implementing such a scheme by force or leaving large minorities in each new state.667 
The commission was also unable to devise any boundary formulation that left Jewish 
areas defensible and Arab territory economically sound.668 As Britain would need to 
conclude treaty agreements with both states, it was also likely find itself in an 
impossible situation of having to defend the Jewish state from outside attack after 
incurring the expense of implementing partition.669 One member of the commission, 
T. Reid, felt the need to add: “it may be said that one cannot make an omelette 
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without breaking a few eggs, but it would not be easy to find an omelette in any 
possible scheme of partition”.670 
Rather than ending on a negative note, however, the Woodhead Commission 
instead proposed partition with two very large British enclaves in the north and south 
that withheld fiscal autonomy from both Jews and Arabs, creating an economic 
federalism between the two with a British administration serving as the federal 
government.671 This, however, would have required a very high financial liability for 
the foreseeable future and would not have alleviated the rebellion already inflamed 
over the idea of Jewish statehood within Palestine.672 Although the commission report 
specifically stated that Arab antagonism toward partition did not oblige them to return 
a verdict that no scheme was practicable, the report permitted no other conclusion.673 
It admitted than even economic federalism would be satisfactory to neither Arabs nor 
Jews, and certainly not to the Treasury.674 As a result, the cabinet officially rejected 
partition in November 1938.675 
Following these two commissions, therefore, the British government was 
seemingly left with very few options. Peel had determined that partition was the only 
way forward, “at least a chance of ultimate peace”, and Woodhead had demonstrated 
the impossibility of its implementation.676 Although it took a relatively long time to 
realise in the context of what was otherwise a matter of urgency, the government was 
eventually faced with a stark choice between continuing to support the Jewish 
national home, thereby suppressing Arab protest indefinitely, or somehow 
surrendering the obligation to Zionism contained in the Mandate.  
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After concurrent bilateral negotiations in early 1939 at St James’s Palace, the 
MacDonald White Paper utilised Woodhead’s arguments but not the commission’s 
recommendations, declaring that, “the establishment of self-supporting independent 
Arab and Jewish states within Palestine has been found to be impracticable”.677 
Instead, the white paper committed Britain to Palestinian independence after a 
transitional period of ten years, allowing the Jewish population to increase to roughly 
30 percent of Palestine’s total inhabitants over five years – a plan permitting about 
75,000 immigrants, made up of 10,000 per year as well as 25,000 refugees.678 After 
that, further immigration would require Arab consent, meaning the Jewish national 
home was officially established.679  As war approached in Europe, this white paper 
represented the most rational course in the sense that it satisfied the simple expected 
utility model. The reasoning behind rejection of partition, however, as well as the 
decision-making process involved in choosing between Britain’s two client-nations in 
Palestine, was more complex than such an analysis implies. Utilising Poliheuristic 
Decision Theory’s two-stage model allows a more nuanced assessment, leading to the 
conclusion that even this sudden change in policy in 1939 was entirely in keeping 
with the way the British cabinet’s logic of political survival had always influenced 
their dealings with the burgeoning Arab-Jewish conflict. 
 
Stage One 
Poliheuristic Decision Theory is based on the premise that options are 
eliminated from the choice set in the first stage of decision-making depending on 
whether they meet requirements on the most important, political dimension.680 Those 
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alternatives that pose intolerable risk to political survival are removed from the choice 
set. In considering the British government’s decision to abandon partition and issue 
the MacDonald White Paper on the eve of the Second World War in 1939, the 
variables that constituted this political dimension were – reflecting criteria given by 
Mintz – diplomacy (threat to regime survival), bureaucratic politics and parliamentary 
politics.681 By analysing how the government interpreted risk in the context of 
imminent war, it is possible to demonstrate how the “noncompensatory loss aversion 
variable” was operationalised, leaving only one option that was politically sound to be 
satisficed in the second stage of decision-making.682 
 
Variable: Diplomacy 
The most important variable on the British political dimension concerning 
Palestine in 1936-1939 was diplomacy. The second half of the 1930s witnessed a 
pervading threat of imminent war spread throughout the government and its decision-
making processes. Diplomacy, therefore, became directly linked to regime survival. In 
this context, Britain’s empire and spheres of influence were both its strongest asset – 
in the event of friendly, acquiescent mass mobilisation and support – and a major 
source of vulnerability – should popular uprisings break out or formerly subject 
leaders alter their allegiances. Added to this concern was the necessity of securing, or 
rather avoiding offending, public opinion of other great powers such as the United 
States. Palestine, unhappily for the British government, combined these delicate facets 
of international diplomacy, pitting Arab leaders in the Middle East and Muslim 
opinion in India against Zionism, ostensibly the United States and a traditionally pro-
Zionist Council of the League of Nations.  
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In the late 1930s, the desire for Arab goodwill towards Britain was an overriding 
concern. No Arab leaders, least of all the Palestinians, applied direct pressure on the 
British government. Instead, Arab leaders jockeyed for regional prominence and 
position vis-à-vis Britain on the Palestine issue. There were no threats to break 
diplomatic ties, only a widespread underlying fear in Westminster of Italian and 
German infiltration, and the catastrophic wartime loss of safe routes through the Suez 
Canal and communication links to India. The perceived necessity of placating opinion 
in the Middle East far outweighed the importance of Zionist opinion, not least because 
the US State Department deliberately refrained from interfering and the League of 
Nations only became involved shortly before the Second World War was declared. In 
addressing the risks associated with each of these parties, the government found that it 
was unable to continue with the options of partition or indefinite repression under the 
Mandate due to uncertain relations with Arab leaders of the Middle East. In contrast, 
the risks to political survival posed by Jewish and Zionist opinion, as well as the 
attitudes of the United States and the League of Nations, did in fact satisfy 
requirements on the political dimension, allowing the option of acting against the 
national home to pass into the second stage of decision-making. 
Throughout this process, regional Arab leaders, rather than Palestinian politicians, 
were central to British decision-making, a phenomenon that arose due to the general 
strike in Palestine which was then promulgated by Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, 
the Committee on Imperial Defence (CID) and eventually the Colonial Office. 
Involving regional leaders in the British Empire’s Middle East policy was a new 
phenomenon in the 1930s and although initially beneficial, this broader spectrum of 
actors became increasingly worrisome. The Peel Commission had been delayed by 
approximately three months while 20,000 reinforcements restored order in Palestine 
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and the strike came to a close, but only with the face-saving help of Ibn Saud, King 
Ghazi of Iraq and Emir Abdullah.683 For the Arab states, their participation was a 
matter of prestige, but it was initiated against the backdrop of more grassroots 
agitation for the Arabs of Palestine. Rebellion was nothing surprising for imperial 
administrators, but the Peel Commission highlighted how the most striking feature of 
Palestine’s revolt was the degree to which it “roused the feeling of the Arab world at 
large against Zionism and its defenders”.684 Although the support offered by Egypt, 
Transjordan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen was “by no means a powerful, all-embracing 
popular sentiment” and was largely confined to opposition groups, the issue gradually 
intensified as the British inability to solve the immediate crisis dragged on for 
years.685 At the cabinet level, it was Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden who repeatedly 
warned of the consequences of Middle Eastern opinion solidifying against Britain 
over Palestine.  
 As Palestine’s Arabs viewed partition with the same moral and material 
objection that was directed against the more vague policy of building a Jewish 
national home, Eden’s initial arguments were against the Peel Commission’s 
proposals, a policy the cabinet had rapidly accepted on recommendation from the 
Colonial Secretary, William Ormsby-Gore (who Lady Passfield described as “small 
and Welsh in appearance”).686 Eden had been cautioning the cabinet regarding 
Palestine’s wider implications since before Peel arrived in the country and the new 
partition policy did little to assuage his concerns. Highlighting the military 
implications, Eden had noted how, 
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“troubles in Palestine have been watched with the keenest anxiety in the 
neighbouring Arab and Moslem-countries”,687 and more importantly, that 
“Saudi Arabia, the Yemen and Iraq have now become of great importance to 
His Majesty’s government from the point of view of imperial 
communications. The air route to India and Australasia must cross over either 
Iraqi or Saudi territories; between Cairo and the Protected States of the Persian 
Gulf, and it is not open to doubt that if Iraq and Saudi Arabia were to become 
hostile to British policy, they would be able seriously to interrupt Imperial 
communications with the East”.688 After Peel’s partition proposals, part of the 
problem was population transfer and the negative political impact of its 
enforcement – the realization that “partition can now only be imposed by 
force”.689  
 
Taking into account the very small size of Peel’s suggested Jewish state and the 
number of Jews needing to flee Germany, Eden pointed out to the cabinet that the 
Jewish state’s urge to expand would be “well-nigh irresistible”.690 Then what would 
be Britain’s responsibility? “If any stimulus were required to their rapidly growing 
nationalism”, Eden argued, “it is hard to imagine any more effective method than the 
creation of a small dynamic State of hated foreign immigrants on the seaboard of the 
Arab countries with a perpetual urge to extend its influence inland”.691 Arabs would 
view the establishment of this entity as treachery and, crucially, it would not solve the 
military problem. Britain would have to protect minorities in the new states, and so 
Eden questioned whether “we see any limit to the extent to which these troops are 
likely to be involved?”692 Such intervention could have had disastrous repercussions 
in Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Yemen.  
In Egypt, the Suez Canal was vital, and Britain had already accepted many 
concessions on this point in negotiating an independence treaty with the Egyptians.693 
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In addition, oil supplies from Iraq would be “seriously threatened”.694 There were also 
similar dangers in Saudi Arabia and Yemen that were intensified by the Italian 
invasion of Abyssinia in 1935 and Italian overtures towards the two kings. Yemeni 
protests against Britain’s Palestine policy, for example, preceded an Italo-Yemeni 
Treaty.695 Based on this interpretation of Middle East politics, Eden concluded that 
the only way to ensure peace with the Arabs was to provide “some assurance that the 
Jews will neither become a majority in Palestine, nor be given any Palestinian 
territory in full sovereignty”.696  
Similar arguments were forthcoming from the Committee on Imperial Defence 
and high ranking British officials who dealt with the new Arab states. The CID, for 
example, consistently warned of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Persia becoming 
“uncertain friends” after Palestine’s political leaders rejected partition, “which would 
be a most serious embarrassment to us in the event of war with Germany”. 697 The 
India Secretary, Lord Zetland, also voiced concerns, that “Moslem opinion in India 
was now becoming rather aggressive on the question of partition”.698 Although by 
1938 the India threat had dissipated except for “occasional expressions of indignation 
in the press and speeches by minor Muslim politicians”, this did not prevent it being 
used as an argument for Arab concessions in 1939.699 Another official who provided 
somewhat confused advice was Miles Lampson, British Ambassador to Egypt. 
Lampson advised Malcolm MacDonald – who had assumed the post of Colonial 
Secretary following Ormsby-Gore’s frustrated resignation in 1938 – that pro-Palestine 
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agitation in Egypt was the political tool of opposition leader Nahas Pasha, but that 
Egyptians knew they were dependent on Britain for their security and well-being.700 
Lampson told Macdonald that any policy pursued in Palestine was unlikely to render 
Arab loyalties a positive asset, but if they were turned against Britain they would 
provide a formidable tool in enemy hands.701 This measured advice acquired an 
urgent tone very quickly, however, as Miles wrote to MacDonald to plead that “unless 
the Arabs get satisfaction over immigration we must face the fact that, if war comes, 
we shall have to take on the Arabs as well as the Italians and Germans”.702 Time, he 
considered, was of the essence, as “[t]he longer you delay that no doubt painful 
decision, the less value you will get from making it. If you leave it until the verge of 
European War you will get no value at all.”703 These arguments built over the course 
of the Arab Revolt to back the British government into what it perceived to be a 
diplomatic corner.  
The content, therefore, of the MacDonald White Paper emerged in phases. The 
government had adopted partition in 1937, but arguments against it from Eden, the 
CID, Lord Zetland and others meant that its longevity as a policy was almost instantly 
in question. The Woodhead Commission was a response to this debate, and its 
conclusions were rumoured to be negative towards partition months before the final 
report was published. Meanwhile, Ormsby-Gore’s successor as Colonial Secretary, 
Malcolm MacDonald, quickly accepted the view that partition was impracticable due 
to wider Arab opinion. This was despite his own pro-Zionist background – 
MacDonald had already served at the Colonial Office and left in 1936 when he wrote 
to Chaim Weizmann that, “I need not tell you how sorry I was to leave the Colonial 
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Office, and so to give up the official connection with Palestine. But you know I shall 
always watch developments there with sympathy, and if I can be of any help at any 
time you only have to let me know.”704  
Following Woodhead’s rejection of partition, however, MacDonald and the 
rest of the government released a command paper agreeing with its conclusions and 
calling for a conference to negotiate a political settlement between the two parties. 
MacDonald was well aware that no settlement was likely and that Britain would still 
have to impose a solution.705 It was imperative, however, that the ultimate policy 
formulation was acceptable to regional Arab leaders and not necessarily to the Arabs 
of Palestine: “It is more important”, MacDonald informed the cabinet, “that we should 
regain the full sympathy of these neighbouring governments than that we should 
secure the friendship of the Palestinian Arabs; they are the countries whose lukewarm 
support or actual hostility in case of war would have most unfortunate results”.706 
This was despite the recognition that Arab states were unlikely to support Germany 
and Italy, having sided with Britain during the Munich crisis “with scarcely any 
mention of the embarrassing situation in Palestine”.707 Regardless, the Colonial 
Secretary continued to assert that “we cannot ignore the repeated warnings of our 
representatives in that part of the world, and the strength of feeling of the Arab public 
generally against our Palestine policy is making it more and more impossible for their 
rulers to maintain a pro-British attitude”.708  
This was how the government abandoned partition, but it was only through the 
course of discussions at St James’s Palace in January, February and March 1939 that 
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the intractable nature of Arab demands became clear. As a result, the cabinet went 
from agreeing to only harsh restrictions on Jewish immigration and land purchase to 
supporting an independent Palestine within ten years.709 The Palestine delegation 
rejected these proposals on the basis that the interim period was too long, and “the 
representatives of the neighbouring Arab States had taken this attitude in public, 
behind the scenes some of them had told us that they regarded our proposals as wise 
and reasonable”.710 In particular, Saudi delegate Fuad Bey Hamza said in private that, 
“while their hearts were with the Palestinian Arabs, they had brought not only their 
hearts, but also their heads, to London”.711 Independence was important, but as a 
principle rather than an immediate outcome.  
It had even “been suggested by the Arab representatives that a solution could 
be reached on the lines of the regime which had been in force for some years 
in Iraq, while arrangements for a constitutional Assembly were being worked 
out. A provisional government of Iraqi Ministers had been established, with 
British advisers; during this period, which lasted some four years, the Iraqi 
Ministers had been a facade, and the British advisers had been the real rulers 
of the country. Nuri Pasha was urging us to follow this precedent.”712  
 
As a result, MacDonald finally put to the cabinet what he had already discussed 
with both delegations: that they should announce an end to the Mandate and the 
establishment of an “independent” Palestine state “with British advisers to run the 
show”.713 The figure of 75,000 additional Jewish immigrants over five years was 
finalised – MacDonald had originally argued for more than 300,000 – and Prime 
Minister Neville Chamberlain admitted there was no better bargain they could strike 
for the Jews, though he felt they had been roughly treated.714 “The plain fact”, 
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MacDonald told the cabinet, “was that the Jews had made no attempt to co-operate 
with the Arabs in the last twenty years, but they would now have to do so”.715 This 
was largely the attitude taken with Zionist leaders after Ormsby-Gore’s departure. 
Rather than adopting the rhetoric often heard in Parliament that portrayed Zionism 
as a special and enlightened movement, MacDonald’s language implied equality with 
Palestine’s Arabs and an air of disdain, trivialising the conflict as merely a battle of 
interests in which “each of them wants to be the master”.716 When Zionists threatened 
to boycott the St James’s Conference after British refusal to allow 10,000 refugees 
into Palestine, Chamberlain and MacDonald understood that that “the Jews” simply 
were not in a position to withdraw.717 The opinion of actual Zionists, therefore, was 
almost inconsequential. The fact that they did not have an impact on the British 
political dimension in this period of decision-making should come as no surprise, 
however, as they had never possessed that of type of direct influence. Previously 
supportive elements in the House of Commons (discussed more below), the League of 
Nations and the United States either shrank away from the issue or wielded too little 
influence to be of assistance.  
The “betrayal” of the MacDonald White Paper was self-imposed, in believing 
Zionism had harnessed the foreign policy of the British Empire only to realise this 
was not the case. Although both Chamberlain and MacDonald still professed affection 
for Zionism, this had no impact on their decision-making. Upon the release of 
MacDonald’s white paper, the Colonial Secretary drafted a letter that Chamberlain 
sent to Chaim Weizmann, saying “I greatly regret that this should be so, and that it 
should be necessary to apply some measure of disappointment to long and ardently 
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cherished hopes. I have always recognised and admired your single-minded 
devotion.”718 In the end it was understood that, regardless of Palestine policy, in a war 
with Germany the Zionists had nowhere but Britain to turn.719 No intervention on 
their behalf was forthcoming. 
Diplomacy from neither the United States nor the League of Nations entered 
the political dimension in this period of decision-making. Although Ormsby-Gore had 
frequently warned of rampant American displeasure over the abandonment of 
partition, this, as the Foreign Office predicted, never materialised.720 The American 
State Department made it clear to British Ambassador Lindsey that they were 
receiving thousands of telegrams on the issue, but that “that this was merely a 
personal message for our information”, because “the United States Government did 
not wish to appear to be interfering in any way with the conduct of matters which 
were within the province of His Majesty’s Government”.721 MacDonald did discuss 
the release of the white paper with US Ambassador to Britain, Joseph P. Kennedy, 
“who had been in a somewhat gloomy mood”, and had thought that “Jews, in his 
view, were unpopular in America, but he thought they might be able to work up a 
certain amount of anti-British agitation; the results of which would not, however, last 
for very long”.722 In terms of US opinion, the government received notification only 
of very low level pleas such as letters from a Presbyterian and a Methodist minister, 
resolutions by the Massachusetts cities of Worcester and Chelsea, and a request to 
continue the Mandate from a New Jersey Senator, as well as many individual 
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concerned citizens and even one telegram from the American Arab National League 
urging the opposite, for British not to be swayed by “Jewish clamor”.723  
These combined factors led Mr Baggaallay at the Foreign Office to “regard 
Middle Eastern opinion, which might be permanently and seriously hostile, as 
outweighing American opinion, which would probably be only temporarily 
incensed”.724 He concluded that “[o]ur interests here are far too important to be made 
the plaything of the Jews of America, however important they may be politically”.725 
Eventually, the US State Department did issue a series of telegrams noting American 
rights to be consulted regarding changes in the Mandate, but the Foreign Office 
dismissed them as pre-election posturing.726 Likewise, the League of Nations never 
posed a political risk.  
Cabinet ministers anticipated that the Permanent Mandates Commission would 
be split four to three on whether MacDonald’s white paper was legal within the terms 
of the Mandate and that it would be referred to September’s full meeting of the 
Council.727 This was indeed the verdict, but before the full Council of the League 
could render its judgment, war was declared.728 Ultimately, the options to partition 
Palestine or continue the Mandate using indefinite repression were eliminated from 
the choice set in the first stage of decision-making due to the importance of Arab and 
Muslim opinion. In contrast, the option to act in contravention of previous obligations 
to the Jewish national home passed the political dimension due to a lack of effective 
opposition in Geneva, in Washington or, as discussed below, in the House of 
Commons. 
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Variable: Bureaucratic Politics 
Utilising the description of bureaucratic politics developed by Allison and 
Halperin,729 this section argues that a turf war between the Foreign and Colonial 
Offices over Palestine policy contributed to an option being removed from the choice 
set in the first stage of decision-making. Throughout 1937 and part of 1938, the two 
secretaries of state for these ministries – Colonial Secretary William Ormsby-Gore 
and Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden – entered into a cabinet-level power struggle 
ostensibly over the Peel Commission’s partition proposals. This turf war only came to 
an end in 1938 when both men resigned from the cabinet – Eden in February and 
Ormsby-Gore in May – and were replaced by Malcolm MacDonald and Lord Halifax 
(formerly Lord Irwin of the Irwin Declaration) respectively. Eden had found the 
Foreign Office a challenging posting, not least because of his relatively junior status 
among fellow cabinet secretaries. Writing later, Eden admitted that, 
“I was aware that my appointment was not welcome to all my elders in the 
Cabinet, where there was no lack of former Foreign Secretaries and other 
aspirants to the office. I knew that Baldwin’s support would be fitful and 
lethargic. I had also seen the practice…of a multiplicity of Ministers taking a 
hand at redrafting a dispatch. On one of these occasions about a year later, I 
began to protest vigorously, when Baldwin passes me a note: ‘Don’t be too 
indignant. I once saw Curzon burst into tears when the Cabinet was amending 
his dispatches.’ After the meeting he told me I must remember that out of my 
twenty colleagues, there was probably not more than one who thought he 
should be Minister of Labour and nineteen who thought they should be 
Foreign Secretary”.730 
 
He faced a built-in tradition of turf wars that began again with William 
Ormsby-Gore over the Palestine question, though Ormsby-Gore supported him on 
other issues. The subsequent Colonial Secretary, Malcolm MacDonald, then adopted 
the Foreign Office view of partition, but the delay created by bureaucratic politics had 
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allowed the situation in Palestine to worsen considerably. This helped to eliminate the 
option of continuing with the Jewish national home due to increased repressive 
measures against the revolt and an inevitable hardening of the Arab position. This turf 
war was characterised by a conflict between two cabinet secretaries rather than only 
their staff and defended as a strategic versus a compassionate argument, leading to the 
Prime Minister intervening in a manner that caused the severe delay before a 
replacement Colonial Secretary emerged successful in the dispute over turf. The 
process of bureaucratic infighting added more than a year to British decision-making, 
procrastinating until after the Munich Crisis and much closer to the profound 
constraint of imminent war in Europe.  
First, it is important to note that the turf war played out between Ormsby-Gore 
and Eden, “sitting atop key organizations, each of which […] trying to maximize its 
interests, agendas and goals”.731 The Colonial and Foreign Offices were traditional 
bureaucratic rivals where chief players were often under-secretaries and heads of 
department, but the conflict between lower ranked officials and office staffs was not 
the factor that influenced decision-making. In 1937, for example, the Colonial Office 
Middle Eastern Department was headed by O. T. R. Williams, one of four assistant 
under-secretaries of state, supervised by Sir Cosmo Parkinson and often Sir John 
Shuckburgh, who presented information to Ormsby-Gore.732 The day-to-day running 
of Palestine fell within the Colonial Office remit, but Palestine’s international 
diplomatic ties were handled by the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office.733 
George Rendel headed this department, which reported to Sir Lancelot Oliphant and 
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upwards to Anthony Eden.734 Previous studies have highlighted the turf war between 
these ministry staffs735 but the key figures, in terms of how interdepartmental conflict 
had an impact on decision-making, sat in the cabinet. This is where the delay was 
created. The Foreign Secretary had a much wider scope than the Colonial Secretary 
and it was this scope – in considering the impact of Palestine policy across Britain’s 
Middle East strategic interests – that gave him a legitimate role in the development of 
policy during the Arab Revolt. Repeatedly, however, the Colonial Secretary attempted 
to reinterpret the crisis as a small, isolated incident that should be dealt with equitably 
rather than strategically, an argument essentially against Foreign Office interference.  
This may appear to be a cynical reading of the Colonial Office’s attempt to do 
what was best for Palestine, but Ormsby-Gore’s early evaluation of the rebellion 
demonstrates agreement with what became the Foreign Office argument, and it was 
only after Eden’s involvement that Ormsby-Gore became hostile regarding any 
cabinet discussions on abandoning partition. When Peel’s proposals were discussed 
and the Colonial Secretary advocated the partition plan, Ormsby-Gore wrote privately 
that “without a reasonable measure of assent on the part of the two peoples concerned, 
no scheme of partition involving the establishment of two independent States can be 
put into effect”.736 Ormsby-Gore had pinned his colours on partition in order to 
prevent the appearance of indecision or uncertainty following the publication of 
Peel’s recommendations.737 This meant that he could not accept Eden’s arguments 
without tacitly surrendering responsibility on this issue to the Foreign Office.  
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Several months later, when international tension increased over Italy’s joining 
with Germany in the Axis and leaving the League, as well as Japan’s threat to the 
British position in Asia, the Foreign Office took a renewed interest in the Palestine 
problem and its ramifications across the region. This began a series of memoranda738 
in which the two secretaries of state jockeyed for position on the issue within the 
cabinet. Ormsby-Gore accused Eden of ignoring “fundamental realities of the 
Palestine problem” and the Foreign Secretary labelled Ormsby-Gore’s assessment of 
regional Arab amity as “unfounded and misleading”.739 A direct result of Ormsby-
Gore’s defensive posture was the need for a second commission. Although the 
Colonial Office did not appoint Sir John Woodhead and his fellow commissioners 
until March 1938, their mission came under intense discussion between Ormsby-Gore 
and Eden in cabinet. Was the commission merely a “technical” commission as 
Ormsby-Gore argued, tasked with implementing partition? Or, as Eden advocated, 
was it a “partition” commission, possessing the right to judge partition 
impracticable?740 Ormsby-Gore managed to get the word “technical” inserted into the 
commission’s terms of reference by securing the Prime Minister’s private approval, a 
measure that Eden referred to as having “gone too far”.741 
In May 1937 – before the Peel Commission had returned its report – Neville 
Chamberlain replaced Stanley Baldwin as Prime Minister; he acted with far more 
intervening authority than the beleaguered Baldwin had demonstrated. On 8 
December 1937, Chamberlain mediated between the two men, asserting that while 
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“evidence available to the world was as yet not sufficient to carry conviction that, 
partition was impracticable”, and “if the Government were to make such an 
announcement it would be criticised for having surrendered to threats and force”, the 
commission should not be debarred from concluding that “in their view no workable 
scheme could be produced”.742  This, Chamberlain asserted, “need not antagonise the 
Arab States! Neither need it exclude the possibility of a change of policy if the 
Commission showed partition to be unworkable.”743 The cabinet generally agreed that 
an announcement committing Britain to enforcing partition would create unrest in 
India while at the same time any “impression of vagueness” had proved just as fatal in 
the past.744 This meant that the technical/partition commission, which became the 
Woodhead Commission, provided a convenient tool to help the government appear 
decisive when it was anything but. The final decision between the two arguments was 
delayed until some unknown date in the future. Woodhead was appointed three 
months later, travelled to Palestine in April and presented the committee’s findings in 
November 1938, nearly a year after Chamberlain had intervened in cabinet. 
As Eden resigned in February 1938 and Ormsby-Gore followed in May, the 
bureaucratic dynamic of a search for peace in Palestine changed significantly. 
Although the traditionally pro-Zionist Malcolm MacDonald assumed Ormsby-Gore’s 
post, he did not defend partition on the basis of an “equitable” solution. Instead, as 
MacDonald shared none of Ormsby-Gore’s responsibility for the adoption of 
partition, he was able to approach the issue free from his predecessor’s defence of 
Colonial Office turf. Although it is unlikely that MacDonald assumed his new post 
with a bureaucratic politics agenda in mind, his agreement with the Foreign Office 
and CID opinion that Arab support was threatened by Palestine policy actually won 
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the bureaucratic battle for the Colonial Office. Without a policy to rail against, the 
Foreign Office possessed no legitimate reason to claim Palestine policy was within its 
remit. The documents that deal with Palestine policy formation following Eden and 
Ormsby-Gore’s resignations are dominated by Malcolm MacDonald in discussions 
with Prime Minister Chamberlain; the new Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, is hardly 
mentioned. This relationship may have been the result of pressure on MacDonald to 
act quickly, which was very difficult before the Woodhead Commission returned its 
findings. MacDonald anticipated that the enquiry would return a verdict of no 
confidence in partition, but this was by no means certain.  
 The Woodhead Commission, far from receiving instructions simply to reject 
partition, found the task set to them was exceedingly difficult. Woodhead noted, “that 
if he had known how difficult this job was when it had been offered to him, he would 
have refused to undertake it!”745 MacDonald pestered the committee continually for 
an early submission, as he needed time to assess their policy recommendations and 
formulate ideas to take to the cabinet. The Colonial Secretary had heard rumours that 
the commission would repudiate partition and believed it would be better for the Arab 
insurrection for this news to emerge sooner rather than later.746 MacDonald pleaded 
with Woodhead, “saying that he would appreciate that the European situation 
increased the desirability of our getting Palestine policy settled as early as 
possible”.747 Woodhead, however, refused to provide him with early data or even 
discuss the matter in private over dinner to avoid overt interference or the appearance 
of impropriety.748 “If I came and dined with him and his colleagues for the purpose 
which I had in mind”, the Colonial Secretary offered, “I would not try to influence 
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their decision. If they liked, I would not open my mouth, except to put food into it, 
throughout the evening”.749 When the conclusions did eventually emerge in 
November 1938, they provided the perfect opportunity to retreat officially from the 
policy that appeared to endanger British strategic interests in the Middle East – a 
consideration that was only pertinent due to the looming threat of a second world war. 
Ultimately, although staff at the respective ministries were indeed pitted 
against each other in terms of their opinions, it remained the relationship between 
William Ormsby-Gore and Anthony Eden that fuelled a turf war between the Foreign 
and Colonial Offices in 1937-38. This is evidenced by the profound change witnessed 
once these two men left the government and a final consensus emerged. Rather than 
demonstrating how bureaucratic politics led to a faulty decision, however, this 
episode of a turf war represented one cabinet minister’s defence against another’s 
legitimate interest in his turf and a subsequent delay in formulating a new policy. The 
resultant was a single bureaucratic adherence to a policy against partition, but rather 
than being purely a product of bureaucratic politics, this consensus primarily resulted 
from the real fear of losing Arab support in the event of war, an opinion that was 
shared and reiterated by many more than Rendel, Oliphant and Eden. The year’s delay 
this conflict produced contributed to eliminating the option to continue with the 
Jewish national home. Arab attitudes hardened against repressive British counter-
insurgency measures and the perceived lack of interest in Westminster. Added to the 
fear of regional Arab leaders and the bureaucratic politics that produced delay, was a 
lack of effective parliamentary criticism that allowed the option to act against the 
Jewish national home to pass into the second stage of decision-making.  
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Variables: Parliamentary Politics 
Although the parliamentary politics variable did not eliminate any options 
from the choice set, it is important to discuss it because this variable had eliminated 
options previously in both 1922 and 1930. In 1939, however, the lack of effective 
parliamentary opposition allowed the option of acting against the Jewish national 
home to move into the second stage of decision-making, a result that seemed 
impossible in the decision-making processes discussed in earlier chapters. This was 
due to Chamberlain and MacDonald’s opinion that prestige was not a variable on the 
political dimension when dealing with Palestine in 1939, and because a large 
Conservative majority in the House of Commons permitted the government to risk 
losing a sizable number of Conservative MPs who equated Palestine’s independence 
with appeasement. Amery, for example, wrote to Eden that “[t]he whole business is a 
replica on a small scale of the European situation; absence of policy and fear of 
irritating those who mean mischief in any case”.750 Incidentally, although Ormsby-
Gore had opposed Eden’s attitude to Palestine, he had supported him in cabinet on the 
crisis with Germany.751 
By the late 1930s, the national government, a Labour-Conservative alliance 
created by a Conservative takeover of Ramsay MacDonald’s government in August 
1931, was very secure. Still dominated by Conservatives, who had a very large 
majority in the House of Commons following a general election in 1935, the 
government felt very little threat from parliamentary politics. There were only eight 
Labour MPs and 33 Liberals versus 387 Conservatives.752 There was, however, a 
proportion of Conservative MPs who opposed the Neville Chamberlain cabinet over 
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the policy of appeasement. This reflected a concern for international prestige and the 
risks appeasement posed to political survival – not in terms of democratic elections, 
but in the event of war in Europe. This placement of prestige as a variable on the 
political dimension, however, was not an opinion shared by the Chamberlain 
government. Those who opposed appeasement in the form of the Munich Agreement 
of 1938 saw parallels in the MacDonald White Paper’s concessions to Palestinian 
Arabs. Consequently, they opposed the white paper too by an extension of principle. 
The Prime Minister and Colonial Secretary took pains to ensure that the white 
paper met their requirements for prestige and, fundamentally, the anti-appeasement 
groups posed no political danger due to the low numbers of opposition MPs in the 
House. This was evidenced during the Commons debate on the white paper, which 
included a great deal of posturing but a vote that reflected surprising abstentions and 
an ultimate, if reduced, victory for the government in line with expectations. The 
unusually large Conservative majority in the House of Commons, therefore, had 
allowed the option of acting against the Jewish national home to pass into the second 
stage of decision-making because the Chamberlain government did not perceive the 
white paper as posing an intolerable risk to the prestige variable and Parliament was 
never anticipated to pose a threat on the political dimension.  
The architects behind the MacDonald White Paper, MacDonald – a former 
Labour MP and son of James Ramsay MacDonald – and Chamberlain, did not view 
prestige as part of the political dimension in dealing with Palestine. This meant the 
policy they developed did not represent as much of a fundamental change as it 
appeared. Britain’s empire had a history of rebellion, and the idea of repressive 
measures to restore “order” followed by concessions was not new. MacDonald had 
specifically questioned Sir Miles Lampson about the impact of abandoning partition. 
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“Would not this be greeted as a sign of our decadence?”, he asked, as “[t]he Germans 
and Italians would certainly urge this in all their propaganda”.753 At the Colonial 
office, the veteran imperial administrator Shuckburgh had expressed similar concerns, 
that “there was a danger that terrorists would declare that they had won their first 
battle and must now carry on with the work of driving the Jews into the sea”.754 
Lampson merely replied, however, that “[i]n a way the British were always giving 
way to this sort of pressure. They had done so in the cases of Ireland and India and 
even of Egypt […] On the whole their credit was far greater after the event than 
before”.755 Pretending Britain had always remained firm in the face of local challenge 
was futile. Rather than associating the rejection of partition with Munich and 
appeasement, the Colonial Secretary and the Prime Minister came to view it as part of 
imperial governance. Ultimately, Britain could concede ground but attempted, if 
possible, to avoid the appearance of it.  
This attitude was most apparent during interdepartmental discussions on 
Palestine in October 1938. MacDonald noted that “if concessions were to be made, it 
was essential to avoid the appearance of a surrender to terrorism; we must show the 
world that our decision has its roots in justice, not force; and thorough-going 
measures for the restoration of security must therefore precede and accompany the 
proposed declaration of policy”.756 This is why communications about Palestine with 
regional Arab leaders were conducted clandestinely. Chamberlain, for example, wrote 
to Egyptian Prime Minister Mahmoud Pasha in October 1938 to assure him they were 
seeking a solution beyond repression, but it was marked “secret”.757 The Colonial 
Secretary also argued that the key leader in the Revolt, Mufti of Jerusalem Haj Amin 
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al Husseini, would have to be represented at bilateral talks because “no considerations 
of prestige should prevent us from coming to terms with the one man who can, on his 
side, guarantee peace. The vicious circle of rebellion – investigation – half settlement 
has got to be broken, and this is apparently the only way of breaking it.758 When 
Palestine’s new High Commissioner Sir Harold MacMichael protested that, “His 
Majesty’s Government cannot treat with instigators of murder”, Sir G. Bushe from the 
Colonial Office replied, “On the contrary, peace in Ireland was made by a treaty 
between Cabinet Ministers and ‘murderers’”.759 MacDonald agreed, and argued that 
rejecting partition in this manner would create some opposition in Parliament, but it 
would not be too great and largely irrelevant because “His Majesty’s Government is 
only committed to consulting Parliament before embarking on a new constructive 
policy”.760 
 This transparent secrecy involved in courting wider Arab opinion continued 
even when the government had to defend its policy to Parliament. When the House of 
Commons debated an end to partition in October 1938 and then voted on the white 
paper in May 1939, at no point did government representatives use the “Arab 
opinion” argument to justify its position. The debates were centred on moral rather 
than strategic questions and were totally dominated by criticisms of the policy with no 
backbench opinion being voiced from the other side – a situation highly out of 
character with previous debates. The final votes, however, vindicated the 
government’s position – meaning 268 MPs who voted in favour of the white paper 
had declined to defend it publicly. Opposition in these debates had mainly been 
mounted by the very small number of Labour MPs, whose presence was hardly 
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threatening, and two vocal Conservative opponents of appeasement, Leopold Amery 
and Winston Churchill. 
 Criticising the white paper on the basis of appeasement, Amery declared that 
“[i]t is preposterous to ask the House to shut its eyes, open its mouth and swallow this 
half-baked project”.761 The white paper only invited “more intransigence, more 
violence, more pressure from neighbouring States”, and was “a direct invitation to the 
Arabs to continue to make trouble”.762 His multiple speeches were long and heated, 
and Churchill stood up to agree, asking, “What will our potential enemies think? 
What will those who have been stirring up these Arab agitators think? Will they not 
be encouraged by our confession of recoil? Will they not be tempted to say: ‘They’re 
on the run again. This is another Munich.’”763 These arguments were echoed across 
parties and in the House of Lords, by Lord Snell and former High Commissioner to 
Palestine, Herbert Samuel. To these men, neither partition nor the white paper 
presented an adequate solution.  
Instead they advocated merely “perseverance”. Churchill, for example, had 
criticised the government’s lack of a decision in November 1937, accusing the cabinet 
of doing nothing except “palter and maunder and jibber on the Bench”.764 He had also 
openly opposed partition in an article for the Jewish Chronicle citing the pending war 
in Europe and an inevitability of armed conflict in Palestine as his reason.765 Then in 
the debate over the MacDonald White Paper in 1939, Churchill declared that he was 
bound to vote against the government’s proposals because “I could not stand by and 
see solemn engagements into which Britain has entered before the world set aside for 
reasons of administrative convenience or – and it will be a vain hope – for the sake of 
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a quiet life […] I should feel personally embarrassed in the most acute manner if I lent 
myself, by silence or inaction, to what I must regard as an act of repudiation”.766 In 
the final vote, Churchill abstained – perhaps demonstrating that he, like all of the 268 
MPs who voted “yes” reluctantly admitted that there was little other choice.767 
Amery, with 178 other MPs, voted against the white paper, but the government still 
won by a margin of 89. As predicted, the government could afford to lose votes and 
split the party on this single issue – it simply had a large enough majority. Therefore, 
although parliamentary politics and the sometimes hollow rhetoric of strident 
members of the House had proved influential in earlier case studies, by 1939, 
parliamentary politics actually met requirements on the political dimension in the first 
stage of decision-making. 
 
Stage Two 
 After the first stage of decision-making eliminated all options from the choice 
set that failed to meet requirements on the political dimension, only one alternative 
remained. The British government could not continue with repression and by 
extension the Mandate for Palestine including a Jewish national home – nor could it 
implement partition. This left only one option, to act against, repudiate or end the 
British obligation towards building a Jewish national home in Palestine. 
As demonstrated in previous chapters, operationalising the noncompensatory 
principle can result in only a single option remaining in the choice set after the first 
stage of decision-making.768 As the poliheuristic approach seeks “acceptable” options, 
the remaining alternative in this conception is compared “to predetermined values 
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along a selected set of dimensions”.769 In the case of Palestine policy as Britain 
approached the Second World War, one dimension emerged as substantive for 
decision-makers. This was the military, or strategic dimension. Rather than seeking a 
cost-benefit analysis between alternatives along this dimension, the option of ending 
the Jewish national home was found to “satisfice” it.770 
 
The Military/Strategic Dimension 
  As war approached, the military or strategic dimension was naturally very 
important. The war played a large role in determining which variables were included 
in the political dimension, but more tangible military considerations, plans of the 
Chiefs of Staff for example, constituted a separate, substantive dimension in the 
second stage. Crucially, any option considered by the cabinet to have passed on the 
political dimension had to satisfice the needs of the army, navy and airforce. Palestine 
had to remain available and in a manner that did not draw troops away from vital 
areas of defence in the Middle East. The white paper met both of these conditions. 
First, as Leopold Amery highlighted in the Commons, Palestine was crucial to 
the British military because it was “the Clapham Junction of all the air routes between 
this country, Africa and Asia”.771 It also occupied an important naval position 
following Italy’s conquest of Abyssinia, what Amery called  “new conditions in the 
Mediterranean” and the port at Haifa allowed a flow of oil supplies from Baghdad.772 
Palestine occupied a key position in the defence of Egypt and India for a dual reason. 
As well as the British military requiring use of Palestine, the armed forces could not 
afford any other power to take its place there and threaten these vital British holdings. 
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This had been a consideration throughout the 1920s and 1930s, with fears that 
renouncing the Jewish national home would mean returning the Mandate to the 
League for re-assignment. By creating a situation in which Britain would continue to 
act as trustee, for the interim period before independence and official treaty 
negotiations (that were supposed to secure an indefinite British military presence), the 
white paper removed this threat. It envisioned a ten-year transition period for 
Palestinian independence, to be followed by a treaty, which was the same process that 
had allowed Britain to grant Egypt “independence” while keeping control of the 
Canal.773 Although “the General Staff strongly criticised the absence from the White 
Paper of a more specific statement as to the strategical safeguards”, critically, it kept 
Britain in Palestine and unencumbered by an indefinite insurrection that was aided by 
regional Arab leaders – such as Ibn Saud who had been funding Palestine’s 
rebellion.774 
Troops deployed in Palestine were needed to defend the Suez Canal in the 
event of war and if Italy blocked the Red Sea entrance to the Canal, reinforcements 
from India would need to be transported to Egypt overland from the Persian Gulf, 
through Palestine.775 As the Peel partition plan was written during the first, less 
violent stage of the Arab Rebellion, it was directed at this strategic need. Partition, 
when proposed, was not primarily an attempt to settle the Arab-Jewish problem but 
merely to solve the immediate political and monetary costs that Britain bore for the 
Arab-Jewish problem.776 As partition appeared universally unacceptable, however, 
military measures were necessary to subdue Palestine. The counter-insurgency 
campaign represented merely a temporary measure, however, for Britain lacked the 
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manpower, funding and public opinion necessary to endure without a political 
solution.777  
Also, while partition might have seemed attractive initially as a means of 
securing the Mediterranean against Italian incursion following Italy’s successful 
invasion of Abyssinia in 1935, this thinking was easily reversible as a second war 
between European powers crept ever closer.778 If Britain needed to mobilise, 
simultaneously creating two new states in the Middle East would have upset the status 
quo, incurred immediate expense and commanded far too much attention considering 
the primacy of European affairs.779 
This meant that troops could not continue to be siphoned away from key 
strategic zones in the Middle East. Cost of troops and hardware was of vital concern 
to the Chiefs of Staff, and the broad swathe of territory Britain “protected” during the 
Interwar period had already led to a reappraisal of military thinking. In October 1937, 
the Chiefs of Staff stressed the policy of “self sufficiency” in the Middle East to avoid 
moving squadrons needed to protect vital areas such as the Suez Canal.780 Defending 
the empire in a state of tension with limited resources had become a sensitive subject. 
The Arab Revolt in Palestine required reinforcements paid for by the Palestine 
administration in the region of £3.5 million (approximately £185 million today) but 
they had to be diverted from other tasks.781 By 1939, the violent element of the Arab 
Revolt had been largely eliminated and the white paper gave Britain more security 
vis-à-vis the other Arab leaders. Vitally, an independent Palestine still meant a strong 
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British military presence and one that did not pose a drain on resources, ensuring that 
the MacDonald White Paper satisficed the military/strategic dimension. 
 
Conclusion 
The MacDonald White Paper of 1939 is often considered to mark a major shift 
in British policy towards Palestine. The white paper stated Britain’s objective was 
“the establishment within ten years of an independent Palestine State”.782 This was 
portrayed as a direct response to the violence in Palestine, highlighting the Arab fear 
of Jewish domination and how this “has produced consequences which are extremely 
grave for Jews and Arabs alike and for the peace and prosperity of Palestine”.783 
Instead of seeking to expand the Jewish national home indefinitely by immigration, 
the cabinet chose to allow further immigration only if the Arabs were prepared to 
acquiesce.  Theoretically, this proviso relieved British troops of the tangible burden of 
policing Palestine solely to protect the growing national home. It also guarded against 
the diplomatic furore with regional Arab leaders who were opposed to Zionism and 
purported to avoid assuming the moral burden of ceasing Jewish immigration – the 
Arabs would make that decision.  
When examining the decision-making process behind this document in the 
context of Britain’s previous policy formulations (the Churchill White Paper of 1922 
and the MacDonald “Black” Letter in 1931), the decision in 1939 represents 
continuity as well as change. This is because the decision-making process, if not the 
final decision, followed a very similar pattern to previous chapters. In every period, 
the British cabinet was presented with authoritative interpretations of tensions in 
Palestine that rested on Arab opposition to the policy of building a Jewish national 
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home. Constraints presented by variables on the political dimension, however, had, 
until the late 1930s, prevented the government following advice to vigorously 
implement, reduce or end the policy.  
Whereas the Chamberlain government did not interpret Palestine data any 
differently than its predecessors, it possessed the impetus of impending war and the 
strength of a large majority in the House necessary to carry out a “rational” policy.  
Inter-party politics had played a large role in denying previous governments this 
luxury. Former India Secretary Lord Winterton noted, for example, how “if during all 
the troubles that we had in India, the Hindu and Moslem disturbances, that if in 
speaking as Under-Secretary I had to deal with a state of affairs in which there was in 
this House either a Pro-Moslem or a Pro-Hindu bloc, it would have been impossible 
for me to discharge my duties, because the government of India could not have 
maintained order”.784  
Also, the new policy was only as finite as the conditions that made it 
necessary, and it was still MacDonald’s hope that there would be an eventual return to 
the idea of partition in the future.785 Political conditions might improve over time, or 
they might deteriorate. As such, the white paper also included a provision that after 
ten years, independence could be postponed.786 This was not a disingenuous article of 
the document, merely a safeguard against an unknowable future condition of 
international relations. By repudiating the Jewish national home and instead 
supporting a Palestinian Arab bid for autonomy masquerading as independence, 
Britain gave up nothing of value to its present or future political or strategic interests 
in the Middle East, making it difficult to label the policy as appeasement.  
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Far from an analogy with the Munich Agreement of 1938 – which was a 
foreign policy anomaly pursued to avoid war with another European power – 
MacDonald’s White Paper represented merely the routine exercise of diplomacy 
within Britain’s own empire.  The London Conference represented a familiar practice 
of short-term conciliation.787 While labelled “appeasement” by some of those MPs 
who opposed Munich, the comparison was an emotional reaction to an otherwise 
normal act of concession and compromise. MacDonald himself was resigned to what 
he considered to be a less than ideal policy: “I don’t think I did make such a good job 
of Palestine; but the problem was insolvable on any short-term lines, and there was 
little else we could do in the circumstances and at the time that would have given us 
the essential minimum of trouble in the Near East now. In the end Jew and Arab alike 
will have gained from our policy.”788 The decision was made in the context of a crisis, 
but the decision-making process was indeed rational, both in terms of a traditional 
expected utility model and the poliheuristic two-stage analysis. Also, it is important to 
remember that Palestine remained but a sideshow to the European situation, and 
books and memoirs on those involved in British foreign policy during the critical time 
period 1938-39 rarely even list Palestine in the index.789 
The Second World War then stalled further cabinet-level considerations of 
Palestine policy, despite a violent campaign orchestrated by the Jewish paramilitary 
organisations, the Irgun and the Stern Gang. When allied troops began to liberate 
concentration camps, however, the horror of the Holocaust meant Britain was again 
severely constrained by the diplomacy variable on the political dimension. Rather 
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than only regional Arab states, by 1945, the cabinet had to contend with a new 
superpower in strident support of the Jewish cause. 
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Chapter 6: From War to Withdrawal 1940-1948 
 
“There must be a Jewish State – it is no good boggling at this – and, even if it is 
small, at least they will control their own immigration, so that they can let in lots of 
Jews, which is what they madly and murderously want”.790 
Hugh Dalton, Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1947. 
 
 
 When Clement Attlee’s Labour government was voted into power in July 
1945, it was faced with a stark post-war reality. As well as problems such as financial 
ruin, occupation of Germany, the beginnings of a Cold War with the Soviet Union and 
a reinvigorated independence movement in India, Palestine was one of many pressing 
issues dominating the political landscape in these initial post-war years. Palestine, 
however, had explosive potential. The MacDonald White Paper of 1939 had left a rift 
between British authorities and the Jewish Agency in Palestine. Paramilitary groups 
such as the Haganah, Irgun and its offshoot, the Stern Gang, repeatedly attacked 
British forces, which were deporting thousands of illegal Jewish immigrants – 
Holocaust survivors – to camps in Cyprus. Tension and violence escalated, and 
explanations of British withdrawal from Palestine in May 1948 tend to cite war 
fatigue and economic hardship as the key elements of this decision.791 The actual 
decision-making process, however, was more related to frustrated diplomacy and the 
potential effects this could have on the economy than singular considerations of 
purely substantive concerns. 
 Like some case studies presented in previous chapters, the British decision to 
withdraw from Palestine in 1948 does not appear to fit the rational choice model. 
After the war ended and Labour ascended to power, two commissions of enquiry in 
1945-1946 and 1947 recommended an end to Britain’s Palestine Mandate in the form 
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it had taken since the 1920s. Labour was in favour of this outcome, but the nature of 
Palestine’s constitutional development placed Britain in a seemingly hopeless 
political quandary. The Anglo-American Committee of 1946 recommended a 
binational state for Arabs and Jews under British trusteeship, whereas a majority of 
the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine in 1947 advocated partition and 
independence. Between these two investigations, Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin had 
attempted to secure agreement between Palestine’s Jews and Arabs on either of these 
solutions, as well as a plan for provincial autonomy. No proposals met with mutual 
agreement, however, leaving Britain between a Zionist position supported by the 
President of the United States and a set of Arab demands endorsed by leaders across 
the Middle East. This meant that between 1945 and late 1947, the British government 
found itself totally incapable of making a final policy decision. A simple cost-benefit 
analysis cannot account for this inertia, as rational choice employs a holistic search in 
which the option providing the greatest utility is simply selected.792 Conversely, 
operationalising Poliheuristic Decision Theory’s nonholistic search and non-
compensatory principle provides a plausible explanation. 
This chapter applies Ph Theory to the British decision to withdraw from 
Palestine in 1948. It argues, that in the first stage of the decision-making process, the 
government rejected alternatives that failed to meet requirements on the most 
important, political dimension. There was only one key variable on this dimension, 
which, reflecting criteria outlined in Mintz 2004, was diplomacy. Until September 
1947, no alternative met requirements on the political dimension, leaving Palestine 
policy in a state of paralysis concealed by ongoing but unprofitable negotiations. In 
1947, however, an additional option was introduced into the choice set that did satisfy 
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the political dimension: the potential to withdraw preceding a vote for partition at the 
United Nations. Then, once all but one option was eliminated, the government sought 
to satisfice the remaining alternative on the substantive strategic and economic 
dimensions in the second stage of decision-making. Rather than an empire fleeing 
from one of its previously vital strategic outposts, this analysis reveals a challenging 
and time-sensitive balancing of diplomatic interests between east and west, and long 
term strategic planning in the context of short-term economic pressure. The lack of 
viable options on the political dimension led to a lengthy delay in deciding Palestine 
policy, an end to which was only made possible by relinquishing any further 
mandatory responsibility. 
 
Defining the Choice Set 
At the annual Labour Party Conference in 1944, the party platform drafted by 
future Chancellor Hugh Dalton was strongly pro-Zionist.793 It advocated a Jewish 
state in Palestine with expanded borders and encouraged local Arabs to emigrate in 
exchange for compensation.794 This position, dubbed “Zionism Plus”, favoured 
unlimited Jewish immigration into Palestine, specifically without consideration of 
economic capacity, and so rejected the MacDonald White Paper.795 Upon election to 
government in July 1945, Ernest Bevin believed his own negotiating skills developed 
through years as a union leader could resolve the Palestine problem. Convinced that 
he could forge an agreement, Bevin boasted, “if I don’t get a settlement, I’ll eat my 
hat”.796 Attlee’s government, however, soon realised the difficulties of their position 
regarding Palestine, finding themselves in similar constraints to those binding Neville 
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Chamberlain’s cabinet in 1939. An uprising in Palestine had the potential to create 
wider diplomatic problems, and the government’s choice set was reflected in the 
polarised plans produced by two commissions of enquiry: the Anglo-American 
Committee and the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine. Although by 
1945 the alternatives presented by these investigations were already well known, it is 
important to realise that the commissions took place specifically in order to search for 
new options. 
 The first post-war investigation, the Anglo-American Committee, resurrected 
the option of a binational state with provincial autonomy. The Peel Commission had 
rejected this alternative in 1937 because it required Jewish and Arab cooperation, but 
it was re-introduced into the choice set in 1945-46. As an investigation, the Anglo-
American Committee was a direct result of increased American awareness of the 
Jewish displaced persons (DPs) problem in Europe.  In mid-1945 the horrors of the 
Holocaust were still unravelling, and President Truman seemed particularly effected 
by the report of public servant, Earl G. Harrison, into poor living conditions among 
DPs encamped in the American zone of occupied Germany.  
Like the Jewish Agency – whose immigration quota under the 1939 white 
paper was nearing completion – Harrison called for the immediate admission of 
100,000 Jewish DPs into Palestine.797 Truman then echoed this demand on 31 August 
1945, but Attlee’s government had barely moved into their offices and found 
compliance with this request fraught with difficulties.798 There was the potential for a 
second Arab uprising against British forces in Palestine that would compound the 
Jewish insurgency growing there since the MacDonald White Paper, and such large-
scale immediate immigration would also have made Attlee’s government appear 
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callously indifferent to British-Arab obligations outlined in 1939. Faced with pressure 
from across the Atlantic, Bevin orchestrated a joint venture with the United States in 
order to persuade its representatives of the merits of the British way of thinking.799 
Appointed 13 November 1945, the committee did not report its findings until 20 April 
1946.  
Five months of investigation and negotiation yielded a unanimous report 
among the Anglo-American committee members. This report relied very heavily on 
the extensive investigation conducted by the Peel Commission in 1937, but came to 
different conclusions. It made ten recommendations, of which the most important 
were immediate immigration of 100,000 Jewish DPs from Germany to Palestine and a 
new Palestinian constitution to establish a binational state in which the majority 
would not be able to dominate the minority.800 The committee members also advised 
for a continuation of the Mandate pending a trusteeship agreement with the United 
Nations.801 Although the committee recognised the problems associated with enacting 
positive policy while “Palestine is an armed camp”, they believed the result of 
withdrawal would be “prolonged bloodshed the end of which it is impossible to 
predict”.802  
To enforce a blending of Arab and Jewish nationalisms, the committee 
recommended “that, if this Report is adopted, it should be made clear beyond all 
doubt to both Jews and Arabs that any attempt from either side, by threats of violence, 
by terrorism, or by the organization or use of illegal armies to prevent its execution, 
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will be resolutely suppressed”.803 The report did not specify which responsible party 
would enact this suppression, which is worth noting since Britain was already 
embroiled in such a conflict and the committee found the reality of this quite 
disturbing – noting how they “became more and more aware of the tense atmosphere 
each day”.804 Faced with an unhappy situation, therefore, the committee had 
recommended a well-intentioned policy but one that seemed ignorant of the entire 
history of British mandated Palestine, as well as the aspirations of both Arab and 
Jewish communities. How to implement these recommendations, therefore, remained 
a difficult proposition. President Truman, for his part, reiterated his demand for the 
100,000 immigration permits without reference to the constitutional development 
necessary to make this possible. Without an agreed framework for implementation, 
the joint committee was virtually useless.  
As a result, Truman agreed to send two groups of advisers to Britain to 
negotiate a scheme for moving forward. The first was charged with discussing only 
the practicalities of admitting 100,000 Jews to Palestine. The second round of 
negotiations was led by Lord President of the Council Sir Herbert Morrison and US 
State Department official Henry F. Grady, resulting in the Morrison-Grady plan of a 
binational state with Arab and Jewish provinces, and a separate Jerusalem and Negev 
under British rule.805 This left a central government with final control of departments 
such as defence, customs and excise, the police and the courts, but with an elective 
legislature in the Jewish and Arab provinces whose bills required approval from the 
High Commissioner.806 In theory, Jewish DPs could immigrate into the Jewish 
province and this meant the plan fulfilled recommendations made by the Anglo-
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American Committee. As the joint investigative commission had already rejected 
provincial autonomy, however, the link was somewhat tenuous.  
Provincial autonomy also comprised only the beginning of a solution, as 
negotiations with Arabs and Jews would still be necessary for implementation. 
Unsurprisingly, President Truman rejected the plan due to the intolerable delay it 
would create for DPs seeking immigration visas. Regardless, provincial autonomy 
was presented to the British Parliament as a basis for negotiations.807 As Conservative 
MP Oliver Stanley noted during the policy debate on 31 July 1946, however, this 
scheme was a year in the making and still lacked American support.808 It was 
pointless discussing the Anglo-American Committee report, Stanley declared, as “that 
Report is dead, although, it is only fair to say, it has been buried with the very highest 
honours”.809 Provincial autonomy remained the official basis for negotiations, but 
representatives of the Jewish Agency refused to attend. Their most basic demand was 
some form of partition. In 1947, this was also recommended by the United Nations 
Special Committee on Palestine. 
Partition had been rejected in 1938 after Sir John Woodhead’s commission 
found it impracticable. The idea did, however, re-emerge in the choice set of Winston 
Churchill’s national wartime government. Churchill’s cabinet had flirted with the idea 
of partition along the lines originally suggested by Peel – with Arab Palestine annexed 
to Transjordan – but they never made a decision and the issue was shelved following 
Lord Moyne’s assassination by the Stern Gang in November 1944.810 Churchill 
especially believed that implementing almost any policy initiative was impossible in 
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the face of terrorist activities and would likely destabilise the Middle East.811 After 
the war, partition re-entered the choice set again, albeit unofficially, because it formed 
the basic demands of Jewish Agency representatives involved in private negotiations 
with Ernest Bevin though 1946 and 1947. Then, after the Palestine issue was referred 
to the United Nations, the option to partition forcibly asserted itself as an alternative 
within the choice set. 
Over four months, the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine 
investigated the Palestine problem and signed its report on 31 August 1947.812 Made 
up of representatives from 11 countries (Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, 
Guatemala, India, Holland, Iran, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay and Yugoslavia), its 
composition specifically avoided any members of the Security Council and reflected 
the geopolitical balance of power in the UN.813 The Higher Arab Executive boycotted 
UNSCOP proceedings, but representatives from Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, 
Syria and Transjordan agreed to participate.814 The boycott, however, effectively 
meant that while the UNSCOP committee was swamped with memoranda, letters of 
appeal, reports, witness testimony and evidence submitted by advocates of the Jewish, 
Zionist and DP cause, there was little seen of the opposing argument unless it was 
included in British documentation. After nearly 40 UNSCOP meetings, the Arab 
states and Pakistan did all testify on behalf of the Palestinian Arab cause, but the 
amount of paperwork – in comparison to documents advocating the Zionist cause – 
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was miniscule. In August, UNSCOP asked to see British documents on various 
partition plans, but the committee had to be educated on the Palestine issue virtually 
from scratch.815 Sir Henry Gurney and the British Liaison MacGillivray gave 
testimony that was almost totally confined to basic facts and figures regarding 
population, taxation, immigration laws, average incomes and how the Palestine 
Administration operated.816 In this context, the committee report was returned 
remarkably quickly, albeit with two different conclusions. 
The majority plan suggested partition into Jewish and Arab states with the city 
of Jerusalem under international supervision and all areas joined by an economic 
union.817 This was deemed necessary because, just as Sir John Woodhead had 
reported in 1938, the Arab state would not, on its own, be economically viable.818 The 
scheme then required Britain to continue the Mandate for an interim period that would 
allow the immigration of 150,000 Jews into Palestine.819 Based to a large degree on 
Lord Peel’s commission of 1937, the majority opinion agreed with Peel’s earlier 
observations “that the claims to Palestine of the Arabs and Jews, both possessing 
validity, are irreconcilable, and that among all of the solutions advanced, partition will 
provide the most realistic and practicable settlement”.820 The majority opinion 
intended to divide Palestine into two sovereign states with an internationalised City of 
Jerusalem under the following specifications:  
“The proposed Arab State will include Western Galilee, the hill country of 
Samaria and Judea with the exclusion of the City of Jerusalem, and the coastal 
plain from Isdud to the Egyptian frontier. The proposed Jewish State will 
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include Eastern Galilee, the Esdraelon plain, most of the coastal plain, and the 
whole of the Beersheba sub-district, which includes the Negev.”821  
 
In contrast, the minority position advocated by India, Iran and Yugoslavia 
called for an independent federal state after a transitional period entrusted to an 
appointee of the General Assembly’s choosing.822 The majority, however, believed 
this type of binational or cantonised state was unworkable because the constant 
oversight necessary to keep both populations in parity would be nearly impossible.823 
These proposals were then refined through ad hoc committee and plenary meetings 
and put to a vote in the General Assembly on 29 November 1947.  
There were, therefore, three options available to British decision-makers in the 
late 1940s. In the House of Commons, President of the Board of Trade, Sir Richard 
Stafford Cripps announced in August 1946 that,  “there are three possible alternatives 
for Palestine in the future – partition […]; the present scheme, or something of that 
character; and, thirdly, the return to the status quo”.824 This meant that other than 
partition, which had already been removed from the choice set in 1938 with the 
Woodhead Commission, the alternatives were to create a binational state along the 
lines suggested by the Anglo-American Committee or, more precisely, with provincial 
autonomy as agreed in the Morrison-Grady proposals, or to continue with the 
Mandate unaltered, adhering to the last defined policy as articulated in the 
MacDonald White Paper of 1939. The presence of this “do nothing” option meant that 
conventional Palestinian independence still remained in the choice set. Partition was 
then officially re-introduced by the UNSCOP report.  
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There was, of course, a final alternative that has not been discussed above. The 
option to withdraw without committing British resources to any form of a “solution” 
was obviously within the choice set because it became the final decision. When this 
alternative entered the choice set, however, was dependent on the rejection of all other 
alternatives, and it was only when faced with the prospect that the General Assembly 
could vote in favour of partition that the option to withdraw in this manner also 
entered the choice set. This is explored in greater detail below. 
 
Stage One 
The fundamental assumption of Poliheuristic Decision Theory is that options 
are eliminated from the choice set in the first stage of decision-making if they fail to 
meet requirements on the political dimension, meaning they threaten political 
survival.825 In the context of post-war decision-making on Palestine policy, there was 
only one key variable that constituted the political dimension: diplomacy. Britain’s 
devastatingly weakened post-war position gave diplomacy a new level of importance. 
The souring of certain political relationships were potentially destructive to 
substantive dimensions such as the fragile economy, but the consequences were only 
vaguely predictable, and this degree of uncertainty only increased the perceived level 
of risk associated with diplomacy. This sole variable was then operationalised in three 
different ways: in negotiations with the United States, the Jewish Agency and the 
Arab states. An analysis of how the British government identified risk after the 
Second World War vis-à-vis these parties demonstrates how the “noncompensatory 
loss aversion variable” was operationalised, leaving no viable options within the 
choice set until after the UNSCOP report was returned in 1947. When the single 
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viable alternative to withdraw appeared, it then satisficed key substantive dimensions 
in the second stage of decision-making.826 
  
Variable: Diplomacy (with the United States of America) 
When President Truman called for 100,000 Jewish DPs to enter Palestine, he 
was declaring a new level of American interest in the Palestine problem. This was the 
result of widespread horror following the Holocaust and Earl Harrison’s report 
detailing survivors’ poor treatment within the American occupation zone in 
Germany.827 Although initially driven by humanitarian concerns, the President’s 
involvement in the Palestine question also acquired importance on his own political 
dimension that was in direct conflict with that of the Attlee government. Due to the 
importance of US-UK relations following the Second World War, and President 
Truman’s humanitarian and politically motivated support for Zionism, the options for 
the British government to pursue either a single majority Arab state of Palestine or 
create a system of provincial autonomy were removed from the choice set in the first 
stage of decision-making. Establishing the terms of reference for the joint committee 
illustrated a mistaken perception in Westminster that British politicians held sway 
over the American government; these initial negotiations also exposed an underlying 
American antagonism to the British position in Palestine more generally. Predictably, 
the two governments were then unable to agree on the report of the Anglo-American 
Committee or the subsequent Morrison-Grady proposals. 
First, it is important to recognise that early in the post-war trans-Atlantic 
relationship, Attlee and Bevin tried to exert influence over the US president and failed 
repeatedly. Truman’s initial request for the immigration permits, for example, arrived 
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in the form of a letter to Attlee.828 This was not immediately made public, but US 
Secretary of State James Byrnes informed Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin it was 
going to be published, causing Attlee to write to the President warning “that such 
action could not fail to do grievous harm to relations between our two countries”.829 It 
was published nevertheless. Additionally, Truman and the US State Department could 
not be persuaded over Bevin’s proposed terms of reference for the Anglo-American 
Committee. Framing the committee’s central purpose demonstrated Washington and 
London’s fundamentally opposed positions on even investigating solutions to the 
Palestine problem.  
Bevin and Attlee wanted a commission focused on the problem of displaced 
persons in Europe and the possibility of their immigration to countries other than 
Palestine; this would have prevented the appearance of British double-dealing against 
the Arabs in favour of Zionism and provided greater scope for dealing with the actual 
DP problem. There was, however, a real danger that Truman would end the whole 
idea of a joint commission if Bevin insisted on redirecting the spotlight away from 
Palestine, where a large number of the DPs professed a desire to go.830 Lord Halifax – 
Britain’s foreign secretary when the MacDonald White Paper was published and 
subsequently the British ambassador in Washington – spied Truman’s personal hand 
in the negotiations over terms of reference. Halifax wrote to Bevin, that, “[t]his is 
very annoying but I got a hint late last night that rats were at work. This is the 
President himself.”831  
Part of Truman’s desire to highlight the Palestine issue in 1945 had been the 
upcoming New York mayoral election in November, but this meant Truman needed to 
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delay the announcement of the Anglo-American Committee – the Democrats needed 
to avoid criticism from New York’s Jewish community about further delay in dealing 
with the DP issue.832 In 1945, it was estimated that only half of the American 
electorate had even heard of the Palestine issue but of those, three to one were in 
favour of the creation of a Jewish state there, and the number was disproportionately 
high in New York.833 As a result of these electoral considerations, the best 
compromise Bevin could achieve on the terms was that the committee would 
investigate DPs’ ability to migrate to Palestine “or other countries outside Europe”.834 
Even after this agreement, it was difficult for the Foreign Office to predict what 
further requirements could yet emerge. Attlee was scheduled to visit Washington in 
November, and Halifax perhaps naively noted that, “there will be value in the Prime 
Minister’s presence here to keep the President straight”.835 
When the Anglo-American Committee returned its report, a cabinet committee 
made up of experts from the Colonial, Foreign and India Offices as well as the Chiefs 
of Staff and cabinet offices agreed “that a policy based on the recommendations of the 
Anglo-American Committee is not one which His Majesty’s Government should 
attempt to carry out alone”.836 This was because “such a policy would have disastrous 
effects on our position in the Middle East and might have unfortunate repercussions in 
India”.837 Added to this, the Anglo-American Committee’s binational state approach 
would not please Zionists either and required a “crippling financial burden”.838 It had 
been a calculated tactic bringing the United States into a joint commission, but Bevin 
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and ultimately the cabinet recognised it was imperative that America also share in the 
solution to prevent Britain shouldering all of the blame or the cost.839  
Bevin believed this was possible, not least because he was under the 
impression that Secretary of State Byrnes told him American interest in the Palestine 
problem was to prevent large-scale Jewish immigration to America.840 As an attempt 
at a comprehensive plan, however, the Anglo-American Committee’s report was 
recognised as “unhelpful, irresponsible, unrealistic” and suggested that the British 
government was being “pushed around”.841 Regardless, pride had to be put aside and 
the necessary next step was to agree a joint scheme for implementation.842 The 
Foreign Secretary, however, was expecting a spirit of cooperation from Washington 
that did not materialise. He had written to Byrnes on 28 April to stress, “I trust that we 
can be sure that the Unites States government will not make any statement about the 
policy without consultation with His Majesty’s Government”.843 Two days later, on 
30 April, Truman unilaterally reiterated his demand for the 100,000 immigration 
permits.844  
A tense few months then followed in which groups of British and American 
experts attempted to develop a new scheme for Palestine. In this atmosphere, Bevin 
and Attlee were trying very delicately to prevent further incidents in Palestine that 
could upset their courting of presidential opinion. In order to avert indiscretions 
among British forces, the High Commissioner was stripped of the power  “to 
authorise the Military Authorities to take drastic action against Jewish illegal 
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organisations without cabinet consent”.845 Attlee informed the High Commissioner 
specifically that “[i]n present critical circumstances it is essential that nothing should 
be done to alienate U.S. sympathy”. 846 President Truman’s attitude towards the 
problem – one naturally centred on his own political requirements rather than the 
British predicament – should perhaps have alerted Attlee and Bevin that solutions 
acceptable to them were unlikely to excite the Americans. In need of both a Palestine 
policy and United States support, however, the British government had to pursue the 
show of cooperation and conciliation, and hope the President could be persuaded. 
To this end, the Jewish Agency, the Higher Arab Executive and the Arab 
states were invited to submit their views on the Anglo-American Committee report 
within one month following 20 May, and then British and American experts would 
convene to discuss.847 Vitally, Attlee and Bevin tried to convince Truman that 
whatever solution the experts created, it had “to consider not only the physical 
problems involved but also the political reactions and possible military 
consequences”.848 This also applied to individual stages of the negotiations. Truman, 
for example, pushed for a preliminary team of American experts to travel to London 
in advance of the main group, specifically to discuss the practicalities of moving 
100,000 DPs to Palestine.849 Bevin resisted, fearing Arabs would interpret such 
discussions as meaning Britain had already decided on the policy of mass 
immigration.850 The Foreign Secretary relented as long as these preliminary talks 
remained confidential, but before US State Department official Averell Harriman and 
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his colleagues could begin talks, Bevin made a highly impolitic speech from the 
Labour Party Conference in Bournemouth on 12 June 1946.  
Bevin remarked how the American desire for 100,000 immigrants to Palestine 
“was proposed with the purest of motives. They did not want too many Jews in New 
York.”851 While this comment betrayed more of what Bevin assumed was American 
anti-Semitism than his own, this comment in conjunction with earlier statements – 
such as his warning at a press conference in 1946 that Jews wanted “to get too much 
at the head of the queue”, meaning this attitude would incite further anti-Semitism – 
only made the foreign secretary himself appear Nazi-like in the tense post-Holocaust 
atmosphere.852 Bevin was even rebuked in Parliament for these “hasty, ill-timed 
remarks”, and Labour MP Sydney Silverman reminded him that “[t]he Jews have 
been at the head of the queue since 1933. They were at the head of the queue in 
Warsaw, in Auschwitz, in Buchenwald, in Belsen and in Dachau and in all the other 
spots of unutterable horror that spattered the European mainland.”853 Bevin’s chief 
crime in these instances was a decided lack of tact, sympathy or emotional 
understanding of the tragedy that had taken place, which only made agreement with 
the profoundly saddened President Truman even more difficult.  
By declaring that the United States only wanted immigration to Palestine to 
prevent the arrival of thousands more Jews in New York, Bevin unwisely made the 
President appear foolish when his goodwill and understanding were crucial.854 Bevin 
never retracted his statement about Jews going to Palestine to avoid them going to 
New York – he had meant it – though he instructed the Bournemouth remarks to be 
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circulated so they could be read in context.855 The second group of American experts 
arrived to begin a second phase of conversations in July just as Congress was 
discussing the United Kingdom Loan.856 As a sweetener, Secretary of State Byrnes 
asked Attlee to issue “a reassuring statement on Palestine” and the cabinet refused.857 
This was because the transparency of such a statement would be obvious to all and 
because they doubted it would have the desired effect.858 The talks over the Anglo-
American committee were scheduled to continue and the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Hugh Dalton, believed that “according to the latest reports from 
Washington, the prospects of Congress approving the United Kingdom loan were now 
more favourable” and so “it would be a mistake for His Majesty’s Government to 
issue any further public statement on Palestine until the debate on the loan was 
completed”.859 At least the appearance of Anglo-American cooperation was perceived 
in Westminster to be doing some good in Washington. 
When the US-UK negotiations produced the Morrison-Grady plan of 
provincial autonomy, Bevin hoped this would secure the President’s support as a 
fulfilment of the Anglo-American Committee’s recommendation that Palestine exist 
as neither an Arab or Jewish state and would allow DPs to immigrate to the Jewish 
province. It was attractive to the British cabinet because provincial autonomy was a 
short-term policy that could see them through the immediate post-war diplomatic 
crisis in Palestine, which was just one of many to be dealt with.860 Then the subject 
could be revisited outside an emergency atmosphere. While partition was an 
inexpedient and diplomatically challenging solution in 1946, provincial autonomy 
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was considered “a constructive and imaginative plan” that “should be commended to 
the favourable consideration of the Jews and the Arabs if United States support for it 
could be secured”.861  
Neither Bevin nor Attlee, nor the rest of the cabinet, were fundamentally 
opposed to partition. It was merely the timing of it that was wrong, when Britain was 
at its weakest, and this was something they hoped the American president would 
understand. Bevin, for example, had Sir Norman Brook advise the cabinet that it may, 
“be practicable to adopt, as our long-term aim, a scheme under which the 
major part of the Arab province would be assimilated in the adjacent Arab 
States of Trans Jordan and the Lebanon, and the Jewish province established 
as an independent Jewish State, with perhaps a somewhat larger territory than 
that suggested for the Jewish province proposed in [the Peel Commission]. He 
hoped that any intermediate solution […] would contain nothing which was 
inconsistent with this long-term aim”.862  
 
Provincial autonomy was officially submitted for US approval on 30 July 1946, 
though Truman had already heard the proposals beforehand from his own team.863 A 
debate on the plan was scheduled in Parliament for 31 July and 1 August, and Bevin 
and Attlee were determined to press ahead despite receiving no word from the White 
House until the day before the debate.864 It was a rejection. 
Principally, this was because the Morrison-Grady proposals, though relatively 
practical, violated the spirit of what both Zionists and Truman’s humanitarian 
concerns wanted to achieve. Although provincial autonomy would have allowed the 
immigration of 100,000 Jewish DPs to Palestine, it reflected no urgency on the matter. 
Such mass immigration would need to wait for the negotiations on constitutional 
development necessary to create a Jewish province, and like the 1939 white paper, 
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was still dependent on Arab acquiescence.865 Agreeing to the plan meant 
postponement of the DP problem indefinitely and admitting a cap on the Jewish 
community’s future growth in Palestine.866  
On the day of Britain’s parliamentary debate, the British Ambassador in 
Washington wrote that, “It is acutely embarrassing for us that, on the eve of debate in 
Parliament, the President should have rejected the proposed statement approved both 
by Grady and Byrnes”.867 Truman also intended to recall his delegation from London 
immediately, and this “can hardly be otherwise interpreted than as denoting that, as at 
present advised, the administration intend drastically to recast the recommendations 
jointly agreed upon in London, if not to reject them in toto”.868 Newly appointed 
British Ambassador Inverchapel labelled this a “deplorable display of weakness” that 
was, he feared, “solely attributable to reasons of domestic politics which, it will be 
recalled, caused the Administration last year to use every artifice of persuasion to 
defer the announcement about the establishment of the Anglo-American Committee 
until after the New York elections”.869 This opinion was based on a conversation with 
the Director of the US State Department’s Near East Division, who “frankly admitted 
as much in talk with me this evening”.870  
Rather than telling Parliament about Truman’s rejection of the Morrison-
Grady proposals, however, Morrison was instructed to inform the Commons that the 
government “had hoped before the Debate to receive from President Truman his 
acceptance, but we understand that he has decided, in view of the complexity of the 
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matter, to discuss it in detail with the United States expert delegation who are 
returning to Washington for the purpose. The President is thus giving further 
consideration to the matter, and we hope to hear again from him in due course.”871 
This avoided the appearance of a total political failure for which there was no time 
before the debate to prepare, but it also left “the door ajar for the Americans to shut” 
so that “part at any rate of the onus for the sequel will then rest with them”.872  
 The Prime Minister tried to persuade Truman that the plan devised by US and 
UK experts was the best prospect for a settlement, that it allowed the introduction of 
DPs to Palestine “without disturbing the peace of the whole Middle East and 
imposing on us a military commitment which we are quite unable to discharge”.873 
Truman continued to deny support for the plan, which forced Attlee to remind him 
that “you will appreciate that any solution must, as matters stand, be one which we 
can put into effect with our resources alone”.874 Provincial autonomy was the only 
plan the British had at that point as a reasonable basis for negotiations. Crucially, 
however, the government did not consider its position immovable on this plan or any 
of its features.875 Its position merely reflected the steadfast adherence to a single 
independent Palestinian state, as advanced by the Arabs, and partition with the 
creation of a Jewish state, as advocated by the Jewish Agency (discussed more 
below). 
A formal conference was opened with the Arab states in London in 
September, but informal talks with representatives of the Jewish Agency had already 
begun in Paris in August. A new moment of tension between the Trans-Atlantic 
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powers then emerged as Truman intended to make a statement on the evening of Yom 
Kippur, the Jewish Day of Atonement. Just as Bevin believed he was starting to reach 
a breakthrough with Zionist negotiators, Attlee received the text of Truman’s 
proposed statement on Palestine at midnight on 3 October 1946. The text reiterated 
Truman’s earlier demand for 100,000 Jewish DP immigration visas to Palestine, and 
gave his reason as the suspension of official conference talks until December, which 
forced DPs to face a harsh German winter without hope or succour.876 As discussed 
below, however, the suspension of talks was entirely innocent and actually intended to 
allow Jewish participation in the official conference. Attlee requested that Truman 
allow him a little time to discuss the message with Bevin in Paris and this was denied.  
“I have received with great regret”, Attlee wrote, “your letter refusing even a 
few hours grace to the Prime Minister of the country which has the actual 
responsibility for the government of Palestine in order that he might acquaint 
you with the actual situation and the probable results of your action. These 
may well include the frustration of the patient efforts to achieve a settlement 
and the loss of still more lives in Palestine. I am astonished that you did not 
wait to acquaint yourself with the reasons for the suspension of the conference 
with the Arabs. You do not seem to have been informed that so far from 
negotiations having been broken off, conversations with leading Zionists with 
a view to their entering the conference were proceeding with good prospects 
of success”.877  
 
Although Truman denied political calculations behind this statement, 1946 
was an election year and Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson informed Britain’s 
Ambassador in Washington, Lord Inverchapel, that “Truman had reluctantly yielded 
to intense pressure from elements within the Democratic Party and from the Jewish 
groups in and about New York, which had been ‘pestering and harassing’ him for 
some time past and which had ‘blown up’ when the news had come that the 
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conference in London had been adjourned until December 16th”.878 The key to this 
pressure, Acheson told Inverchapel, was that “the President had been much stirred on 
hearing that all the candidates nominated for the coming elections in New York were 
preparing an open attack on him”.879 Complicating the Palestine issue for Democratic 
congressional candidates was the American Federation of Labor and a general fear 
among the American voter about Jewish immigration to the US.880  
By 1946, American opinions about immigration had hardened, with less than 
ten percent of voters outside the clergy favouring immigration.881 Among the 90% 
against, roughly half opposed immigration for economic reasons – they remembered 
the hardship of the 1930s, for example – and the rest possessed feelings against Jews 
or foreigners more broadly and the “threat” they posed to the American way of life.882 
An AIPO poll in January 1946 found even fewer in favour of immigration from 
Europe, less than five percent, and for the same reasons.883 In a poll specific to Iowa 
in 1946, about one in seven respondents volunteered an opinion on Palestine – about 
half were critical of Britain and half believed the US should expedite sending DPs 
“‘back’ to Palestine” rather than admit them to the US.884 Conversely, there was 
almost a complete consensus on the need for a Jewish haven and the majority 
favoured immigration to Palestine but disagreed with any active US military 
participation in settling the problem.885  
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In addition, between 1946 and 1949, the Truman Administration received just 
under a million campaign cards on the Palestine issue.886 More than half of these 
cards came from New York, which contained 47% of America’s Jews.887 This meant 
the cards did not represent the American population as a whole but betrayed the 
existence of a sophisticated and highly mobilised pressure group campaign.888 
Similarly, Zionist organisations issued letter templates for various age and socio-
economic groups, including school children, to rewrite in their own words to the 
President and encourage policies such as selling arms to Palestine’s Jews.889 The 
White House only realised the letters were orchestrated because many had neglected 
to change the wording adequately enough to avoid detection.890 These polling 
statistics and Zionist campaigning made judging the Palestine issue in terms of public 
opinion confusing at best, and this environment must have weighed on Truman and 
congressional candidates’ minds.  
Sensing this atmosphere when in New York for the Council of Foreign 
Ministers in November 1946, Bevin began to consider any means that might make 
partition a workable solution, which would strengthen the vital US-UK relationship. 
Agreeing to consider partition, Bevin believed, was simply an invitation for greater 
Zionist demands that had the potential to provoke US support for allotting Palestine in 
its entirety to the Jews.891 This meant that “before His Majesty’s Government could 
move openly from their present position they would have to await an undertaking by 
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the Jews and by the American government that partition would satisfy them and not 
be merely the first of a series of demands”.892  
Support from both Republican and Democratic parties would be necessary to 
avoid Palestine becoming “a subject for bargaining and vote-catching in the 
Presidential election”.893 Then, finally, partition would require approval by the United 
Nations.894 Secretary of State Byrnes advised Bevin that the President would approve 
of such a plan.895 The Foreign Secretary even seems to have initiated the diplomatic 
foundations for such a scheme, attempting to scare his counterparts a little. “In all 
these talks”, Bevin wrote back to the Foreign Office, “I have taken the line that there 
are three courses open to us; to settle the problem ourselves if we can, to offer the 
Mandate to the United States or to return it to the United Nations”, adding gleefully, 
that “my frank statement of these alternatives has been received with a certain amount 
of consternation on all sides”.896 After he returned home from New York, however, 
these ideas seem to have been discarded, most likely due to fundamental Arab 
opposition (discussed more below). 
In January 1947, Bevin told the cabinet that he was not fundamentally 
opposed to partition but that the difficulty was imposing that solution against the will 
of either or both communities, and instead some middle ground should be sought 
through further negotiations.897 At this meeting, the cabinet declined to specify a 
course of action in the event that negotiations broke down, but they acknowledged 
that referral to the UN “was bound to be embarrassing” because “[t]here would be 
much discussion of the various promises that had been made on behalf of His 
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Majesty’s Government, not all of which were easy to reconcile with one another, and 
critics would dwell on the long history of our failure to find a solution of the problem 
by ourselves”.898 When Bevin finally did ask the cabinet to approve referral to the 
United Nations, he “recalled the various stages of the negotiations over the past 
eighteen months, and explained how the problem had become progressively more 
intractable”.899 He blamed the influence of American Jewry both in Washington and 
within the Jewish Agency, and despite having “made every effort to secure the 
assistance of the United States government, […] their interventions had only 
increased our difficulties”.900 The UN was not an avenue of investigation to be taken 
lightly, but it provided one potential avenue to secure, at last, a modicum of American 
acquiescence. 
When talks did break down and the cabinet approved referral to the United 
Nations in February 1947, Bevin held informal talks in New York with the United 
States Ambassador to the UN and the Secretary General before seeking approval also 
from Chinese, French and Soviet delegates.901 Between them they agreed that a 
special session of the General Assembly would be called to select the member states 
of a committee on Palestine, which would report back to the regular Assembly.902 
British Ambassador to the UN, Sir Alex Cadogan, issued a formal note to the 
Secretary General on 2 April 1947, making it official.903 In the end, even Truman 
admitted that “[w]e could have settled this Palestine thing if U.S. politics had been 
kept out of it”.904 During the process, however, the British government had been 
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rendered incapable of following a course of policy that conflicted with Zionist 
interests due to the level of support offered to their cause in the United States. This 
meant that both provincial autonomy and the option for a single independent 
Palestinian state, due to the American opposition detailed above, were removed from 
the choice set in the first stage of decision-making. 
 
Variable: Diplomacy (with Zionists) 
As well as negotiations with the United States, diplomacy was also undertaken 
between Britain and representatives of the Jewish Agency. While this was not 
necessary on a purely strategic level, as the Joint Chiefs agreed Palestine’s Jewish 
rebellion could be ended, like the Arab Revolt, with enough reinforcements, the 
political consequences of a war against “the Jews” following the Holocaust were too 
ludicrously damaging to consider.905 As noted above, US opinion was firmly in 
support of Zionist goals and it was American, rather than strictly Zionist, goodwill 
that was perceived as crucial to Britain’s post-war recovery. Provincial autonomy was 
the plan Bevin advanced following the Anglo-American Committee and securing 
Zionist agreement to it or any otherwise viable plan implied backing from the United 
States would be forthcoming as well. Crucially, Zionist acquiescence would have 
mended the diplomatic fissure that Palestine had opened between London and 
Washington.  
It was not, however, forthcoming, and this failure meant the option to create a 
system of provincial autonomy was removed from the choice set in the first stage of 
decision-making, placing Britain in an increasingly tightening diplomatic vice. 
Provincial autonomy received limited objections in Parliament, and Britain’s 
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politicians treated the issue surprisingly calmly considering Jewish paramilitary 
activities in Palestine. The plan for provinces was never in any way acceptable to the 
Jewish Agency, however, even as the basis for negotiations through 1946 and 1947. 
First, it is important to understand that the provincial autonomy plan, which 
provided the basis for talks with Jews and Arabs, was presented to Parliament very 
soon after Zionist paramilitary groups bombed the King David Hotel on 22 July 1946, 
which housed the British Palestine administration’s headquarters.  Rather than driving 
policy, however, it seemed to create a certain amount of fatigue towards the Palestine 
issue that removed Parliamentary politics from the political dimension. When the 
House of Commons met to debate provincial autonomy on 31 July, the death toll was 
still unknown and a large number of people were missing. Other than the expected 
condemnations of terrorist activities, however, combined with expressions of 
sympathy for Jews killed by the Nazis, mention of the event itself was surprisingly 
absent.  
An exception was Labour backbencher Mr Wilkes, who declared that the 
“Irgun represents a right wing, Fascist, terrorist, brutal, murdering organisation 
controlled by a terrorist and Fascist Right Wing party”.906 After this a number of 
Conservatives questioned the exact denotation of the term “right wing” and Wilkes 
agreed to retract that particular phrase from his assessment, which he stated again for 
good measure. The only MP to note how the bombing might cause political 
ramifications at home was Mr Evans. He expressed that it was “a most unpleasant 
business to be hunted, stalked and ambushed by evilly disposed persons armed with 
sticks of dynamite, tommy-guns and other lethal weapons, a very unpleasant business 
indeed. I have had some. And it does not console the victims of these attacks to know 
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that their assailants are Zionist gentlemen with political ambitions. Neither does it 
console their bereaved mothers and wives, our constituents.”907  
Instead of focusing on the bombing itself, or even the merits of provincial 
autonomy, a great deal of this discussion surrounded the necessity of guarding against 
carelessly anti-Semitic language – as used by both the Foreign Secretary and 
Palestine’s General Evelyn Barker – and mostly criticising the government for delay 
but not actual policy. Barker’s anti-Semitic indiscretions were somewhat more 
vehement than Bevin’s, as the general had circulated a “restricted” letter to his 
officers following the King David Hotel bombing, ordering them to “put out of 
bounds to all ranks all Jewish places of entertainment, cafes, restaurants, shops and 
private dwellings. No British soldier is to have any intercourse with any Jew […]”; he 
concluded by calling on the army to begin “punishing the Jews in a way the race 
dislikes as much as any – by striking at their pockets”.908  
Although the government distanced itself from these comments, the 
accumulated damage was done. Additionally, it had been a year since Bevin had 
initiated the creation of the Anglo-American Committee and the debate was soured 
because MPs had learned of the provincial autonomy plan through leaks to the press 
rather than an official communiqué. Lieutenant-Colonel Morris, for example, 
remarked how “The Lord President of the Council comes along like a conjuror 
producing a rabbit out of a hat – a rabbit which has, apparently, already escaped and 
created a certain amount of mischief”.909 The lack of attention Attlee’s government 
paid to Parliament, however, reflects its low level of importance on the political 
dimension regarding Palestine policy in the late 1940s. Even when presented with 
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policy initiatives that would satisfy neither Zionists nor Arabs, and therefore, based on 
previous experience, should have provoked outrage among pro-Zionist or pro-Arab 
MPs, there was hardly a murmur.  “It is remarkable”, Colonial Secretary George Hall 
noted on 1 August, “that we should have a two days’ Debate on the question of 
Palestine with so little political feeling displayed, so many constructive speeches 
made and so much agreement as to the policy before the House”.910 Equipped with 
parliamentary acquiescence, Attlee’s government pressed ahead with persuading the 
Jewish Agency and the Arab states to accept provincial autonomy.  
Negotiations with representatives of the Jewish Agency were informal, 
unofficial and unfruitful, and Ernest Bevin publicly blamed President Truman for the 
deadlock. One of the key problems was that the Jewish Agency refused to participate 
in a conference in which the basis for discussion was not partition. As such, when 
talks began in Paris on 17 August 1946 they were, to a large degree, spontaneous.911 
Principally, Bevin wanted to get the Jewish Agency into official negotiations, but they 
continued to refuse any framework that did not centre on partition proposals. Both the 
Foreign and Colonial Secretaries “regarded the condition as an impossible one” and 
this deadlock continued through September 1946.912 As late as 1 October, Bevin met 
with Agency representatives Weizmann, Fishman, Goldman, Locker, Brodetsky, 
Kaplan and Linton, and they reiterated that attendance at the conference was only 
possible if its object was to establish a Jewish state in, or as part of, Palestine.913 They 
also requested an act of good faith such as releasing Zionist detainees or stopping 
arms searches in Palestine.914 Bevin refused, telling them that, “British bayonets 
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would not force partition on resisting Arabs”.915 Nevertheless, the Foreign Secretary 
did express the hope that provincial autonomy could be an agreed “modus vivendi that 
might lead to partition”.916 This idea of autonomy as merely a transition period before 
the creation of a Jewish state seemed more appealing to the Jewish Agency 
representatives.  
To Bevin, the situation suddenly seemed promising.917  Regarding detainees 
and searches, Bevin also scored a small victory by convincing the Jewish Agency 
representatives to enter separate talks on law and order, assuring them “there would 
be no difficulty in reaching some sort of an arrangement about detainees. The British 
government had not taken the initiative in blowing people up.”918 As Bevin found 
himself “groping towards a conclusion”, he “felt that the best answer would be a trial 
transitory period on the basis of a unitary state ensuring proper rights for every 
citizen”.919 As had been the practice since August, the Agency representatives agreed 
to meet with Bevin again after considering the questions of law and order in Palestine 
separately.920 Meanwhile, talks with the Arab states had been postponed until 16 
December, after the UN General Assembly and Council of Foreign Ministers.921 Far 
from approaching a settlement, Bevin’s 1 October meeting with the Zionists was 
merely the first sign that the Jewish Agency might enter the official conference when 
it reopened.922 It provided Bevin with a very small glimmer of hope that was dashed 
following a statement by President Truman on 4 October 1946.  
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On the eve of Yom Kippur, Truman publicly reiterated his earlier demand for 
the immediate immigration of 100,000 Jewish DPs to Palestine. Attlee had received 
only hours of notice before the announcement, and since Bevin was in Paris 
negotiating with the Jewish Agency, requested a delay in order to confer with his 
Foreign Secretary. This was denied, despite that fact that postponement was partly 
decided in hope that the Jewish Agency would agree to join, which might be 
prejudiced by Truman’s statement.923 This is what Attlee wrote to the President, and 
that modifying Britain’s immigration policy during the adjournment would be 
tantamount to a breach of faith towards the Arabs.924 Further complicating the 
relationship were Zionist interpretations of Truman’s speech. He ended the statement 
with a call for compromise between British and Jewish negotiators, but this was 
widely viewed as an endorsement of partition.925 For his part, Truman believed the 
statement contained nothing new.926 
Fearing a resurgence of Zionist intransigence, Bevin seized the initiative and 
set in motion the “good faith” gesture they had requested. If an agreement regarding 
detainees could be found, Bevin advised the cabinet, “we shall be able to bring Jewish 
representatives into the Conference on future policy in Palestine, and there is no 
reason why this should be deferred until the Delegates of the Arab States return to 
London on the 16th December”.927 The result was a Colonial Office subcommittee 
formed to find means of cooperation between the Jewish Agency and the Palestine 
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Administration over issues such as detainees, arms searches and Emergency 
Regulations with the aim of securing a truce.928  
In October, Arthur Creech Jones’s replaced George Hall as Colonial Secretary. 
A known Zionist sympathiser, Creech-Jones’ appointment was also an act of good 
faith.929 The next month, in line with Bevin’s earlier discussions with Agency 
representatives, the new Colonial Secretary recommended the release of members of 
the Jewish Executive detained in Palestine since Operation Agatha in June 1946.930 
Agatha had been a forcible search and seizure operation ordered by General Barker 
involving more than 100,000 soldiers and police surrounding Jewish settlements, 
including Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, and imposing a curfew. Renamed locally as the 
“Black Sabbath”, the manoeuvre resulted in more than 3,000 arrests and considerably 
exacerbated the already tense situation between Jews and Britons in Palestine.931 The 
King David Hotel was then bombed only a few weeks later, and this meant that 
negotiators on both the Zionist and British sides spent the autumn and winter of 1946 
engaging in tentative talks while totally unsure who they could trust. 
Additionally, the conference scheduled for 16 December was postponed again 
until after Christmas. This was because an upcoming election at the Zionist 
Conference in Basle would decide whether the Jewish Agency could enter official 
negotiations and would not be complete by 16 December.932 This meant that in the 
meantime, the Jewish Agency pushed very strongly for Bevin to admit partition to the 
conference proceedings in order to sway the Basle vote.933  
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The problem was, however, that Bevin was attempting to secure an agreement 
based on provincial autonomy in the short term that may lead in the future to partition 
– agreeing to consider partition in the first instance would only invite greater demands 
and place Britain in an intolerable position with the Arab states (discussed more 
below).934 At the Twenty-Second Zionist Conference in Basle, Chaim Weizmann lost 
his presidency to Rabbi Silver and attendance at the London conference in January 
was refused unless Britain made significant concessions in the direction of partition – 
an attitude that US Secretary of State Byrnes told Silver was “frankly silly”.935 This 
marginalisation of Weizmann had begun with the Peel Commission’s proposals in 
1937 when Labour Leader David Ben-Gurion rose in ascendancy in Palestine’s 
leadership; the power in international Zionism then continued to shift away from its 
British representatives and more towards American leaders, such as Rabbi Silver, 
when Weizmann’s failure to secure the longevity of the Jewish national home became 
clear in 1939.936 The post-war Zionist attitude in negotiations became less 
conciliatory and more militant. Informal talks, however, did continue, though Bevin 
noted that, “[t]errorism is poisoning the relationship between Great Britain and the 
Zionist movement”.937 
Meeting several times in January and February 1947, the representatives of the 
Jewish Agency and Foreign Secretary Bevin, new Colonial Secretary Creech-Jones 
and additional secretary to the cabinet Norman Brook, still could not reach any points 
of consensus.938 The two Secretaries agreed to launch a last ditch effort for agreement 
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to provincial autonomy leading to independence after a transition period of five 
years.939 If this failed, then they recommended referral to the United Nations – the 
statesmen had run out of ideas.940  
Another problem, however, was that the Jewish Agency could not accept 
provincial autonomy (even as an interim measure before partition) because it was 
viewed as merely a small alteration to the 1939 white paper and deprived the Jewish 
people of their rights in their homeland as promised by the Balfour Declaration, 
Mandate and prior policy of the Labour Party.941 Considering the Zionists’ Biltmore 
Declaration, which called for the remaking of Palestine into a Jewish commonwealth 
(rather than the traditional demand for a Jewish national home within Palestine), 
Agency representative Moshe Shertok told Creech Jones “he would like the British 
Delegation to understand the magnitude of the sacrifice which the Jews were prepared 
to make in offering to accept a reasonable partition”.942 When shown British maps of 
the proposed Jewish province, for example, the Zionists rejected them “as a mockery 
of their just claims”.943 Instead, they insisted that a Jewish state “must include, over 
and above the area shown on the map, Galilee, the Gaza Sub-district, the Beersheba 
Sub-district and the eastern portions of the Hebron and Jerusalem Sub-districts, up to 
and including the Jerusalem-Jericho road”.944 The Colonial Secretary noted how “[i]n 
other words, they claimed the whole of Palestine except the central Judean hills”.945 
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After the Anglo-American Committee, Ernest Bevin had engaged in Anglo-Jewish 
negotiations for more than five months and achieved absolutely nothing. As 
provincial autonomy, even as an interim measure, required cooperation from both 
sides, the Jewish Agency’s constant and unwavering rejection of this plan meant it 
was removed from the choice set in the first stage of decision-making. 
 
Variable: Diplomacy (with Arab states) 
Directly linked to political survival in the post-war environment, diplomacy 
concerning the Palestine problem also took place between representatives of the 
British government and leaders of the Arab states. This was, in a nutshell, because 
communications and oil supplies “depended on retaining the goodwill and co-
operation of the Arab peoples”.946 Like the relationship with America, full 
consequences of any broken ties were difficult to predict, lending the subject an air of 
greater risk. Crucially, diplomacy with the Middle East seems to have been viewed on 
roughly equal terms as the US-UK relationship and, by extension, more important 
than British-Zionist relations. Bevin and Atlee agreed, for example, that, “if the Jews 
refuse to participate in the Conference owing to their demands not being met, the 
Conference must go on without them”.947 Although representatives of the Arab states 
were, ostensibly, willing to negotiate, their basic requirements removed the option to 
partition Palestine, or create a system of provincial autonomy, from the choice set in 
the first stage of decision-making. A regional desire for independence was 
complicated by ongoing Anglo-Egyptian talks, and the Arab leaders’ position 
remained just as immovable as that of their Jewish counterparts. 
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It is important to note that Arab leaders’ opinions were highly important to the 
British political dimension. 1946-47 was a time of British weakness and Middle East 
ascendancy, and the Arabs leaders were aware of their value. This placed Britain in a 
similar situation to 1939, when the white paper was formulated to appeal to regional 
Arab leaders who then negotiated in support of their own interests as well as those of 
Palestinian Arabs. The fate of Palestine, however, was an even trickier subject to 
discuss with Arab leaders after the war because it was tied to wider impatience for full 
independence in the Middle East. During the war, Churchill had called for Syria and 
Lebanon to have full independence. Once this was achieved in 1943, it was entirely 
unrealistic to expect other Arab states to forfeit the right.948  
Complicating the situation were ongoing talks between Britain and individual 
Arab states on other issues. Negotiations over Palestine, for example, coincided with 
Anglo-Egyptian talks for revising the 1936 treaty of alliance.949 British Ambassador 
to Egypt, Sir Ronald Campbell, argued that the Anglo-American Committee proposals 
“will add another serious element of disturbance to the troubled situation in the 
Middle East at an inopportune moment when in view of the treaty revision problems 
in Egypt and Iraq, we need to secure as much goodwill as possible from Egyptian-
Arab world”.950 Campbell suggested that accepting the committee’s proposals should 
be deferred until after the treaty negotiations with Egypt were complete.951 Likewise, 
the Joint Intelligence Staff warned that the committee report would create unrest 
throughout the Arab and Muslim world, endangering a settlement of the India 
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question.952 This conflict of interests only worsened as negotiations dragged on. 
January 1947 witnessed Anglo-Egyptian negotiations stall, Britain withdrawing from 
responsibility in Greece and Turkey, and the beginning of a phased withdrawal from 
India.953  This only heightened the strategic importance of the rest of the Middle East, 
and Arab states recognised their leverage.  
When invited to begin talks on the Palestine issue by the British government, 
the Foreign Ministers of the Arab states met first in Alexandria to agree minimum 
requirements.954 They would attend, but only if the subjects of partition, federalisation 
and Jewish immigration remained off the agenda.955 Nothing was said about the 
participation of Palestine’s Higher Arab Executive, but the Arab states were not 
willing to consider any proposals that endangered their counterpart’s goal of 
independence.956 The Arabs of Palestine did not engage in separate talks over their 
future because the former Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husseini, was specifically 
excluded and the Higher Arab Executive – formed during the Arab Revolt in the 
1930s – refused to continue negotiating on a subject that was supposed to have been 
settled by the 1939 white paper.957 This proto-nationalism was something that Attlee 
found difficult to understand, commenting in his memoirs that “you might think that 
an Arab struggling to keep alive on a bare strip of sand would jump at the chance of 
going to Iraq or somewhere else where there was more opportunity for a better life. 
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But oh no. One patch of desert doesn’t look very different from another patch of 
desert but that was the one they wanted – their own traditional piece.”958  
The London Conference opened on 9 September 1946 and, like private talks 
with the Jewish Agency, showed little ground for compromise on the subject of 
provincial autonomy. The Additional Secretary to the cabinet, Norman Brook, wrote 
to Attlee that the Chiefs of Staff believed “any solution of the Palestine problem must 
satisfy two conditions. First, it must give us the power to control and co-ordinate the 
defence of the country and to maintain forces and military facilities in it as, when and 
where we require; and, secondly, it must not alienate the Arab States.”959 They 
doubted very much whether provincial autonomy satisfied the second of these 
conditions.960 As the Chiefs expected, all of the Arab states opposed provincial 
autonomy because they viewed it as a transition to partition, and feared Jewish 
autonomy would lead to overall population majority and expansionist policies.961  
In response to this plan, the Arab states proposed an independent unitary 
Palestine with safeguards for the Jewish minority but a prohibition on further Jewish 
immigration.962 It was essentially a fulfilment of the MacDonald White Paper, an 
alternative that had been removed from the British choice set primarily through the 
need for good diplomatic relations with America. When the conference resumed in 
1947, Bevin had to admit to the cabinet that negotiations with the Arab states “have 
confirmed our fear that there is no prospect of finding such a settlement”.963 This was 
because the absolute minimum requirements for both parties were incompatible – 
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Arabs could not, under any circumstances, endorse the creation of a Jewish state in 
Palestine and the Zionists could not agree to anything less.964 This meant Bevin could 
not secure either full American or Arab backing for any plan and instead searched for 
another potential source of ideas in the United Nations.965  
 When UNSCOP returned its verdict in August in favour of partition, Bevin 
immediately understood that Britain could in no way be associated with implementing 
this plan due to its fragile relationship with the Arab states. He informed the cabinet, 
in contradiction with an earlier opinion, that partition would have a destabilising 
impact on the Middle East as a whole. “It would probably not be long”, Bevin wrote, 
“before the Jewish government, faced as it would be in the course of time with a 
problem of over-population and driven by the ultra-nationalist political parties which 
will not accept partition as a final settlement, would try to expand its frontiers”.966 
Partition created a Jewish state with a large Arab minority surrounded by Arab 
territory, and so Bevin supposed that “the Arab population of this State would play a 
part in history not unlike that of the Sudeten German minority in pre-war 
Czechoslovakia. Thus the existence of a Jewish State might prove to be a constant 
factor of unrest in the Middle East, and this could hardly fail to have a damaging 
effect on Anglo-Arab relations.”967 Fundamentally, Bevin asserted, partition was not 
possible because, as well as producing an economically unviable Arab state and in the 
process putting British soldiers in danger, it would, crucially, incur bad relations with 
the Arab states.968 As the London conference demonstrated staunch Arab opposition 
                                                 
964 Ibid.  
965 CAB 129/17, 13 February 1947, “Palestine. Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs and the Secretary of State for the Colonies”, TNA. 
966 CAB 129/21, 18 September 1947, “Palestine. Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs”, TNA. 
967 Ibid. 
968 CAB 129/16, 6 February 1947, “Palestine. Joint Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs and the Secretary of State for the Colonies”, TNA. 
 259 
to both provincial autonomy and partition, therefore, these alternatives were both 
removed from the choice set in the first stage of decision-making. 
 
Redefining the Choice Set 
 As diplomacy with the United States prevented fulfilment of the MacDonald 
White Paper, and since both Jews and Arabs rejected provincial autonomy while the 
Arab states refused to consider partition, the British government was left in a situation 
in which all available options had been removed from the choice set in the first stage 
of decision-making. This is when the option to withdraw entered the choice set. After 
the UNSCOP proposals were returned in September 1947, but long before the General 
Assembly voted in favour of partition on 29 November, withdrawal became an option 
viable on the political dimension simply because all avenues of negotiation had failed 
and withdrawal threatened to damage neither US nor Arab state relations.969  
As early as January 1947, before the conference with Arab states resumed, 
Bevin was advising Attlee that success was unlikely and that they were running out of 
alternatives. Bevin wrote to Attlee that, “I think this decision should be taken in full 
realisation that the Conference has very little chance of success, and before taking it 
we should look ahead and consider what we should have to do in the event of a 
breakdown”.970 They had two options: to impose a solution by force, which, as 
already noted was impossible on a diplomatic level alone before considering the cost, 
or to give up responsibility for Palestine.971 Considering this dilemma, the referral to 
the United Nations should be viewed as a stalling tactic, a desperate search for more 
options. In February 1947, Bevin told parliament that “[w]e have carefully studied 
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this matter, and put forward proposal after proposal. They are there, and I personally 
do not think that we can offer to the United Nations any more proposals. We shall 
leave them on the table. They, in turn, may have better ones, but this is the best we 
can do.”972 Colonial Secretary Creech-Jones, however, specifically told the House,  
“We are not going to the United Nations to surrender the Mandate. We are going to 
the United Nations setting out the problem and asking for their advice as to how the 
Mandate can be administered.”973 As well as buying time, the Foreign Secretary 
believed this action could bully Palestine’s communities into accepting some 
compromise. 
Bevin advised the cabinet that he “thought that both Jews and Arabs were 
anxious to avoid discussion of the problem” in the UN, and “our firm intention to take 
the matter to the United Nations Assembly […] might bring them to a more 
reasonable frame of mind”.974 Bevin believed that “[e]ven though we gave notice of 
our intention to submit the matter to the United Nations, we could subsequently 
withdraw it from the agenda of the Assembly if between now and September a 
solution could be found which was acceptable to both parties”.975 Rather than 
“dumping” the issue on the UN in February 1947, therefore, Bevin intended to use the 
new circumstances as a negotiating ploy to Britain’s advantage, and “[e]ven after such 
an announcement had been made, he would certainly continue his efforts to find a 
solution”.976 The Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister even extended this logic 
after the UNSCOP report was returned. Bevin advised the cabinet that, “unless His 
Majesty’s Government announced their intention of abandoning the Mandate and of 
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withdrawing from Palestine, there was no prospect of an agreed settlement”.977 Attlee 
agreed, hoping that the threat posed to both Jews and Arabs by an unpredictable UN 
vote on partition might scare the two groups sufficiently to extract concessions.978 
Ultimately however, no additional overtures from either Jews or Arabs were 
forthcoming. 
As well as seeking more options or more fruitful negotiations, this tactic also 
had to prevent Britain taking on the responsibility for implementing whatever scheme 
upon which the General Assembly decided. To avoid unwelcome obligations, Bevin 
inserted a key section in Creech-Jones’s statement to the UN saying Britain would not 
implement a solution that was not acceptable to both parties.979 The additional proviso 
was intended to ensure that no other UN member put forward ludicrous counter 
proposals expecting Britain to implement them, but it also allowed Britain to cede 
responsibility for Palestine under a guise of moral abstention.980 This was based on a 
valid fear, since rumours were spreading at the General Assembly before the vote on 
29 November, “that the strategic importance of Palestine to our oil interests in the 
Middle East and to defence of Suez Canal is so great that Great Britain is bound to 
implement whatever United Nations decides, regardless of consequences to 
ourselves”.981 In cabinet, however, this was far from the general consensus, and 
withdrawal had been considered a viable option since at least mid-September. “[O]ur 
withdrawal from Palestine”, Bevin informed the cabinet, “even if it had to be effected 
at the cost of a period of bloodshed and chaos in the country, would have two major 
advantages. British lives would not be lost, nor British resources expended, in 
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suppressing one Palestinian community for the advantage of the other. And (at least as 
compared with enforcing the majority plan or a variant of it) we should not be 
pursuing a policy destructive of our own interests, in the Middle East.”982 The option 
to withdraw, therefore, became part of the choice set following the removal of all 
other alternatives, and it merely had to satisfice the key substantive dimensions in 
stage two in order to become the final decision. 
 
 Stage Two 
Previous chapters have demonstrated the possibility and likelihood that only a 
single viable option remains within the choice set after the first stage of decision-
making. This sole alternative is then required to satisfice the most important 
substantive dimensions, which, immediately following the Second World War, were 
the economic and military/strategic dimensions. As there was only one option left, no 
cost-benefit analysis was possible. Instead, the option to withdraw from Palestine 
merely had to avoid prohibitively high costs in the realms of short-term economic 
hardship and long term strategic planning. As withdrawal involved minimal costs and 
Palestine’s importance as a strategic outpost was nullified by the Jewish insurgency 
and prospects of civil war, it was found to “satisfice” these key substantive 
dimensions.  
 
The Economy Dimension  
In the post-war environment, it was inevitable that considerations of the 
economy would form some part of any foreign policy decision-making. Discussed 
briefly here, the economic dimension played an important role, but one that was 
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somewhat intertwined with the military/strategic dimension discussed below. When, 
in 1947, the British government was presented with an option to withdraw from 
Palestine, it was facing a disastrous year for the economy, most notably in the form of 
a Sterling crisis. In order to satisfice the economic dimension, therefore, withdrawal 
simply had to avoid incurring additional costs.  
First, it is important to note that when 1947 began, and during ongoing 
negotiations with both Arabs and Jews over Palestine, Britain was trapped in a 
profound energy shortage. A terribly cold winter highlighted the already short supply 
of coal, and this vital resource slipped below the stock levels considered necessary for 
national survival.983 As coal could not be transported to power stations, the lack of 
electricity throughout the country shut down industry and home consumption; 
livestock died and people froze in their homes.984 This was the domestic economic 
context in which Attlee, Bevin and the cabinet agreed to refer the Palestine problem to 
the UN in February. To complicate decision-making further, another – potentially 
devastating – financial crisis then hit Westminster in August, just before the 
completion of the UNSCOP report, and was the direct result of Britain’s loan 
conditions with the United States.  
In December 1945, the Attlee government had secured a loan from the United 
States that began in July 1946. By 1947, however, the funds were diminishing far too 
quickly.985 A global shortage of food and raw materials effectively made the United 
States a sole supplier, and a sharp rise in American prices in early 1947 decreased the 
original loan’s value by approximately one billion dollars.986 As the dollar drain 
continued, the Treasury estimated the loan might last until 1948 rather than the 
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original estimate of 1951; by July, the Treasury was losing 500 million dollars every 
month and there were major depletions of gold and silver reserves.987  
Additionally, part of the loan’s terms had been a British commitment to the 
free convertibility of Sterling into dollars, and this initiative was scheduled to 
commence on 15 July 1947.988 The result was disastrous. Free convertibility and the 
global demand for dollars – as well as speculating in foreign markets – meant that 
Britain was suddenly hit by a massive outflow of capital.989 In order to meet the 
demand for dollars, it was necessary to use funds from the American loan, which 
meant it was unlikely to last even throughout 1947. Britain was losing dollar reserves 
at a rate between 100 and 200 million dollars each week.990 On 17 August, the cabinet 
decided that financially, the situation was too dire and agreed to halt convertibility. In 
response, the remaining United States loan was frozen.991 Only after tense but rapid 
negotiations did the US agree to a temporary emergency suspension on 20 August.992 
The situation was bleak and Britons faced cuts in their food rationing by November 
1947.993 This provided the economic context of the cabinet’s decision to withdraw. 
The military expenditure associated with rebellion in Palestine had exceeded 
82 million pounds by May 1947, and although this was largely borne by the 
Palestinian rather than British taxpayer, there was still a perception of Palestine 
incurring high costs in times of austerity.994 Palestine’s financial burden was 
mentioned rarely in cabinet discussions in comparison to the diplomatic constraints of 
                                                 
987 Ibid, 213, 340. 
988 Ibid, 342. 
989 C.S.S. Newton, “The Sterling Crisis of 1947 and the British Response to the Marshall Plan”, The 
Economic History Review 37(3) 1984: 391-408, 401. 
990 O’Morgan, Labour in Power, 344. 
991 Ibid, 346. 
992 Ibid. 
993 Ibid, 348. 
994 CAB 129/19, 18 May 1947, “Financial Situation. Cost of Terrorist Damage and Other Illegal 
Activities, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies”, TNA; CAB 128/9, 20 May 1947, 
Cabinet Minutes, TNA. 
 265 
both the United States of America and the Arab states, but Ernest Bevin did 
specifically recommend withdrawal to avoid the further loss of British lives and waste 
of resources.995 Britain’s very limited financial reserves were a constant, well-known 
constraint. Withdrawal removed a costly responsibility following a year of economic 
uncertainty and privation, not least by removing the 100,000 troops needed to fight a 
Jewish insurgency, and this meant that the economic dimension was satisficed.996 
 
The Military/Strategic Dimension 
A recurrent theme in Palestine policy discussions during the Mandate, the 
military/strategic dimension, was also an important consideration in the post-war 
environment and tied very closely to the economic dimension. Palestine was a 
strategic imperial outpost and at no point did the Chiefs of Staff ever explicitly 
renounce its geographic military importance. The undeclared state of war in Palestine, 
however, was financially draining and possessed the explosive potential to create 
equally expensive unrest elsewhere in the Middle East, especially if Britain attempted 
to enforce either of the UNSCOP proposals. Crucially, when Foreign Secretary Bevin 
recommended withdrawal to the cabinet on 18 September 1947, he did so with the 
specific understanding that Palestine lost its military/strategic value when constantly 
engaged in, or under the threat of, violent internal conflict and civil war.997  
 First, British strategic and military planning continued after 1945 as though 
Britain was still a great world power and a strong empire.998 The withdrawal option 
had been mentioned in passing before the UNSCOP report, but it had always been the 
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consensus that withdrawal from Palestine “would have serious effects on our strategic 
position in the Middle East and on our prestige throughout the world” and the Foreign 
Secretary specifically asked the cabinet not to consider such alternatives in October 
1946.999 Throughout consideration of the Palestine problem, the Chiefs of Staff 
stressed that “strategic considerations should not be overlooked”.1000 Palestine’s 
location gave Britain its strategic hold in the Mediterranean close to the Suez Canal, 
both of which were made more important in 1947 by the plan to withdraw from 
Greece and removal of troops from Egypt following Anglo-Egyptian talks.  
As prospects for negotiations with the Jewish Agency and the Arab states 
seemed bleak in January 1947, the Chiefs of Staff outlined the three cardinal 
requirements of future defence of the British Commonwealth: “(i) the defence of the 
United Kingdom and its development as a base for an offensive; (ii) the maintenance 
of our sea communications; and (iii) the retention of our existing position and 
influence in the Middle East”.1001 These “vital props” of Britain’s defensive position 
were all interdependent, and “if any one were lost the whole structure would be 
imperilled”.1002 
Specifically with regard to Palestine, the territory was considered to hold 
“special importance in this general scheme of defence. In war, Egypt would be our 
key position in the Middle East; and it was necessary that we should hold Palestine as 
a screen for the defence of Egypt.”1003 Following the stalled Anglo-Egyptian talks, 
however, and Britain’s commitment to withdraw from Egypt unless it was threatened, 
the Chiefs saw in Palestine the “base for the mobile reserve of troops which must be 
                                                 
999 CAB 128/6, 25 October 1946, Cabinet Minutes, TNA. 
1000 CAB 128/6, 11 July 1946, Cabinet Minutes, TNA, 189-191. 
1001 CAB 128/11, 15 January 1947, “Confidential Annex”, TNA. 
1002 Ibid. 
1003 Ibid. 
 267 
kept ready to meet any emergency throughout the Middle East”.1004 This was because 
Transjordan was not a good enough outpost on its own, and the Jerusalem enclave 
would not suffice either in the event of partition.1005 Even when the Foreign and 
Colonial Secretaries suggested merely referring the Palestine problem to the UN, the 
Joint Chiefs reacted defensively against the proposal. They believed that “[t]he 
Preservation of our strategic position in the Middle East as a whole would be gravely 
prejudiced if our right to station British forces in Palestine were not retained”.1006 It 
was strategically imperative to keep some form of base in the Mediterranean because 
if all bases there and in the Middle East were lost, the “defence of the United 
Kingdom and the Commonwealth would be undermined”.1007 
Combined with this preoccupation with long term strategic planning, however, 
was the realisation of very limited short term resources that made hostilities in 
Palestine, and their potential to create wider instability across the Middle East, 
financially costly and strategically dangerous.1008 Colonial Secretary George Hall, for 
example, stressed that, implementing the Anglo-American Committee's 
recommendations was likely “to involve us in military and financial commitments 
beyond our capacity to bear”.1009 In a joint memorandum, the Foreign and Colonial 
Secretaries stressed, that “[i]f we were to undertake it, or to be associated in any way 
with the enforcement of a settlement as unpopular with one of the parties as that now 
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recommended by the United Nations, the whole responsibility would fall on us, as the 
only armed forces on the spot are ours”.1010  
This potential commitment was more than a little daunting. In February 1947, 
Colonial Secretary Creech-Jones, who had professed sympathy for Zionism and 
favoured partition, admitted to the cabinet that it was an unworkable plan. The 
Colonial Secretary “confessed” that “the enforcement of Partition was, he was now 
convinced, bound to involve conditions of rebellion and disorder in Palestine which 
might last for a considerable time and would involve a substantial military 
commitment for us”.1011 This recognition of limited resources combined with the 
reality of ongoing hostilities in Palestine then gradually altered opinions among 
Britain’s military elites over the summer of 1947, causing them to question whether 
Palestine was really worth the expense and lives lost. These casualties amounted to 
141 members of the Palestine police, 368 servicemen from the army, navy and 
airforce and 21 British civilians – lost to both Arab and Jewish hostilities in 
Palestine.1012 An important consideration of British well being may have been the 
hanging of two sergeants in July 1947 – kidnapped and murdered by the Irgun, their 
bodies were then booby trapped to injure others.1013 This was only the latest in a line 
of incidents involving kidnap or ambush, but it was considered particularly 
shocking.1014 
By 18 September, after the UNSCOP report was complete, a new attitude 
emerged. The same day Bevin dated his recommendation of withdrawal for the 
cabinet, the Defence Secretary outlined the impossibility of fulfilling almost any plan 
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in Palestine. The UNSCOP Majority Plan for partition would involve “[t]he 
imposition by force of some Colonial type of government in the Arab State, the 
safeguarding of the Jewish State and the protection of British life”, which entailed 
“appreciable reinforcement of the existing Middle East garrison with appropriate 
naval and air supports”.1015 Long-term, it would “render impossible of achievement 
the firm strategic hold in the Middle East which is an indispensable and vitally 
important part of Imperial defence policy”.1016 Similarly, the Minority Plan for a 
single binational state “would be impossible to implement […] against greatly 
increased opposition from the Jews and it would be necessary to impose by force a 
Colonial type of government”.1017 Agreeing to implement either one of these plans, on 
a purely military level, therefore, would “entail a drastic revision of our Defence 
Policy”.1018 Critically, although the Defence Secretary advised against any 
“demonstration of weakness in withdrawing in the face of difficulty” and that 
withdrawal “might be impossible to implement”, he did not at any point object to 
withdrawal from Palestine on the basis of its military importance.1019 The strategic 
value perceived only months earlier had simply dissipated. Exemplifying this new 
consensus were the opinions of Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Hugh Dalton. 
Dalton, another professed Zionist sympathiser within the cabinet, wrote to 
Attlee in August 1947:  
“I am quite sure […] that the time has almost come when we must bring our 
troops out of Palestine altogether. The present state of affairs is not only costly 
to us in man-power and money, but is, as you and I agree, of no real value 
from the strategic point of view – you cannot in any case have a secure base 
on top of a wasps’ nest – and riot is exposing our young men, for no good 
purpose, to most abominable experiences, and is breeding anti-Semites at an 
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alarming speed. […] It is high time that either we left the Arabs and Jews to 
have it out in Palestine, or that some other Power or Powers took over the 
responsibility and the cost.”1020  
 
Dalton also raised the issue in cabinet on 20 September. “If an agreed settlement 
could not be reached in Palestine”, he said, “that country was of no strategic value to 
His Majesty’s Government and the maintenance of British forces in it merely led to a 
heavy drain on our financial resources and to the creation of a dangerous spirit of anti-
Semitism”.1021 The decision to withdraw was approved that day, more than two 
months before the UN officially adopted partition. Only one option had remained in 
the choice set in the first stage of decision-making, and due to Palestine’s cost and 
dwindling military/strategic importance, this single alternative also satisficed the key 
substantive dimensions in the second stage of decision-making. 
 
Conclusion 
After submission on 31 August, and months in committee and plenary 
meetings, the partition resolution was finally ready for a vote in the General 
Assembly. It achieved the necessary two-thirds majority on 29 November 1947, 
inaugurating the famous Resolution 181.1022 Five days later, on 4 December, the 
cabinet approved a withdrawal plan drafted jointly by the Foreign and Colonial 
Secretaries, and approved by the Defence Committee.1023 It was presented to 
Parliament on 11 December and received barely a hint of criticism except on the most 
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minute of procedural details.1024 Although in Parliament the arrival of this policy 
seems to have been entirely expected, neither the Jews nor Arabs nor even the 
Americans believed it was real, and their UN representatives had to be informed 
privately in order to be convinced.1025 British forces and administration would only 
stay in Palestine long enough to aid Jews and Arabs through a limited transition 
period, and planned to withdraw fully by 1 August 1948.1026 This was revised later, 
and the last member of the British Administration left Palestine on 15 May 1948.1027 
 Ultimately, the need to satisfy diplomatic requirements with both the United 
States and the Arab states left the Attlee government between two policies – partition 
and independence – that were bitterly opposed on each side. When first assuming 
office in 1945, Bevin even highlighted Britain’s new dual obligation with regards to 
Palestine: “I consider the Palestine question urgent”, he wrote, “and when I return to 
London I propose to examine the whole question, bearing in mind the repercussions 
on the whole Middle East and U.S.A”.1028 The American relationship with Zionism 
and President Truman’s desire to intervene on behalf of displaced persons suffering a 
humanitarian crisis, as well as the need to consider his own domestic political 
situation, meant there could be no repeat of 1939.  
Attlee and Bevin’s problem in dealing with Truman, as well as American 
public opinion moulded by Holocaust newspaper headlines, was that British 
politicians attempted to deal with the tragedy of displaced persons as entirely separate 
from the fate of Palestine, when the tide of global opinion viewed them as one and the 
same – not least due to very effective Zionist campaigning. Attlee expressed this to 
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Truman, explaining, “[w]e are giving deep thought to means of helping the Jews in 
Europe and to the question of Palestine. The two problems are not necessarily the 
same […].”1029 Bevin then attempted to “sell” the plan of provincial autonomy to both 
Zionists and Arabs on the basis that it would be an interim solution, though this was a 
scheme with two diametrically opposed outcomes depending on who constituted the 
Foreign Secretary’s audience. Bevin’s initial search for a long-term settlement 
became a desperate attempt to create almost any short-term agreement, enough to see 
the British government through the whirlwind of post-war crises elsewhere.  
In the first stage of decision-making, therefore, no option proved viable on the 
political dimension until talks stalled and withdrawal entered the choice set 
specifically because negotiations had been exhausted. The poor health of Britain’s 
post-war economy and the doubtful strategic benefit of a warring Palestine then 
allowed this alternative to become the final choice. Attlee later wrote in his memoirs 
that “[i]t was one of those impossible situations for which there is no really good 
solution. One just had to cut the knot.”1030 Hector McNeil, Foreign Office Minister 
and subsequently Vice President of the UN General Assembly, in 1947 summed up 
the legacy such knot-cutting was going to leave for two peoples locked in conflict: 
“We have failed”, he said, “and we must confess our failure. Beyond doubt when the 
historians come to look at our record of administration in Palestine, they will find 
many errors, and I hope that they will learn from those errors.”1031 
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Conclusion 
“It may seem fanciful, at a moment like this, to dream of a day when Jewish and Arab 
leaders may come together […] to frame their own constitution for Palestine as a self-
governing nation within the orbit of the British Commonwealth. But in no other way 
can the problem of Palestine find its ultimate solution […]”1032 
Leopold Amery, Former Colonial Secretary, 1929. 
 
“This conflict was inherent in the situation from the outset. The terms of the Mandate 
tended to confirm it. If the government had adopted a more rigorous and consistent 
policy it might have repressed the conflict for a time, but it could not have resolved 
it.”1033 
Peel Commission Report, 1937. 
 
More than thirty years of British rule in Palestine witnessed a seemingly 
unshakable commitment to Zionism crumble under the weight of varying pressures 
that threatened the political survival of successive prime ministers and cabinets. The 
case studies presented in previous chapters represent four distinct periods of decision-
making, which reflect the only instances when the central government for the British 
Empire became embroiled in a small nationalist conflict in Palestine. Charting these 
British attempts, ostensibly at reconciliation between Jews and Arabs, reveals how the 
distinct leaders’ feelings, biases and passions about Zionism or Arab nationalism, and 
their intents and goals for the tiny territory, were continually shaped and undermined 
by the necessity of maintaining their own political positions. In every case, the 
decision-makers under consideration were confronted with only a single viable option 
or an extremely narrow selection of alternatives. Rather than “choosing” which policy 
to pursue in Palestine, they consistently found themselves cornered into a suboptimal 
decision. This realisation has changed the focus of study entirely, away from 
questioning what the British government hoped to achieve in Palestine, to asking first 
and foremost what ramifications it tried to avoid. 
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As the case studies featured in this thesis are organised chronologically while 
reflecting distinctly themed episodes, they constitute the individual puzzle pieces that 
fit together in order to form a more complete image of British decision-making than 
previous works on the Mandate have achieved. During the Balfour Zeitgeist, when 
Britain committed itself to supporting the creation of a Jewish national home in 
Palestine – following the Balfour Declaration, the draft Mandate and finally the 
Churchill White Paper – there was ample evidence that this policy was fomenting 
violent unrest. Such disturbances had the potential to undermine the strategic value of 
Palestine and were draining financially. Under these circumstances, ending the British 
involvement with the Jewish national home would have been a rational decision, as 
demonstrated by both the Palin and Haycraft Commissions. Instead, the British 
government found itself in a position where either renouncing or wholeheartedly 
supporting the policy of the Balfour Declaration was politically untenable. The calm 
in Palestine that followed the Churchill White Paper in 1922 seemed to vindicate 
Britain’s medium course, but the riots of 1929 threw it into question yet again. 
 The decision-making process associated with reversing the Passfield White 
Paper in 1931 is possibly the most misunderstood element of the Palestine Mandate. 
Rather than a simple equation of Zionist pressure achieving a change in policy, an 
alignment of political interests among Zionists, Liberals and the Conservative Party 
threatened the unity and survival of the Labour government, which eventually had to 
withdraw the policy of limiting Jewish immigration and land purchase in Palestine. 
This episode has received startlingly little scholarly attention, perhaps because the 
myth of an all-powerful Jewish lobby in Interwar Westminster has suited both Israeli 
and Palestinian historical narratives. Such simplification is not useful to 
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understanding decision-making, however, and a more complete analysis of why the 
Passfield White Paper was reversed is a crucial component of this thesis.  
 When Palestine’s tensions remained unsolved in the early 1930s and erupted 
into the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939, the decision-making process became simpler to 
identify. Pending war presented such an obvious risk to the government’s political 
survival that the strategic importance of the Arab leaders outside Palestine’s 
diminutive boundaries in 1939 was readily apparent. The policy of the MacDonald 
White Paper, which called for Palestinian independence, has been labelled a 
“betrayal”, but the previous chapters demonstrated that loyalty to the Zionist cause 
never drove British cabinet decision-making at any stage of the Mandate. Rather than 
the beginning of Realpolitik, this episode was merely a continuation of it.  
 Ultimately, the withdrawal from Palestine represented the same elimination of 
risky options demonstrated in earlier British decision-making. By highlighting the 
primacy of the political dimension, however, it becomes clear that perfectly 
reasonable explanations for Britain’s withdrawal, such as the cost of troops in a 
dwindling post-war economy, played a lesser role than expected. Inconclusive 
diplomacy with the United States, Zionists and the Arab states left the British 
government’s proverbial hands tied. Even before the United Nations General 
Assembly voted for partition, there was no viable alternative except to withdraw.  
Looking at these case studies – from the Churchill White Paper in 1922, to the 
reversal of the Passfield White Paper in 1931, the MacDonald White Paper in 1939 
and, finally, Britain’s decision to withdraw from Palestine in 1947 – it becomes 
possible to identify how every decision made with regard to Palestine was based on an 
assessment of alternatives, with leaders judging their political and substantive 
ramifications. There were changes in British policy during the course of the Mandate, 
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but there was perfect continuity of decision-making processes. Although this seems 
like a logical and expected system of behaviour for any state, this is not the way much 
of British decision-making has been presented in the Palestine literature. Rather than 
an assessment of British intents and goals based on individual politicians’ capricious 
allegiances or aversions to Zionism, Poliheuristic Decision Theory reveals a 
predictable pattern, within case studies of a well-defined type, enriched with a level of 
complexity that reflects real life. 
 
Historical Lessons of the Poliheuristic Perspective 
 Although the focus of this thesis has been on British foreign policy decision-
making towards Palestine through the lens of a poliheuristic perspective, its four case 
studies yield several additional points to consider in terms of a historical intervention. 
As well as the central theme that personal biases had less to do with policy than 
individual career prospects, three further potential conclusions can be raised. The first 
is that Britain’s sponsorship of the Jewish national home, which significantly 
contributed to Israeli statehood in 1948, was to some degree an accident, not least 
because Zionism’s infamous hold on British politicians was tenuous and dependent on 
context. In addition, it is possible to assert that successive British negotiators did 
wholeheartedly try to solve the conflict they had provoked in Palestine but found the 
issue constrained severely by their own domestic politics. This predicament ultimately 
aided the Jewish insurgency’s cause following World War Two, specifically with 
reference to the Holocaust’s impact on international diplomacy. While one popular 
argument attests that international sympathy led to the creation of Israel and there are 
scholarly rebuttals to the contrary, this thesis indicates that due to the rift in Anglo-
American relations that opened specifically over the issue of Palestine, which formed 
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a crucial component of the British decision to withdraw, there was an indirect link 
between six million Jewish deaths and the creation of Israel. 
 First, the British sponsorship of a Jewish national home evolved out of a 
combination of ambition and necessity. The original overtures towards Zionism, as 
discussed in Chapter One, were conducted by Sir Mark Sykes. He believed in national 
self-determination for small ethnic groups, and was searching for a political rather 
than strictly military means to legitimise British invasion and occupation of Palestine. 
After the First World War, this championing of a grand cause helped Prime Minister 
David Lloyd George to secure Britain’s hold on Palestine, which was necessary to 
protect the routes to Egypt and India. The international approval required for this 
arrangement, however, meant that it was nearly impossible for Britain to extract itself 
from the pledge to support a Jewish national home, despite many warnings that this 
was potentially a dangerous commitment. This is where the “accidental” British 
support for Zionism became entrenched and was demonstrated in multiple 
governments’ tacit commitment to the policy throughout the 1920s. 
Although it was frustrated relatively quickly, the Passfield White Paper also 
represented an attempt to roll back the “accidental” policy that was causing unrest 
among Palestine’s majority Arab population.  As detailed in Chapter Four, the effort 
was undermined by the inherent weakness of James Ramsay MacDonald’s minority 
Labour government. Again, the continuation of Britain’s commitment to a Zionist 
enterprise was merely a short-term fix, a policy that lacked real intent. The next 
decision-making episode witnessed yet another retreat from the idea of a Jewish 
national home. The white paper named for Colonial Secretary Malcolm MacDonald 
promised independence to Palestine and demonstrated the British government’s 
collectively unsentimental attitude towards the future of Zionism. Interestingly, the 
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most dedicated British effort to maintain the Jewish national home arguably came 
during the tenure of Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, who relentlessly tried to keep the 
territory and court President Truman’s approval but ultimately helped to engineer 
Britain’s withdrawal.  
From this perspective, the British sponsorship of Zionism over a 30-year 
period, which allowed the Yishuv to develop enough strength in terms of population 
numbers, organisational ability and military training to engage in the first Arab-Israeli 
War in 1948 and establish the State of Israel, might be considered an accident of 
history. Even the raging Jewish insurgency in Palestine and the threat of further Arab 
disturbances that necessitated a final departure could be attributed to the British 
failure in preceding years to “clarify” internally what endured as an undefined and 
often inadvertent British responsibility towards Zionism. Mission creep and the use of 
Palestine as a political football allowed the commitment to continue far longer and 
more deeply than multiple British governments intended.  
On a similar note, the accidental nature of Britain’s commitment to Zionism 
undermines more conspiratorial ideas of Jewish power or, in less controversial terms, 
the influence of Zionist lobbying. A closer look at British decision-making reveals 
that while Dr Weizmann was a well liked, respected and adroit negotiator among 
Britain’s political elite, his influence owed as much to luck and to the virtue of 
representing the right cause at the right time, as to his personal skill in British politics. 
He and other Zionist leaders, however, did have to battle against periodic British 
governments’ attempts at reconciliation between Zionism and developing Arab 
nationalism that would have led to the creation of self-governing institutions in 
Palestine.  
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At first, the logical course of action regarding these animosities would have 
been for Britain to simply abandon the policy of a Jewish national home. This was 
implied in the first commissions chaired by Major-General Palin and Sir Thomas 
Haycraft and suggested by multiple officials, including Winston Churchill, during the 
initial stages of British rule. As it was in the Empire’s best interests to avoid rioting in 
Palestine, the Churchill White Paper of 1922 did represent a concerted effort to 
assuage what were considered to be unfounded fears about the nature of Zionism – 
restricting Jewish immigration in line with economic capacity and assuring the world 
that the aim was not to create a solely Jewish Palestine.  
Then again in 1930, the Passfield White Paper represented an honest if 
somewhat naïve attempt at redressing a perceived imbalance in Palestine, between the 
Jewish community, which seemed to be benefiting largely from British rule, and the 
Arab population that was suffering far more as a result of economic depression. The 
same was true in the negotiations leading to the MacDonald White Paper in 1939 – 
the aim was a quiet Palestine. Although the policy of promising independence, as 
discussed in Chapter Five, was hardly driven by altruistic motives, it still 
demonstrated an attempt at settlement that many British politicians who professed 
Zionist sympathies, including Colonial Secretary MacDonald, hoped would not be 
necessary. Following the Second World War, Ernest Bevin staked his reputation on 
finding a solution to the Jewish-Arab conflict in Palestine and worked tirelessly to 
secure some compromise from both sides. It was only because these negotiations 
repeatedly stalled that Britain’s Mandate for Palestine came to an end.  
While it is very easy, therefore, to dismiss a succession of British politicians’ 
policy decisions as inept, dithering or worsening the conflict, there was also a 
concerted and consistent effort to end and prevent violence. The counterinsurgency 
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methods of the 1930s are today considered unacceptable, brutal and in many cases 
illegal, but the Arab Revolt was a turning point in the British government’s attitudes 
towards Palestinian nationalism. Early British negotiators had really lacked a 
sympathetic understanding of Arab complaints. The rebellion, and later the Jewish 
insurgency, meant that subsequent mediators were forced to recognise both Zionist 
and Arab concerns, but they were simply unable to reconcile what they realised far 
too late was a conflict between nations within one strip of land. It is possible to 
conclude, therefore, that there were some good intentions but an inability or 
unwillingness to understand the situation with unmitigated clarity.  
These efforts at negotiation are relevant to the discussion of one final 
misperception about the Mandate. A common opinion is the idea that international 
sympathy for the Zionist cause, following the Holocaust, led to Israel’s creation. Such 
a simplistic argument is easy to refute,1034 but Chapter Six of this thesis reveals how 
outrage and distress, particularly in the United States following World War Two, 
severely constrained both British counter-insurgency efforts against Zionists in 
Palestine and options for dealing with the crisis diplomatically. The policy of granting 
Palestinian independence, for example, became untenable chiefly because the British 
economy needed American money. At the same time, maintaining the intended 
British presence in Palestine endangered relations with the Arab states and would 
have required a stronger and politically unviable counter-insurgency campaign. While 
it is simplistic, therefore, to draw a direct link between international sympathy and the 
creation of Israel, it did play a vital role in the British decision to withdraw that 
prompted Israel to proclaim statehood. The use of Poliheuristic Decision Theory has 
made this clarification possible, as well as the other small historical points discussed 
                                                 
1034 Evyatar Friesel, “On the Myth of the Connection Between the Holocaust and the Creation of 
Israel”, Israel Affairs 14 (3) 2008: 446-466. 
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above. In addition, the case studies included in this thesis also have a broad impact on 
the framework’s development as a theory of decision-making.  
 
Implications for Poliheuristic Decision Theory 
 Over the course of four case studies, research into the critical junctures in 
British decision-making towards Palestine during the Mandate has raised several key 
issues with regard to the development of Poliheuristic Decision Theory. These relate 
to bureaucratic politics and the impact of personality or leadership styles, the potential 
for inertia following Stage One, the importance of the single option and a possibility 
that politicians may make a faulty assessment of risk. 
First, although Poliheuristic Decision Theory has often neglected the role of 
group behaviour, this thesis has sought to partially remedy this oversight by 
integrating a discussion of bureaucratic politics into the framework as a variable in the 
first stage of decision-making. While literature on the Mandate tends to assume 
bureaucratic politics was a constant force during the time period, this thesis finds that 
it was only an influencing factor in two of the four key junctures of policy-making: 
the Balfour Zeitgeist in the 1920s and the MacDonald Betrayal of the late 1930s. 
Although the bureaucracies of the Foreign and Colonial Offices were always involved 
in the question of Palestine and its day-to-day administration, it was the rivalry 
between various heads of these organisations that mobilised their respective ministries 
and had an impact on decision-making at cabinet level. Without this individual 
competition, the other periods of decision-making covered in this thesis found that 
bureaucratic politics was largely immaterial. Unfortunately, when turf wars did erupt, 
the result was a staggering lethargy or delay in the British government’s ability to act 
on Palestine policy. 
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 In the early 1920s, this dynamic of group decision-making manifested in a 
fierce competition between Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon and Colonial Secretary 
Winston Churchill, which was partly the result of a prior turf war between Curzon and 
David Lloyd George. Palestine had entered the Empire under auspices of Foreign 
Office control before passing to the Colonial Office’s newly constituted Middle East 
Department, but neither institution gained complete control of the Middle East and the 
cabinet secretaries continued to agitate for bureaucratic expansion on the basis that 
splitting responsibility created paralysis. This led to a situation in which the decision-
making atmosphere was prohibitive of decisive change, not least because in a turf war 
it was in both men’s and institutions’ best interests to demonstrate that they could not 
work together. While the costs involved in keeping Palestine part of the British 
Empire were readily apparent, there was, however, no institutional ability to react 
with any alacrity, as a direct result of the personal rivalries of men representing the 
Foreign and Colonial Offices. This level of immobilisation, however, was far less 
severe than the stoppage created by Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and Colonial 
Secretary William Ormsby-Gore in the late 1930s. 
 As highlighted in Chapter Five, the Arab Revolt and the Peel Commission’s 
suggestion of partitioning Palestine created an almost paralysing inertia between the 
two rival institutions in Westminster. It is particularly curious that Ormsby-Gore and 
Eden seemed vitriolic in their attacks against the other’s position on this one issue but 
gave each other support on other subjects such as the Munich Agreement of 1938. 
This implies that the competition between them was indeed a turf war, probably the 
result of splitting governmental responsibility for the Middle East back in the 1920s. 
The bureaucratic conflict ended when both men resigned from the cabinet in 1938, 
and their successors avoided its continuation partially due to the Woodhead 
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Commission’s opinion that partition was impracticable. This investigation was 
deliberately aimed at solving the deadlock within cabinet on this issue. The 
commission extended decision-making processes for over a year, during which 
violence and brutal suppression continued in Palestine.  
Over the 30 years of British rule, therefore, it is possible to assert that 
bureaucratic politics played both a minor role – as it influenced the timings of 
decision-making in only two of four case studies – and that it formed a crucial 
component in periods of apparent British ineptitude and dithering during situations of 
crisis. In these instances, the decision-making process was drawn out to the detriment 
of Palestine’s communities, a delay resulting not from considerations of public safety 
or long-term strategic and financial planning, but rather from the expansionist and 
defensive attitudes of key institutions that was evident in more personal, cabinet-level 
rivalries. This assessment is only made possible by including a description of 
bureaucratic politics in Stage One of Poliheuristic Decision Theory, demonstrating its 
appropriate and necessary integration despite the fact that bureaucratic politics cannot 
explain the elimination of any variable from the choice set on its own. This use of 
bureaucratic politics, however, is complicated slightly by considerations of leadership 
style and personality within the cabinet. 
 Although personality would also fail to provide causal pathways in the 
decision-making processes featured in this thesis, it does seem to have played a 
secondary role in the development of bureaucratic politics that may warrant further 
investigation. During the Balfour Zeitgeist, David Lloyd George was prime minister 
and adopted a presidential style of leadership. He conducted post-war negotiations 
with his French counterpart in relative isolation, cutting the Foreign Office and 
Foreign Secretary Curzon out of the bargain and encroaching far onto his turf. Not 
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only did this result in the kind of secret diplomacy often blamed for starting the First 
World War, but also it must have contributed to Lord Curzon’s defensive posture on 
Palestine when Colonial Secretary Churchill tried to acquire responsibility for the 
entire Middle East. Indeed, Curzon’s personal attachment to the Middle East as a 
region he had visited and explored, and Churchill’s single-minded pursuit of budget 
cuts, may have worsened both men’s inclination towards bureaucratic conflict in the 
first place.  
Paradoxically, Prime Minister Baldwin’s later deliberate avoidance of foreign 
policy fed the turf war between Ormsby-Gore and Eden in the late 1930s. It was only 
Neville Chamberlain’s appointment to the prime ministerial chair and his attempt at 
compromise in the Woodhead Commission that helped to end their particular battle 
over partition. Again, it is not possible to draw causal pathways between these 
personality traits and the outcome of decision-making processes, but idiosyncrasies of 
various prime ministers and their cabinet colleagues may well have made them more 
or less inclined to enter into turf wars. The role of personality and leadership style is 
not a main or even subsidiary focus of this thesis, but it does seem to have been a 
factor that helped to create the atmosphere surrounding decision-making in at least 
two of the case studies presented herein. This is something with which Poliheuristic 
Decision Theory is not entirely equipped to deal, but it can be made part of any 
discussion of bureaucratic politics integrated into Stage One. The result would be 
more descriptive accuracy but not necessarily any greater outcome validity due to the 
lack of causal pathways. One factor that does have an impact on the poliheuristic 
framework’s predictive abilities, however, is situations in which no option satisfies 
requirements on the political dimension. 
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In Poliheuristic Decision Theory, it is assumed that alternatives are eliminated 
from the choice set when they pose too much risk to the decision-maker’s political 
survival. An obvious question, therefore, is what happens when all of the available 
alternatives fail this test and no option passes into the second stage? This situation 
seems to have arisen in two instances during the British Mandate. First, the political 
storm surrounding the Passfield White Paper made it very clear that any attempt to 
limit Jewish immigration and land purchase in Palestine would encounter staunch 
opposition in the House of Commons, and secondly, the diplomatic gridlock between 
representatives of Zionism, the United States and the Arab states following World 
War Two gave Prime Minister Attlee and Foreign Secretary Bevin no avenue to 
pursue. The result in both cases was inertia.  
Although the inability to act following the Passfield White Paper ended with 
the outbreak of the Arab Revolt and a freshly defined political dimension, and the 
post-war deadlock was relieved by a United Nations Special Committee favouring 
partition, these instances reflect an interesting and unexplored element of Ph Theory. 
DeRouen’s study of President Eisenhower’s decision to withhold bombing at Dien 
Bien Phu represents the sole case applying a poliheuristic framework to a decision 
that maintained the status quo.1035 DeRouen, however, demonstrates how 
Eisenhower’s decision not to act was the result of a political risk assessment followed 
by utility maximisation. This is very different to a situation in which the decision-
makers are paralysed by high levels of political risk on every front. What seems to 
happen in these cases is that the risks posed by politically dangerous alternatives, 
those requiring some form of positive action, carry more weight than the objectively 
equal risk of doing nothing.  
                                                 
1035 DeRouen, “The Decision Not to Use Force at Dien Bien Phu”. 
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Mintz proffers the noncompensatory principle as a method to rank dimensions 
– the political always outweighs other considerations – but ranking does not explicitly 
take place within the political dimension itself. In addition, an assumption of the Ph 
approach is that “the presentation of information will affect how this information is 
evaluated and what choices are made. Mintz et al. found that “in an experimental 
setting […] decision makers were more likely to disregard new information due to 
sunk costs.”1036 Practically, however, it is difficult to assert that a “do nothing” option 
necessarily occurs to decision-makers before the urge to “do something”. The natural 
inclination of politicians may be more towards the latter than the former. The 
noncompensatory principle, therefore, needs to be augmented slightly to take into 
account that risk on one variable within the political dimension may be relative to risk 
on another variable within the same organising theme. This means that inertia, or 
delay, may be a bad choice politically, but one that is made tolerable by the excessive 
risk presented by other variables. The only way these periods of inertia in British 
decision-making in the early 1930s and late 1940s were resolved was a change in the 
choice set brought about by events outside British control. This has serious 
implications for Ph Theory’s predictive abilities, especially in competition with the 
extremely reliable outcome validity of rational choice. 
When pursuing post-dictions, it is entirely possible to determine which 
variables on the political dimension represent more or less risk than others, even when 
all alternatives pose too much danger to political survival. This would be very 
difficult to achieve for predictions because foreign policy analysts would probably not 
have access to as many resources as archival researchers and do not possess the 
benefit of hindsight. One solution is to adopt the principle that politicians generally 
                                                 
1036 Mintz, Geva, Redd and Carnes, “The Effect of Dynamic and Static Choice Sets on Political 
Decision Making”, 556. 
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view “doing nothing” as the lesser of multiple evils. This, however, would need to be 
tested in further case studies. Another situation problematic for Ph Theory is the 
existence of a single viable alternative after Stage One, which occurred in three out of 
the four case studies contained in this thesis. 
 Although the Poliheuristic Decision Theory purports to act as a bridge 
between rational choice and cognitive approaches by using both in a two-stage 
decision-making process, the bridging element of the theory is severely undermined 
when there is only a single viable option remaining after Stage One – this is discussed 
in Chapter Two. Mintz skirts the issue by using a satisficing principle, asserting that 
Stage Two is still necessary to ensure that the politically sound option also satisfices 
the key substantive dimensions, and this is the approach taken in this thesis. In three 
case studies, however, it would seem as though the real decision was made using 
Stage One alone. 
 During the Balfour Zeitgeist, for example, political risk eliminated all but one 
alternative, which was to continue with the policy of supporting a Jewish national 
home but with limits to that commitment. The resulting policy document, the 
Churchill White Paper of 1922, did indeed satisfice the vitally important 
military/strategic dimension but would probably have failed to pass through Stage 
One if such a vital component of British foreign policy had been ignored – there 
would have been political ramifications. A similar paradox occurred with the 
MacDonald White Paper in 1939 and the decision to withdraw from Palestine, taken 
in 1947.  
 In terms of how this affects Poliheuristic Decision Theory, the bridging 
element of the theory is undermined, but this anomaly may also contribute to a 
narrower and perhaps more accurate definition of rationality specifically in the 
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context of political decision-making. Ph Theory, by focusing on the political 
dimension, highlights how national leaders’ decision-making processes are different 
to the average human’s. As Foreign Policy Analysis is largely centred upon these 
leaders, the political dimension provides a useful and easily identifiable limit to 
rationality. It is bounded, yes, but critically, it is confined by the logic of political 
survival. This means that Stage One can indeed provide all the theoretical framework 
that is necessary to explain some decisions – those where only one option remains. 
Otherwise, the theory can invoke Stage Two to perform a cost-benefit analysis 
between options. What these case studies reveal, therefore, is that the satisficing 
principle is useful in terms of description, but it is not necessarily crucial to 
explaining or predicting. Conversely, outcome validity is shattered by the possibility 
that politicians can make inaccurate assessments of risk. 
The Poliheuristic Decision Theory assumes that decision-makers at the state 
level will always consider their own political survival before any other dimensions 
such as the economy or strategic planning. This means that politicians must always 
perform an assessment of risk to their political survival at the outset of any decision-
making process. While the case studies in previous chapters tend to confirm this view, 
one case presented a situation that may prove problematic for the predictive function 
of Ph Theory. Chapter Four detailed the decision-making process surrounding the 
passage of the highly controversial Passfield White Paper and its subsequent reversal 
only months later. While the reversal process does seem to have been influenced to a 
great extent by the James Ramsay MacDonald government’s need to maintain 
political survival, it is curious that the white paper received agreement in cabinet in 
the first place. Lord Passfield believed he had secured the acquiescence of Chaim 
Weizmann in announcing a new policy, and framed the document to address the 
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specific concerns of Sir John Hope-Simpson by cutting Jewish immigration and land 
purchase in Palestine. In addition, the Prime Minister was kept informed at every 
stage and, even after the white paper’s provocative publication, Foreign Secretary 
Henderson continued to defend its contents as innocent of the charge that it 
crystallised the Jewish national home.  
These attitudes point to a conclusion that is difficult to marry with 
Poliheuristic Decision Theory – that politicians can make an assessment of risk and 
get it wrong. In terms of a purely historical understanding of foreign policy decision-
making, this is neither a new nor startling assessment. However, if Ph Theory intends 
to replace rational choice as a predictive model – albeit one based on substantial 
available resources rather than strict utility maximisation – then the realisation that 
politicians’ assessment of risk is not necessarily predictable does have an impact on 
its overall outcome validity.  
Just as rational choice can struggle to deal with decisions that maintain the 
status quo, Poliheuristic Decision Theory cannot account for choices in which the key 
decision-makers possess a flawed understanding of the risk to their own political 
survival. Within this thesis, the case study of the Passfield White Paper represents a 
one in four anomaly in the decision-making process. In turn, politicians’ inability to 
assess risk correctly may be linked to other more traditional elements of Foreign 
Policy Analysis such as the role of personality, illness or culture. The only way to 
establish how often this phenomenon occurs, and thereby how frequently Ph Theory 
either loses a degree of external validity or has to become complicated by a larger 
range of cognitive variables, is to perform a greater number of case studies. The same 
is true of the other concerns and points for discussion detailed above. 
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The Last Word 
 This thesis encompasses four distinct case studies of British foreign policy 
decision-making during the Mandate and has yielded several interventions on the 
subject. First and foremost, this research addresses the myth that British policy was 
driven primarily by individual politicians’ biases for or against Zionism or Arab 
nationalism. In addition, the studies clarify some minor points on the Mandate period 
more broadly – concluding that British support for a Jewish national home may 
represent an accident of history; that some British politicians did attempt to solve the 
conflict in Palestine regardless of motive; and finally that the Holocaust did play an 
indirect role in the creation of Israel. In terms of theory development, this thesis also 
contributes new and innovative studies to the third wave of Foreign Policy Analysis. 
Utilisation of Poliheuristic Decision Theory highlights the framework’s potential and 
also the elements that require further attention. Group decision-making, personality 
and factors that undermine external validity are all areas that call for further case 
studies. 
Just as the British Mandate for Palestine constituted a formative stage in the 
Israel-Palestine conflict, Poliheuristic Decision Theory is still in its infancy. By 
developing the theory, it is possible to gain a better understanding of the role played 
by domestic politics in foreign policy-making. This has implications for studying not 
only the British Mandate, but also a multitude of issues that continue to demand 
worldwide attention from state leaders and governments, all with their own political 
dimensions to consider. 
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